In ch47, Harry’s list of conditions for his agreement with Draco is broken: he has forgotten an extremely obvious condition. Namely, that Dumbledore did it deliberately. This doesn’t seem like a very likely oversight for MoR!Harry; I wonder whether it’s deliberate on Eliezer’s part.
I wonder whether it’s deliberate on Eliezer’s part.
I now imagine that it is. Here is my scenario, with so much detail that its probability is extremely small, so that it cannot be a spoiler:
Dumbledore, being cleverer than in canon, discovered the existence of the diary Horcrux. After diligently searching for basilisk venom and researching any other safer means of destroying a Horcrux, he realised that he would have to use Fiendfyre. He broke into Malfoy Manor but found it more difficult than he expected and was badly weakened when he found the diary, so he was unable to overcome additional protective enchantments on the diary itself and remove it. Having good reason to believe that the manor was empty, however, he used Fiendfyre right there and then used his last strength to escape. As it turns out, Narcissa was home, and her valiant efforts saved the manor from destruction but cost her her own life.
Later, Dumbledore spoke to Lucius to apologise. While he did not dare to explain why he had started Fiendfyre in the Malfoys’ home, he told Lucius that he never intended to kill anybody and only reluctantly cast the spell that would have destroyed the house. He also told Lucius that, while he could not give details, the act was only necessary because the Malfoys were still working for Voldemort, and he warned Lucius to rid himself of anything to do with Voldemort to avoid any future accidents.
When Harry discovers these facts, he will realise his omission and beg Draco to trigger the first condition. Drama ensues.
On second thought, the character of the Dumbledore above is more like in canon than in MoR. Under the circumstances, Dumbledore would probably start the Fiendfyre even if he knew that Narcissa might be killed. This is another missing exception: if the act that killed Narcissa, despite her having no dirty hands, saved more lives than it took. (Whether or not that applies in this case, it would certainly be Dumbledore’s defence, and Harry might buy it, given enough evidence.)
This is another missing exception: if the act that killed Narcissa, despite her having no dirty hands, saved more lives than it took. (Whether or not that applies in this case, it would certainly be Dumbledore’s defence, and Harry might buy it, given enough evidence.)
It seems likely that he would give it at least some weight. The justification reasoning even crossed his mind when considering the possibility that Dumbledore set Voldemort on him and his parents.
For Harry, is morality about intentions or consequences? Maybe he doesn’t care whether Dumbledore did it deliberately; if anybody is so careless as to do such a thing accidentally, then they’re an enemy.
For Harry, is morality about intentions or consequences? Maybe he doesn’t care whether Dumbledore did it deliberately; if anybody is so careless as to do such a thing accidentally, then they’re an enemy.
It’s hard to tell. Harry’s morality seems to be somewhat ad-hoc in nature. For example, he declares that sometimes killing is necessary but torture can never be, which rules out being purely consequentialist but is hardly typical of deontological ethical frameworks either (but fairly normal for standard human thinking).
Even so it would surprise me if Harry didn’t distinguish at least partially on intent. Completely not caring about intent, well, just “doesn’t seem like his style”. I observe, for example, that Harry judges Dumbledore for sharing gossip to Severus with the intent of setting Voldemort after Harry’s family. When looking at raw causal interactions there are no doubt countless trivial actions that have the consequence of really bad things happening. Yet Harry singles Dumbledore’s (alleged) conniving out purely based on the fact that he intended it to lead to particular a chain of events.
he declares that sometimes killing is necessary but torture can never be, which rules out being purely consequentialist
If you don’t take that statement to have the force of logic behind it, there’s no conflict with consequentialism. It could be that Harry believes that there is no benefit to come from torture, while there are obvious benefits to come from removing a dangerous person from the world.
It could be that Harry believes that there is no benefit to come from torture, while there are obvious benefits to come from removing a dangerous person from the world.
I gave Harry the benefit of the doubt on that one by inferring that he is slightly idealistic rather than blatantly stupid. ie. A general ethical ruling against torture is reasonable while believing that there are no possible instances in which torture could provide net consequentialist benefits would be insane even for Harry.
While this is certainly true, human biases mean that those with the power to torture will self-justify its use far more than is optimal. When promulgating a rule for when torture is acceptable, “never” really does seem the best choice.
Yeah, “Promoting less than maximally accurate beliefs is an act of sabotage. Don’t do it to anyone unless you’d also slash their tires.”. I think slashing the tires of torturers is more than justified.
Yeah, “Promoting less than maximally accurate beliefs is an act of sabotage. Don’t do it to anyone unless you’d also slash their tires.”. I think slashing the tires of torturers is more than justified.
Cute, but you’re actually slashing the metaphorical tires of the non-torturers while the torturer’s tires are (evidently) slash resistant.
In ch47, Harry’s list of conditions for his agreement with Draco is broken: he has forgotten an extremely obvious condition. Namely, that Dumbledore did it deliberately. This doesn’t seem like a very likely oversight for MoR!Harry; I wonder whether it’s deliberate on Eliezer’s part.
I now imagine that it is. Here is my scenario, with so much detail that its probability is extremely small, so that it cannot be a spoiler:
Dumbledore, being cleverer than in canon, discovered the existence of the diary Horcrux. After diligently searching for basilisk venom and researching any other safer means of destroying a Horcrux, he realised that he would have to use Fiendfyre. He broke into Malfoy Manor but found it more difficult than he expected and was badly weakened when he found the diary, so he was unable to overcome additional protective enchantments on the diary itself and remove it. Having good reason to believe that the manor was empty, however, he used Fiendfyre right there and then used his last strength to escape. As it turns out, Narcissa was home, and her valiant efforts saved the manor from destruction but cost her her own life.
Later, Dumbledore spoke to Lucius to apologise. While he did not dare to explain why he had started Fiendfyre in the Malfoys’ home, he told Lucius that he never intended to kill anybody and only reluctantly cast the spell that would have destroyed the house. He also told Lucius that, while he could not give details, the act was only necessary because the Malfoys were still working for Voldemort, and he warned Lucius to rid himself of anything to do with Voldemort to avoid any future accidents.
When Harry discovers these facts, he will realise his omission and beg Draco to trigger the first condition. Drama ensues.
On second thought, the character of the Dumbledore above is more like in canon than in MoR. Under the circumstances, Dumbledore would probably start the Fiendfyre even if he knew that Narcissa might be killed. This is another missing exception: if the act that killed Narcissa, despite her having no dirty hands, saved more lives than it took. (Whether or not that applies in this case, it would certainly be Dumbledore’s defence, and Harry might buy it, given enough evidence.)
It would be very interesting to watch Harry try and convince a very smart and angry Draco to let him out of his promise, in such a situation.
It seems likely that he would give it at least some weight. The justification reasoning even crossed his mind when considering the possibility that Dumbledore set Voldemort on him and his parents.
Wow, I hadn’t even thought of fiendfyre and the diary. Awesome hypothesis.
Thanks!
For Harry, is morality about intentions or consequences? Maybe he doesn’t care whether Dumbledore did it deliberately; if anybody is so careless as to do such a thing accidentally, then they’re an enemy.
It’s hard to tell. Harry’s morality seems to be somewhat ad-hoc in nature. For example, he declares that sometimes killing is necessary but torture can never be, which rules out being purely consequentialist but is hardly typical of deontological ethical frameworks either (but fairly normal for standard human thinking).
Even so it would surprise me if Harry didn’t distinguish at least partially on intent. Completely not caring about intent, well, just “doesn’t seem like his style”. I observe, for example, that Harry judges Dumbledore for sharing gossip to Severus with the intent of setting Voldemort after Harry’s family. When looking at raw causal interactions there are no doubt countless trivial actions that have the consequence of really bad things happening. Yet Harry singles Dumbledore’s (alleged) conniving out purely based on the fact that he intended it to lead to particular a chain of events.
If you don’t take that statement to have the force of logic behind it, there’s no conflict with consequentialism. It could be that Harry believes that there is no benefit to come from torture, while there are obvious benefits to come from removing a dangerous person from the world.
I gave Harry the benefit of the doubt on that one by inferring that he is slightly idealistic rather than blatantly stupid. ie. A general ethical ruling against torture is reasonable while believing that there are no possible instances in which torture could provide net consequentialist benefits would be insane even for Harry.
Possible Mindkilling Warning.
While this is certainly true, human biases mean that those with the power to torture will self-justify its use far more than is optimal. When promulgating a rule for when torture is acceptable, “never” really does seem the best choice.
Yeah, “Promoting less than maximally accurate beliefs is an act of sabotage. Don’t do it to anyone unless you’d also slash their tires.”. I think slashing the tires of torturers is more than justified.
Cute, but you’re actually slashing the metaphorical tires of the non-torturers while the torturer’s tires are (evidently) slash resistant.
That is an important omission—I’m not sure what Harry should do under those circumstances.