Thanks for the comment. This lines up with my [basic-level] thinking on this. It struck me as similar to EY’s point in Reductionism with his friend insisting that there was a difference between predictions resulting from Newtonian calculations and those found using relativity.
In a similar vein, they seem to insist that this area isn’t governed by Bayes’ theorem.
Lastly, I might have not credited Carrier well enough. He does assign cardinal values to his predictions. He simply makes the point that when we don’t know, we can use a “fringe” number that everyone agrees is at the low or high end. For example, he’s making a case against the resurrection and needs a value for the possibility that the Centurion didn’t properly verify Jesus’ death. Carrier says:
As it is, we must grant at least a 0.1% chance that the centurion mistook him for dead...
All I was pointing out is that Carrier, though making a case to those who disagree with him, tries to present some reasons why a person in that day and time might mistake a living (but wounded) person for being dead when they weren’t. Then he brings in a cardinal number, in essence saying, “You’ll grant me that there’s a 1 in 1000 chance that this guy made a mistake, right?”, and then he proceeds to use the value itself, not a qualitative embodiment.
Thanks for the comment. This lines up with my [basic-level] thinking on this. It struck me as similar to EY’s point in Reductionism with his friend insisting that there was a difference between predictions resulting from Newtonian calculations and those found using relativity.
In a similar vein, they seem to insist that this area isn’t governed by Bayes’ theorem.
Lastly, I might have not credited Carrier well enough. He does assign cardinal values to his predictions. He simply makes the point that when we don’t know, we can use a “fringe” number that everyone agrees is at the low or high end. For example, he’s making a case against the resurrection and needs a value for the possibility that the Centurion didn’t properly verify Jesus’ death. Carrier says:
All I was pointing out is that Carrier, though making a case to those who disagree with him, tries to present some reasons why a person in that day and time might mistake a living (but wounded) person for being dead when they weren’t. Then he brings in a cardinal number, in essence saying, “You’ll grant me that there’s a 1 in 1000 chance that this guy made a mistake, right?”, and then he proceeds to use the value itself, not a qualitative embodiment.
Is that any clearer re. Carrier?