When you ask “would this be the same conscious experience”, do you have a clear idea of what “the same conscious experience” means, and you’re wondering whether the world works in such a way that the concept would hold in these hypotheticals? Or is it a concept that feels important, but which you can’t pin down, and your goal here is to analyse it?
I would rather analyze this concept; I do not yet have completely accurate and firm conclusions on these issues.
I would like to emphasize once again that, for me, the question is that even when creating identical clones, we have two subjective experiences, two perspectives from within. Therefore, for me, being “the same” in the “perfect resurrection” scenario means remaining the same consciousness, without creating an additional consciousness, an additional first-person perspective (above, in my response to Dagon, I tried to explain this more clearly again).
Most likely, there may be no way to verify whether the new instance is “the same,” but I am interested in discussing this.
From my perspective, unless there is something akin to a soul or disembodied consciousness, there’s simply no fact of the matter here beyond the more granular facts. I don’t think “the same consciousness” means anything more than the prosaic ways in which we might define it, e.g. with reference to overlapping chains of experience and memory. We instinctively care about it, but I think that’s fairly easy to explain as a byproduct of our self/other distinction and self-preservation instinct and so on.
When you ask “would this be the same conscious experience”, do you have a clear idea of what “the same conscious experience” means, and you’re wondering whether the world works in such a way that the concept would hold in these hypotheticals? Or is it a concept that feels important, but which you can’t pin down, and your goal here is to analyse it?
I would rather analyze this concept; I do not yet have completely accurate and firm conclusions on these issues.
I would like to emphasize once again that, for me, the question is that even when creating identical clones, we have two subjective experiences, two perspectives from within. Therefore, for me, being “the same” in the “perfect resurrection” scenario means remaining the same consciousness, without creating an additional consciousness, an additional first-person perspective (above, in my response to Dagon, I tried to explain this more clearly again).
Most likely, there may be no way to verify whether the new instance is “the same,” but I am interested in discussing this.
From my perspective, unless there is something akin to a soul or disembodied consciousness, there’s simply no fact of the matter here beyond the more granular facts. I don’t think “the same consciousness” means anything more than the prosaic ways in which we might define it, e.g. with reference to overlapping chains of experience and memory. We instinctively care about it, but I think that’s fairly easy to explain as a byproduct of our self/other distinction and self-preservation instinct and so on.