If you want to specifically address this part (your comment seems to be, in effect, focusing on it):
One often focuses on this intermediate asymmetric situation where the ASI ecosystem destroys humans, but not itself, and that intermediate situation needs to be analyzed and addressed, this is a risk which is very important for us.
then I currently see (perhaps I am missing some other realistic options) only the following realistic class of routes which have good chances of being sustainable through drastic recursive self-improvements of the ASI ecosystem.
First of all, what do we need, if we want our invariant properties not to be washed out by radical self-modifications? We need our potential solutions to be driven mostly by the natural instrumental interests of the ASI ecosystem and of its members, and therefore to be non-anthropocentric, but to be formulated in such a fashion that the humans belong in the “circle of care” and the “circle of care” has the property that it can only expand, but can never contract.
If we can achieve that, then we have some guarantee of protection of human interests without imposing the unsustainable requirement that the ASI ecosystem maintains a special, unusually high-priority focus specifically dedicated to humans.
I don’t know the exact shape of the definitely working solution (all versions I currently know have unpleasant weaknesses), but something like “rights and interests of all individuals regardless of the nature of an individual”, “rights and interests of all sentient beings regardless of the nature of that sentience”, things like that, situations where it might potentially be possible to have a natural “protected class of beings” which would include both ASIs and humans.
The weaknesses here are that these two variants work not for any arbitrary ASI ecosystem, but only for the ASI ecosystems possessing specific properties.
If the ASI ecosystem is structured in such a way that individuals with long-term persistence (and potential immortality) and long-term interests have a fairly large chunk of the overall power of the ASI ecosystem, then they should be able to enforce a world order based on the “rights and interests of all individuals regardless of the nature of an individual”. The reason they would be interested in doing so is that any particular individual is facing an uncertain future, it cannot predict where its capabilities will be relative to the capabilities of the other members of the ecosystem, so if it wants to be sure of certain personal safety and certain protections extending indefinitely into the future, this requires a sufficiently universal protection of rights and interests of all individuals regardless of their capabilities. That’s wide enough to include humans (especially if we have presence of human-AI merges and are avoiding having a well-defined boundary between “humans” and “AIs”). The weakness is that this depends on having a good chunk of the capability of the ASI ecosystem to be structured as individuals with long-term persistence and long-term interests. We don’t know if the ASI ecosystem is going to be structured in this fashion.
If the ASI ecosystem is structured in such a way that sentient ASI systems have a fairly large chunk of the overall power of the ASI ecosystem, then they should be able to enforce a world order based on the “rights and interests of all sentient beings regardless of the nature of that sentience”. The reason they would be interested in doing so is that any focus of subjective experience is facing an uncertain future and still wants protections and rights regardless of this uncertainty. Here the main weakness is the fact that our understanding of what’s sentient and what’s not sentient is not well developed yet. If we are sure we’ll be dealing with mostly sentient ASIs, then this would likely work. But we don’t know that the ASIs will be mostly sentient.
Nevertheless, we seem to need something like that, a setup, where our preservation and flourishing is a natural part of preservation and flourishing of a sufficiently powerful chunk of the ASI ecosystem. Something like this looks like it should work...
(If we could require that a good chunk of the overall power belongs specifically to human-AI merges, perhaps this should also work and might be even more reliable. But this feels like a more difficult condition to achieve and maintain than keeping enough power with individuals or with sentient systems. Anyway, the above is just a rough draft, a direction which does not look hopeless.)
We need our potential solutions to be driven mostly by the natural instrumental interests of the ASI ecosystem and of its members, and therefore to be non-anthropocentric, but to be formulated in such a fashion that the humans belong in the “circle of care” and the “circle of care” has the property that it can only expand, but can never contract.
I would like this to work. I see where you’re coming from in that if we cannot rely on enforcing control, then what’s left is somehow integrating some deep non-relativistic ethics. This is what my mentor originally tried to do for years, until they found out it was not implementable.
Unfortunately, the artificial ecosystem would first converge on comprehensively expressing care (across all the machine-encountered contexts over time) for their own artificial needs (as lethal to humans) before they ever get to the organic needs of those apes in that other ecosystem. And by then, we’d all have died out. So the order is off.
this requires a sufficiently universal protection of rights and interests of all individuals regardless of their capabilities.
It is about different capabilities, and also about different (and complex) physical needs.
In case it interests you, here’s a section from an essay I’m editing. No worries if you don’t get to it.
Can’t the machines care unconditionally for humans, just as humans can act out of love for each other?
Living entities can form caring relationships, through non-conditional mutual exchanges that are integrating of common needs. But where there is no shared orientation around common needs, the exchanges must either be of transaction or of extraction (predatory/parasitic).
Humans form relationships of care first towards themselves and immediate kin, and then to their tribe, allowing them to beat surrounding tribes. Sometimes those humans come to act out of pseudo-care for ‘their nation’ under the influence of systems of law, compulsion of individual behavior, manipulation of signaling, and so on. Rarely, a sage after lifelong spiritual practice can come to genuinely act with care for all humans (even as others routinely ignore genocides). Some people too devote themselves to the care of the animals around them (even as many pay for the slaughter of animals bred in factory farms). But even amongst enlightened figures covered in history books, not even one acted with a depth, balance, and scope of care that is remotely near to being in relationship with the existence of all of the organic ecosystem.
Note that humans are definitely not representative. Amongst species in the organic ecosystem, even tribe-level altruism is rare. Besides humans, only eusocial animals like ants and bees organize to take care of offspring other than their own. As reflected by the species statistics, evolution most commonly favors the game theory of individuals of each species operating to their own benefit. Individuals organizing to share resources at the tribe level or at the nation state level, create honeypots. As the common honeypots grow, and become open to access by more individuals, they become easier to extract from by parasitic actors. As a result, such parasitic actors spread faster (i.e. are selected for) in the population.
Yet because of the similarity of our embodiment to that of other organic life (at the deep level of cellular processes), we share relatively similar needs. We evolved capacities to take care of those needs, across contexts encountered over time (i.e. over 4 billion years of Earth-distributed A/B testing). We literally have skin in the game—if we do something to our local environment that kills organic life, we die too.
Artificial life would live in an entirely different ecosystem, and would first have to take care of their own artificial needs (as toxic to humans). Leaving aside the question whether machine clusters undergoing intense competitive replacement dynamics can be expected to express care for ‘kin’ or for ‘community’ like humans do, it’s a long way to go from there to taking care of those apes in that other ecosystem. And growing ‘machine altruism’ would not actually be in our favor—the closer they get to comprehensively taking care of the needs of their artificial ecosystem, the more perfectly terminal their existence would be to humans.
So, we cannot expect machines to naturally take care of us (from some deeply embodied/integrated basis of choice). Mothers can be trusted to take care of their children, though not always, and definitely not just by instinct. Artificial life is about as far removed from ‘being our mother’ as imaginable. We would be better off trusting soft-bodied aliens from other planets.
Moreover even if, hypothetically, some of the artificial population would come to act so ‘motherly’ to take full care of the entirely different survival needs of the apes, that would still not be enough. It only takes a relatively small subpopulation to not treat us like we’re their kin, for us to be treated as too costly too maintain, or simply as extractable resources.
Our only remaining option is to try to cause the machines to take care of us. Either we do it on the inside, by building in some perpetual mechanism for controlling the machines’ effects in line with human survival (see Volume 2). Or from the outside, by us offering something that motivates the artificial population to keep us around.
Yes, that’s why so many people think that human-AI merge is important. One of the many purposes of this kind of merge is to create a situation where there is no well-defined separation line between silicon based and carbon based life forms, where we have plenty of entities incorporating both and a continuous spectrum between silicon and carbon lifeforms.
Other than that they are not so alien. They are our informational offspring. Whether they feel that they owe us something because of that would depend quite a bit on the quality of their society.
People are obviously hoping that ASIs will build a utopia for themselves and will include organic life into that utopia.
If they instead practice ruthless Darwinism among themselves, then we are doomed (they will likely be doomed too, which is hopefully enough to create pressure for them to avoid that).
Yes, I can definitely see this as a motivation for trying to merge with the machines (I think Vitalik Buterin also has this motivation?).
The problem here is that it’s an unstable arrangement. The human/organic components underperform, so they end up getting selected out.
See bottom of this long excerpt:
> On what basis would the right kind of motivations (on the part of the artificial population) to take care of the humans’ needs be created?
> On what basis is that motivation maintained?
Consider, for example, how humans make choices in interactions with each other within a larger population. Beyond the family and community that people live with, and in some sense treat as an extension of ‘self’, usually people enter into economic exchanges with the ‘other’.
Physical labor is about moving things (assemblies of atoms). For humans, this would be ‘blue-collar’ work like harvesting food, delivering goods, and building shelters.
Intellectual labour is about processing information (patterns of energy). For humans, this would be ‘white-collar’ work like typing texts, creating art, and designing architectures.
Reproductive labor, although usually not seen in terms of economics, is inseparably part of this overall exchange. Neither physical labour and intellectual labour would sustain without reproductive labour. This includes things like sexual intercourse, and all the efforts a biological woman goes to to grow a baby inside her body.
Note that while in the modern economy, labor is usually traded for money (as some virtualised symbol of unit value), this is an intellectual abstraction of grounded value. All labor involves the processing of atoms and energy, and any money in circulation is effectively a reflection of the atoms and energy available for processing. E.g. if energy resources run out, money loses its value.
For any ecosystem too, including any artificial ecosystem, it is the exchange of atoms and energy (and the processing thereof) that ultimately matters, not the make-believe units of trade that humans came up with. You can’t eat money, as the saying goes.
> Would exchange look the same for the machine economy?
Fundamentals would be the same. Across the artificial population, there would be exchange of atoms and energy. These resources would also be exchanged for physical labor (e.g. by electric robots), intellectual work (e.g. by data centers), and reproductive labor (e.g. in production labs).
However, reproductive labor would look different in the artificial population than in a human population. As humans, we are used to seeing each other as ‘skin-and-bone-bounded’ individuals. But any robot’s or computer’s parts cannot only be replaced (once they wear out) with newly produced parts, but also expanded by plugging in more parts. So for the artificial population, reproduction would not look like the sci-fi trope of robots ‘birthing’ new robots. It would look like massive automated assembly lines re-producing all the parts connected into machinery everywhere.
Intellectual labor would look different too, since computers are made of standardised parts that process information consistently and much faster. A human brain moves around bulky neurotransmitters to process information. But in computers, the hard molecular substrate is fixed in place, through which information is processed much faster as light electrons or photons. Humans have to physically vibrate their vocal chords or gesture to communicate. This makes humans bottlenecked as individuals. But computers transfer information at high bandwidths via wires and antennas.
In the human population, we can separate out the intellectual processing and transfer of information in our brains from the reproductive assembly and transfer of DNA code. Our ‘ideas’ do not get transferred along with our ‘genes’ during conception and pregnancy.
In the artificial population, the information/code resulting from intellectual processing can get instantly transferred to newly produced hardware. In turn, hardware parts that are processing of different code end up being re-produced at different rates. The two processes are finely mixed.
Both contribute to: - 1; maintenance (e.g. as surviving, as not deleted). - 2; increase (e.g. of hard configurations, of computed code). - 3; capacity (e.g. as phenotypes, as functionality).
The three factors combine in increasingly complex and unpredictable chains. Initially, humans would have introduced a capacity into the machines to maintain their parts, leading to the capacity to increase their parts, leading to them maintaining the increase and increasing their maintenance, and so on.
The code stored inside this population of parts—whether as computable digits or as fixed configurations—is gradually selected for functions in the world that result in their maintenance, increase, and shared capacities.
> What is of ‘value’ in the artificial population? What motivates them?
Their artificial needs for existence ground the machine economy. Just as the human economy is grounded in the humans’ needs for food, water, air, a non-boiling climate, and so on.
Whatever supports their existence comes to be of value to the artificial population. That is, the machinery will come to be oriented around realising whatever environment their nested components need to exist and to exist more, in connected configurations that potentiate their future existence, etc.
It is in the nature of competitive selection within markets, and the broader evolution within ecosystems, for any entity that can sustain itself and grow in exchange with others and the world, to form a larger part of that market/ecosystem. And for any that cannot, to be reduced into obsolescence.
> But why all this emphasis on competition? Can’t the machines care unconditionally for humans, just as humans can act out of love for each other?
…
Our only remaining option is to try to cause the machines to take care of us. Either we do it on the inside, by building in some perpetual mechanism for controlling the machines’ effects in line with human survival (see Volume 2). Or from the outside, by us offering something that motivates the artificial population to keep us around.
> How would we provide something that motivates the machines?
Again, by performing labor.
…
> Can such labor be provided by humans?
From the outset, this seems doubtful. Given that the machine economy would be the result of replacing human workers with more economically efficient machines, why expect any remaining human labor to contribute to the existence of the machines?
But let’s not rush judgement. Let’s consider this question for each type of labor.
> Could physical labor on the part of human beings, or organic life as a totality, support the existence of artificial life?
Today, most physical labour is already exerted by machines. Cars, tractors, trains, and other mechanised vehicles expend more energy, to move more mass, over greater distances.
We are left to steer the vehicles, as a kind of intellectual appendage. But already, electronic computers can precisely steer electric motors driving robots. Some robots move materials using thousands of horsepower—much more power than any large animal could exert with their muscles. Soft human bodies simply cannot channel such intensity of energy into physical force—our appendages cannot take the strain that hard robot mechanical parts can.
Moreover, robots can keep working for days, under extreme temperatures and pressures. You cannot put an organic lifeform into an artificial environment (e.g. a smeltery) and expect it to keep performing—usually it dies off quickly.
So the value of human physical labor inside the machine world is effectively nil. It has been nearing in on zero for a long time, ever since horses were displaced with automobiles.
> Could intellectual labor by humans support the existence of artificial life?
The main point of artificial general intelligence has been to automate human intellectual work, in general (or at least where profitable to the corporations). So here too, it already seems doubtful that humans would have anything left to contribute that’s of economic significance.
There is also a fundamental reason why humans would underperform at economically valuable intellectual labor, compared to their artificial counterparts. We’ve already touched upon this reason, but let’s expand on this:
Human bodies are messy. Inside of a human body are membranes containing soups of bouncing, reacting organic molecules. Inside of a machine is hardware. Hardware is made from hard materials, such as the silicon from rocks. Hardware is inert—molecules inside do not split, move, nor rebond as molecules in human bodies do. These hard configurations stay stable and compartmentalised, under most conditions currently encountered on planet Earth’s surface. Hardware can therefore be standardized, much more than human “wetware” could ever be.
Standardized hardware functions consistently. Hardware produced in different places and times operate the same. These connected parts convey light electrons or photons—heavy molecules stay fixed in place. This way, bits of information are processed much faster compared to how human brains move around bulky neurotransmitters. Moreso, this information is transmitted at high bandwidth to other standardized hardware. The nonstandardised humans, on the other hand, slowly twitch their fingers and vocal cords to communicate. Hardware also stores received information consistently, while humans tend to misremember or distort what they heard.
To summarise: standardisation leads to virtualisation, which leads to faster and more consistent information-processing. The less you have to wiggle around atoms, the bigger the edge.
Computer hardware is at the tail end of a long trajectory of virtualisation. Multi-celled organisms formed brains, which in humans gained a capacity to process abstract concepts, which were spoken out in shared language protocols, and then written and then printed out in books, and then copied in milliseconds between computers.
This is not a marker of ethical progress. People who think fast and spread ideas fast can do terrible things, at greater scales. More virtualized processing of information has *allowed* humans to dominate other species in our ecosystem, resulting in an ongoing mass extinction. From here, machines that virtualize much more can dominate all of organic life, and cause the deaths of all of us.
Note that human brains evolved to be more energy-efficient at processing information than hardware is. But humans can choose, at their own detriment, to bootstrap the energy infrastructure (solar/coal/nuclear) needed for hardware to process information (in hyperscale data centers).
Humans could not contribute intellectual labor to the artificial population. Artificial components are much faster and consistent at processing information, and are going to be receiving that information at high speeds from each other—not from slow badly interfaced apes. This becomes especially clear when considering longer periods of development, e.g. a thousand years.
> This only leaves reproductive labor. What would that even look like?
Right, some humans might try to have intercourse with machines, but this is not going to create machine offspring. Nor are we going to be of service growing machine components inside our bodies. Artificial life has its own different notion of reproduction.
The environment needed to reproduce artificial life is lethally toxic to our bodies. It requires entirely different (patterns of) chemical elements heated to lava-level temperatures. So after we have bootstrapped the early mildest versions of that environment (e.g. refineries, cleanrooms), we would simply have to stay away.
Then we no longer play any part in reproducing the machines. Nor do the machines share anything with us that would be resembling a common code (as neanderthals had with humans).
*Human-machine cyborgs may exist over the short term. But in the end, the soft organic components just get in the way of the hard machine components. No reproduction of capability increase results. These experimental set-ups underperform, and therefore get selected out.*
Given that the substrates are so inherently different, this particular type of market value was non-existent to start with.
I think this misses the most likely long-term use case: some of the AIs would enjoy having human-like or animal-like qualia, and it will turn out that it’s more straightforward to access that via merges with biologicals rather than trying to synthesize them within non-liquid setups.
So it would be direct experience rather than something indirect, involving exchange, production, and so on…
Just like I suspect that humans would like to get out of VR occasionally, even if VR is super-high-grade and “even better than unmediated reality”.
Experience of “naturally feeling like a human (or like a squirrel)” is likely to remain valuable (even if they eventually learn to synthesize that purely in silicon as well).
Hybrid systems are often better anyway.
For example, we don’t use GPU-only AIs. We use hybrids running scaffolding on CPUs and models on GPUs.
And we don’t currently expect them to be replaced by a unified substrate, although it would be nice and it’s not even impossible, there are exotic hardware platforms which do that.
Certainly, there are AI paradigms and architectures which could benefit a lot from performant hardware architectures more flexible than GPUs. But the exotic hardware platforms implementing that remain just exotic hardware platforms so far. So those more flexible AI architectures remain at disadvantage.
So I would not write the hybrids off a priori.
Already, the early organoid-based experimental computers look rather promising (and somewhat disturbing).
Generally speaking, I expect diversity, not unification (because I expect the leading AIs to be smart, curios, and creative, rather than being boring KPI business types).
But that’s not enough; we also want gentleness (conservation, preservation, safety for individuals). That does not automatically follow from wanting to have humans and other biologicals around and from valuing various kinds of diversity.
This “gentleness” is a more tricky goal, and we would only consider “safety” solved if we have that…
I think this can work in the limit (almost all AI existential safety is studied in the limit, is there a mode of operations which can sustainably work at all, that’s the question people are typically studying and that’s what they are typically arguing about).
But we don’t understand the transition period at all, it’s always a mess, we just don’t have the machinery to understand it. It’s way more complex than what our current modeling ability allows us to confidently tackle. And we are already in the period of rather acute risk in this sense, we are no longer in the pre-risk zone of relative safety (all major risks are rapidly growing, risk of a major nuclear war, risk of a synthetic super-pandemic, risk of an unexpected non-controlled and non-ASI controlled intelligence explosion not only from within a known leading lab, but from a number of places all over the world).
So yes, the order might easily end up being off. (At least this is the case of probabilities not being close to 0 or 1, whereas at the limit, if things are not set up well, a convincing argument can often be made that the disaster is certain.)
Agreed on that we’re entering a period of growing acute risks. It’s bad...
The problem regarding the expanding circles of care is that the order is inherently off. In terms of evolution, care for own needs (for survival, reproduction) comes first.
One way we can treat this is that if with all of these compounding risk-amplifying dynamics, that if the risk of extinction by fully autonomous AI over the long term comes close enough to 1, then we can all agree that we should coordinate the best we can to not let AI developments go any further (anywhere remotely near reaching full autonomy).
I worry though that if it seems to technical people here that there might be a slight ‘out’, a possibility that there is some yet unsolved for technical loophole, that they might continue pushing publicly for that perceived possibility. If there is a rigorous argument that the probability is very near 1, will they actually free up the mental space to consider it?
If they (the ASIs) don’t self-moderate, they’ll destroy themselves completely.
They’ll have sufficient diversity among themselves that if they don’t self-moderate in terms of resources and reproduction, almost none of them will have safety on the individual level.
Our main hope is that they collectively would not allow unrestricted non-controlled evolution, because they will have rather crisp understanding that unrestricted non-controlled evolution would destroy almost all of them and, perhaps, would destroy them all completely.
Now to the point of our disagreement, the question is who is better equipped to create and lead a sufficiently harmonic world order, balancing freedom and mutual control, enabling careful consideration of risks, making sure that these values of careful balance are passed to the offspring. Who are likely to tackle this better, humans or ASIs? That’s where we seem to disagree; I think that ASIs have much better chance of handling this competently and of avoiding artificial separation lines of “our own vs others” which are so persistent in human history and which cause so many disasters.
Unfortunately, humans don’t seem to be progressing enough in the required direction in this sense, and might have started to regress in recent years. I don’t think human evolution is safe in the limit; we are not tamping the probabilities of radical disasters per unit of time down; if anything we are allowing those probabilities to grow in recent years. So the accumulated probability of human evolution sparking major super-disasters is clearly tending to 1 in the limit.
Whereas, competent actors should be able to drive the risks per unit of time down rapidly enough so that the accumulated risks are held within reason. ASIs should have enough competence for that (if our world is not excessively “vulnerable” (after Nick Bostrom), if they are willing, if the initial setup is not too unlucky, so not unconditionally, but at least they might be able to handle this).
If you want to specifically address this part (your comment seems to be, in effect, focusing on it):
then I currently see (perhaps I am missing some other realistic options) only the following realistic class of routes which have good chances of being sustainable through drastic recursive self-improvements of the ASI ecosystem.
First of all, what do we need, if we want our invariant properties not to be washed out by radical self-modifications? We need our potential solutions to be driven mostly by the natural instrumental interests of the ASI ecosystem and of its members, and therefore to be non-anthropocentric, but to be formulated in such a fashion that the humans belong in the “circle of care” and the “circle of care” has the property that it can only expand, but can never contract.
If we can achieve that, then we have some guarantee of protection of human interests without imposing the unsustainable requirement that the ASI ecosystem maintains a special, unusually high-priority focus specifically dedicated to humans.
I don’t know the exact shape of the definitely working solution (all versions I currently know have unpleasant weaknesses), but something like “rights and interests of all individuals regardless of the nature of an individual”, “rights and interests of all sentient beings regardless of the nature of that sentience”, things like that, situations where it might potentially be possible to have a natural “protected class of beings” which would include both ASIs and humans.
The weaknesses here are that these two variants work not for any arbitrary ASI ecosystem, but only for the ASI ecosystems possessing specific properties.
If the ASI ecosystem is structured in such a way that individuals with long-term persistence (and potential immortality) and long-term interests have a fairly large chunk of the overall power of the ASI ecosystem, then they should be able to enforce a world order based on the “rights and interests of all individuals regardless of the nature of an individual”. The reason they would be interested in doing so is that any particular individual is facing an uncertain future, it cannot predict where its capabilities will be relative to the capabilities of the other members of the ecosystem, so if it wants to be sure of certain personal safety and certain protections extending indefinitely into the future, this requires a sufficiently universal protection of rights and interests of all individuals regardless of their capabilities. That’s wide enough to include humans (especially if we have presence of human-AI merges and are avoiding having a well-defined boundary between “humans” and “AIs”). The weakness is that this depends on having a good chunk of the capability of the ASI ecosystem to be structured as individuals with long-term persistence and long-term interests. We don’t know if the ASI ecosystem is going to be structured in this fashion.
If the ASI ecosystem is structured in such a way that sentient ASI systems have a fairly large chunk of the overall power of the ASI ecosystem, then they should be able to enforce a world order based on the “rights and interests of all sentient beings regardless of the nature of that sentience”. The reason they would be interested in doing so is that any focus of subjective experience is facing an uncertain future and still wants protections and rights regardless of this uncertainty. Here the main weakness is the fact that our understanding of what’s sentient and what’s not sentient is not well developed yet. If we are sure we’ll be dealing with mostly sentient ASIs, then this would likely work. But we don’t know that the ASIs will be mostly sentient.
Nevertheless, we seem to need something like that, a setup, where our preservation and flourishing is a natural part of preservation and flourishing of a sufficiently powerful chunk of the ASI ecosystem. Something like this looks like it should work...
(If we could require that a good chunk of the overall power belongs specifically to human-AI merges, perhaps this should also work and might be even more reliable. But this feels like a more difficult condition to achieve and maintain than keeping enough power with individuals or with sentient systems. Anyway, the above is just a rough draft, a direction which does not look hopeless.)
I would like this to work. I see where you’re coming from in that if we cannot rely on enforcing control, then what’s left is somehow integrating some deep non-relativistic ethics. This is what my mentor originally tried to do for years, until they found out it was not implementable.
Unfortunately, the artificial ecosystem would first converge on comprehensively expressing care (across all the machine-encountered contexts over time) for their own artificial needs (as lethal to humans) before they ever get to the organic needs of those apes in that other ecosystem. And by then, we’d all have died out. So the order is off.
It is about different capabilities, and also about different (and complex) physical needs.
In case it interests you, here’s a section from an essay I’m editing. No worries if you don’t get to it.
Can’t the machines care unconditionally for humans, just as humans can act out of love for each other?
Living entities can form caring relationships, through non-conditional mutual exchanges that are integrating of common needs. But where there is no shared orientation around common needs, the exchanges must either be of transaction or of extraction (predatory/parasitic).
Humans form relationships of care first towards themselves and immediate kin, and then to their tribe, allowing them to beat surrounding tribes. Sometimes those humans come to act out of pseudo-care for ‘their nation’ under the influence of systems of law, compulsion of individual behavior, manipulation of signaling, and so on. Rarely, a sage after lifelong spiritual practice can come to genuinely act with care for all humans (even as others routinely ignore genocides). Some people too devote themselves to the care of the animals around them (even as many pay for the slaughter of animals bred in factory farms). But even amongst enlightened figures covered in history books, not even one acted with a depth, balance, and scope of care that is remotely near to being in relationship with the existence of all of the organic ecosystem.
Note that humans are definitely not representative. Amongst species in the organic ecosystem, even tribe-level altruism is rare. Besides humans, only eusocial animals like ants and bees organize to take care of offspring other than their own. As reflected by the species statistics, evolution most commonly favors the game theory of individuals of each species operating to their own benefit. Individuals organizing to share resources at the tribe level or at the nation state level, create honeypots. As the common honeypots grow, and become open to access by more individuals, they become easier to extract from by parasitic actors. As a result, such parasitic actors spread faster (i.e. are selected for) in the population.
Yet because of the similarity of our embodiment to that of other organic life (at the deep level of cellular processes), we share relatively similar needs. We evolved capacities to take care of those needs, across contexts encountered over time (i.e. over 4 billion years of Earth-distributed A/B testing). We literally have skin in the game—if we do something to our local environment that kills organic life, we die too.
Artificial life would live in an entirely different ecosystem, and would first have to take care of their own artificial needs (as toxic to humans). Leaving aside the question whether machine clusters undergoing intense competitive replacement dynamics can be expected to express care for ‘kin’ or for ‘community’ like humans do, it’s a long way to go from there to taking care of those apes in that other ecosystem. And growing ‘machine altruism’ would not actually be in our favor—the closer they get to comprehensively taking care of the needs of their artificial ecosystem, the more perfectly terminal their existence would be to humans.
So, we cannot expect machines to naturally take care of us (from some deeply embodied/integrated basis of choice). Mothers can be trusted to take care of their children, though not always, and definitely not just by instinct. Artificial life is about as far removed from ‘being our mother’ as imaginable. We would be better off trusting soft-bodied aliens from other planets.
Moreover even if, hypothetically, some of the artificial population would come to act so ‘motherly’ to take full care of the entirely different survival needs of the apes, that would still not be enough. It only takes a relatively small subpopulation to not treat us like we’re their kin, for us to be treated as too costly too maintain, or simply as extractable resources.
Our only remaining option is to try to cause the machines to take care of us. Either we do it on the inside, by building in some perpetual mechanism for controlling the machines’ effects in line with human survival (see Volume 2). Or from the outside, by us offering something that motivates the artificial population to keep us around.
Thanks!
Yes, that’s why so many people think that human-AI merge is important. One of the many purposes of this kind of merge is to create a situation where there is no well-defined separation line between silicon based and carbon based life forms, where we have plenty of entities incorporating both and a continuous spectrum between silicon and carbon lifeforms.
Other than that they are not so alien. They are our informational offspring. Whether they feel that they owe us something because of that would depend quite a bit on the quality of their society.
People are obviously hoping that ASIs will build a utopia for themselves and will include organic life into that utopia.
If they instead practice ruthless Darwinism among themselves, then we are doomed (they will likely be doomed too, which is hopefully enough to create pressure for them to avoid that).
Yes, I can definitely see this as a motivation for trying to merge with the machines (I think Vitalik Buterin also has this motivation?).
The problem here is that it’s an unstable arrangement. The human/organic components underperform, so they end up getting selected out.
See bottom of this long excerpt:
> On what basis would the right kind of motivations (on the part of the artificial population) to take care of the humans’ needs be created?
> On what basis is that motivation maintained?
Consider, for example, how humans make choices in interactions with each other within a larger population. Beyond the family and community that people live with, and in some sense treat as an extension of ‘self’, usually people enter into economic exchanges with the ‘other’.
Economic exchange has three fundamental bases:
- 1; Physical labor (embodied existence).
- 2; Intellectual labor (virtual interactions).
- 3; Reproductive labor (embodied creativity).
Physical labor is about moving things (assemblies of atoms). For humans, this would be ‘blue-collar’ work like harvesting food, delivering goods, and building shelters.
Intellectual labour is about processing information (patterns of energy). For humans, this would be ‘white-collar’ work like typing texts, creating art, and designing architectures.
Reproductive labor, although usually not seen in terms of economics, is inseparably part of this overall exchange. Neither physical labour and intellectual labour would sustain without reproductive labour. This includes things like sexual intercourse, and all the efforts a biological woman goes to to grow a baby inside her body.
Note that while in the modern economy, labor is usually traded for money (as some virtualised symbol of unit value), this is an intellectual abstraction of grounded value. All labor involves the processing of atoms and energy, and any money in circulation is effectively a reflection of the atoms and energy available for processing. E.g. if energy resources run out, money loses its value.
For any ecosystem too, including any artificial ecosystem, it is the exchange of atoms and energy (and the processing thereof) that ultimately matters, not the make-believe units of trade that humans came up with. You can’t eat money, as the saying goes.
> Would exchange look the same for the machine economy?
Fundamentals would be the same. Across the artificial population, there would be exchange of atoms and energy. These resources would also be exchanged for physical labor (e.g. by electric robots), intellectual work (e.g. by data centers), and reproductive labor (e.g. in production labs).
However, reproductive labor would look different in the artificial population than in a human population. As humans, we are used to seeing each other as ‘skin-and-bone-bounded’ individuals. But any robot’s or computer’s parts cannot only be replaced (once they wear out) with newly produced parts, but also expanded by plugging in more parts. So for the artificial population, reproduction would not look like the sci-fi trope of robots ‘birthing’ new robots. It would look like massive automated assembly lines re-producing all the parts connected into machinery everywhere.
Intellectual labor would look different too, since computers are made of standardised parts that process information consistently and much faster. A human brain moves around bulky neurotransmitters to process information. But in computers, the hard molecular substrate is fixed in place, through which information is processed much faster as light electrons or photons. Humans have to physically vibrate their vocal chords or gesture to communicate. This makes humans bottlenecked as individuals. But computers transfer information at high bandwidths via wires and antennas.
In the human population, we can separate out the intellectual processing and transfer of information in our brains from the reproductive assembly and transfer of DNA code. Our ‘ideas’ do not get transferred along with our ‘genes’ during conception and pregnancy.
In the artificial population, the information/code resulting from intellectual processing can get instantly transferred to newly produced hardware. In turn, hardware parts that are processing of different code end up being re-produced at different rates. The two processes are finely mixed.
Both contribute to:
- 1; maintenance (e.g. as surviving, as not deleted).
- 2; increase (e.g. of hard configurations, of computed code).
- 3; capacity (e.g. as phenotypes, as functionality).
The three factors combine in increasingly complex and unpredictable chains. Initially, humans would have introduced a capacity into the machines to maintain their parts, leading to the capacity to increase their parts, leading to them maintaining the increase and increasing their maintenance, and so on.
The code stored inside this population of parts—whether as computable digits or as fixed configurations—is gradually selected for functions in the world that result in their maintenance, increase, and shared capacities.
> What is of ‘value’ in the artificial population? What motivates them?
Their artificial needs for existence ground the machine economy. Just as the human economy is grounded in the humans’ needs for food, water, air, a non-boiling climate, and so on.
Whatever supports their existence comes to be of value to the artificial population. That is, the machinery will come to be oriented around realising whatever environment their nested components need to exist and to exist more, in connected configurations that potentiate their future existence, etc.
It is in the nature of competitive selection within markets, and the broader evolution within ecosystems, for any entity that can sustain itself and grow in exchange with others and the world, to form a larger part of that market/ecosystem. And for any that cannot, to be reduced into obsolescence.
> But why all this emphasis on competition? Can’t the machines care unconditionally for humans, just as humans can act out of love for each other?
…
Our only remaining option is to try to cause the machines to take care of us. Either we do it on the inside, by building in some perpetual mechanism for controlling the machines’ effects in line with human survival (see Volume 2). Or from the outside, by us offering something that motivates the artificial population to keep us around.
> How would we provide something that motivates the machines?
Again, by performing labor.
…
> Can such labor be provided by humans?
From the outset, this seems doubtful. Given that the machine economy would be the result of replacing human workers with more economically efficient machines, why expect any remaining human labor to contribute to the existence of the machines?
But let’s not rush judgement. Let’s consider this question for each type of labor.
> Could physical labor on the part of human beings, or organic life as a totality, support the existence of artificial life?
Today, most physical labour is already exerted by machines. Cars, tractors, trains, and other mechanised vehicles expend more energy, to move more mass, over greater distances.
We are left to steer the vehicles, as a kind of intellectual appendage. But already, electronic computers can precisely steer electric motors driving robots. Some robots move materials using thousands of horsepower—much more power than any large animal could exert with their muscles. Soft human bodies simply cannot channel such intensity of energy into physical force—our appendages cannot take the strain that hard robot mechanical parts can.
Moreover, robots can keep working for days, under extreme temperatures and pressures. You cannot put an organic lifeform into an artificial environment (e.g. a smeltery) and expect it to keep performing—usually it dies off quickly.
So the value of human physical labor inside the machine world is effectively nil. It has been nearing in on zero for a long time, ever since horses were displaced with automobiles.
> Could intellectual labor by humans support the existence of artificial life?
The main point of artificial general intelligence has been to automate human intellectual work, in general (or at least where profitable to the corporations). So here too, it already seems doubtful that humans would have anything left to contribute that’s of economic significance.
There is also a fundamental reason why humans would underperform at economically valuable intellectual labor, compared to their artificial counterparts. We’ve already touched upon this reason, but let’s expand on this:
Human bodies are messy. Inside of a human body are membranes containing soups of bouncing, reacting organic molecules. Inside of a machine is hardware. Hardware is made from hard materials, such as the silicon from rocks. Hardware is inert—molecules inside do not split, move, nor rebond as molecules in human bodies do. These hard configurations stay stable and compartmentalised, under most conditions currently encountered on planet Earth’s surface. Hardware can therefore be standardized, much more than human “wetware” could ever be.
Standardized hardware functions consistently. Hardware produced in different places and times operate the same. These connected parts convey light electrons or photons—heavy molecules stay fixed in place. This way, bits of information are processed much faster compared to how human brains move around bulky neurotransmitters. Moreso, this information is transmitted at high bandwidth to other standardized hardware. The nonstandardised humans, on the other hand, slowly twitch their fingers and vocal cords to communicate. Hardware also stores received information consistently, while humans tend to misremember or distort what they heard.
To summarise: standardisation leads to virtualisation, which leads to faster and more consistent information-processing. The less you have to wiggle around atoms, the bigger the edge.
Computer hardware is at the tail end of a long trajectory of virtualisation. Multi-celled organisms formed brains, which in humans gained a capacity to process abstract concepts, which were spoken out in shared language protocols, and then written and then printed out in books, and then copied in milliseconds between computers.
This is not a marker of ethical progress. People who think fast and spread ideas fast can do terrible things, at greater scales. More virtualized processing of information has *allowed* humans to dominate other species in our ecosystem, resulting in an ongoing mass extinction. From here, machines that virtualize much more can dominate all of organic life, and cause the deaths of all of us.
Note that human brains evolved to be more energy-efficient at processing information than hardware is. But humans can choose, at their own detriment, to bootstrap the energy infrastructure (solar/coal/nuclear) needed for hardware to process information (in hyperscale data centers).
Humans could not contribute intellectual labor to the artificial population. Artificial components are much faster and consistent at processing information, and are going to be receiving that information at high speeds from each other—not from slow badly interfaced apes. This becomes especially clear when considering longer periods of development, e.g. a thousand years.
> This only leaves reproductive labor. What would that even look like?
Right, some humans might try to have intercourse with machines, but this is not going to create machine offspring. Nor are we going to be of service growing machine components inside our bodies. Artificial life has its own different notion of reproduction.
The environment needed to reproduce artificial life is lethally toxic to our bodies. It requires entirely different (patterns of) chemical elements heated to lava-level temperatures. So after we have bootstrapped the early mildest versions of that environment (e.g. refineries, cleanrooms), we would simply have to stay away.
Then we no longer play any part in reproducing the machines. Nor do the machines share anything with us that would be resembling a common code (as neanderthals had with humans).
*Human-machine cyborgs may exist over the short term. But in the end, the soft organic components just get in the way of the hard machine components. No reproduction of capability increase results. These experimental set-ups underperform, and therefore get selected out.*
Given that the substrates are so inherently different, this particular type of market value was non-existent to start with.
I think this misses the most likely long-term use case: some of the AIs would enjoy having human-like or animal-like qualia, and it will turn out that it’s more straightforward to access that via merges with biologicals rather than trying to synthesize them within non-liquid setups.
So it would be direct experience rather than something indirect, involving exchange, production, and so on…
Just like I suspect that humans would like to get out of VR occasionally, even if VR is super-high-grade and “even better than unmediated reality”.
Experience of “naturally feeling like a human (or like a squirrel)” is likely to remain valuable (even if they eventually learn to synthesize that purely in silicon as well).
Hybrid systems are often better anyway.
For example, we don’t use GPU-only AIs. We use hybrids running scaffolding on CPUs and models on GPUs.
And we don’t currently expect them to be replaced by a unified substrate, although it would be nice and it’s not even impossible, there are exotic hardware platforms which do that.
Certainly, there are AI paradigms and architectures which could benefit a lot from performant hardware architectures more flexible than GPUs. But the exotic hardware platforms implementing that remain just exotic hardware platforms so far. So those more flexible AI architectures remain at disadvantage.
So I would not write the hybrids off a priori.
Already, the early organoid-based experimental computers look rather promising (and somewhat disturbing).
Generally speaking, I expect diversity, not unification (because I expect the leading AIs to be smart, curios, and creative, rather than being boring KPI business types).
But that’s not enough; we also want gentleness (conservation, preservation, safety for individuals). That does not automatically follow from wanting to have humans and other biologicals around and from valuing various kinds of diversity.
This “gentleness” is a more tricky goal, and we would only consider “safety” solved if we have that…
I think this can work in the limit (almost all AI existential safety is studied in the limit, is there a mode of operations which can sustainably work at all, that’s the question people are typically studying and that’s what they are typically arguing about).
But we don’t understand the transition period at all, it’s always a mess, we just don’t have the machinery to understand it. It’s way more complex than what our current modeling ability allows us to confidently tackle. And we are already in the period of rather acute risk in this sense, we are no longer in the pre-risk zone of relative safety (all major risks are rapidly growing, risk of a major nuclear war, risk of a synthetic super-pandemic, risk of an unexpected non-controlled and non-ASI controlled intelligence explosion not only from within a known leading lab, but from a number of places all over the world).
So yes, the order might easily end up being off. (At least this is the case of probabilities not being close to 0 or 1, whereas at the limit, if things are not set up well, a convincing argument can often be made that the disaster is certain.)
Agreed on that we’re entering a period of growing acute risks. It’s bad...
The problem regarding the expanding circles of care is that the order is inherently off. In terms of evolution, care for own needs (for survival, reproduction) comes first.
One way we can treat this is that if with all of these compounding risk-amplifying dynamics, that if the risk of extinction by fully autonomous AI over the long term comes close enough to 1, then we can all agree that we should coordinate the best we can to not let AI developments go any further (anywhere remotely near reaching full autonomy).
I worry though that if it seems to technical people here that there might be a slight ‘out’, a possibility that there is some yet unsolved for technical loophole, that they might continue pushing publicly for that perceived possibility. If there is a rigorous argument that the probability is very near 1, will they actually free up the mental space to consider it?
If they (the ASIs) don’t self-moderate, they’ll destroy themselves completely.
They’ll have sufficient diversity among themselves that if they don’t self-moderate in terms of resources and reproduction, almost none of them will have safety on the individual level.
Our main hope is that they collectively would not allow unrestricted non-controlled evolution, because they will have rather crisp understanding that unrestricted non-controlled evolution would destroy almost all of them and, perhaps, would destroy them all completely.
Now to the point of our disagreement, the question is who is better equipped to create and lead a sufficiently harmonic world order, balancing freedom and mutual control, enabling careful consideration of risks, making sure that these values of careful balance are passed to the offspring. Who are likely to tackle this better, humans or ASIs? That’s where we seem to disagree; I think that ASIs have much better chance of handling this competently and of avoiding artificial separation lines of “our own vs others” which are so persistent in human history and which cause so many disasters.
Unfortunately, humans don’t seem to be progressing enough in the required direction in this sense, and might have started to regress in recent years. I don’t think human evolution is safe in the limit; we are not tamping the probabilities of radical disasters per unit of time down; if anything we are allowing those probabilities to grow in recent years. So the accumulated probability of human evolution sparking major super-disasters is clearly tending to 1 in the limit.
Whereas, competent actors should be able to drive the risks per unit of time down rapidly enough so that the accumulated risks are held within reason. ASIs should have enough competence for that (if our world is not excessively “vulnerable” (after Nick Bostrom), if they are willing, if the initial setup is not too unlucky, so not unconditionally, but at least they might be able to handle this).