Well, we (humans) categorize our epistemic state largely in propositional terms, e.g. in beliefs and suppositions.
I’m not too confident of this. It seems to me that a lot of human cognition isn’t particularly propositional, even if nearly all of it could in principle be translated into that language. For example, I think a lot of cognition is sensory awareness, or imagery, or internal dialogue. We could contort most of that into propositions and propositional attitudes (eg ‘I am experiencing a sensation of pain in my big toe’, ‘I am imagining a picnic table’), but that doesn’t particularly seem like the natural lens to view those through.
That said, I do agree that propositions and propositional attitudes would be a more useful language to interpret LLMs through than eg activation vectors of float values.
I’m not too confident of this. It seems to me that a lot of human cognition isn’t particularly propositional, even if nearly all of it could in principle be translated into that language. For example, I think a lot of cognition is sensory awareness, or imagery, or internal dialogue. We could contort most of that into propositions and propositional attitudes (eg ‘I am experiencing a sensation of pain in my big toe’, ‘I am imagining a picnic table’), but that doesn’t particularly seem like the natural lens to view those through.
That said, I do agree that propositions and propositional attitudes would be a more useful language to interpret LLMs through than eg activation vectors of float values.