The idea is that faith and self-deception are bad, while truth and rationality are good. So we reward good behavior and punish bad behavior.
There’s an implicit premise here that the punishment works to discourage the bad behavior. Your argument for this premise is to make an analogy with the gay-rights movement:
How did the gay movement make so much progress in so little time? Was it by engaging in gentle, respectful debate with their opponents? Of course not. They just pointed out the obvious repeatedly: Those people are intolerant bigots.
That is not my sense of how the gay-rights movement succeeded at all. As I see it, they did it by gaining the sympathy of enough of the right people. This, in turn, they did by making their humanity evident. And this they did by having high-status, sympathetic representatives.
Now, once your group is already high-status, you can use scorn to squelch opposition. If you’re high-status, people will want to affiliate with you, and they’ll read your scorn as a signal that they can affiliate with you by helping to squelch your opposition.
Personally, I’d say that that trick is a dishonest manipulation, because it’s not truth-tracking. It depends only on having high status, not on being right. But, more pragmatically, it only works if you already have the high status. Otherwise, it backfires. People read your scorn as a signal to affiliate with your opponents.
Before homosexuals had sufficiently high status, any scorn they showed hampered their progress. But I grant that they eventually gained enough status so that the scorn trick could work. Sam Harris does not appear to me to have reached that level.
That is not my sense of how the gay-rights movement succeeded at all. As I see it, they did it by gaining the sympathy of enough of the right people. This, in turn, they did by making their humanity evident. And this they did by having high-status, sympathetic representatives.
Now, once your group is already high-status, you can use scorn to squelch opposition. If you’re high-status, people will want to affiliate with you, and they’ll read your scorn as a signal that they can affiliate with you by helping to squelch your opposition.
This may be true, but I don’t think the gay movement waited to start expressing their scorn for homophobia until after they were high status. Are you saying that before the gay movement was high status, most of its representatives acted like homophobia was simply an opinion with which they disagreed, but which they respected nonetheless?
My impression is that portraying homophobia as something contemptible played an important part in obtaining this high status. Hell, just coming up with the word ‘homophobia’ (which was brilliant) helped a lot, and that was done a few decades ago.
Anyway, there’s another reason why treating religious beliefs like they’re crazy is a good thing: Religious beliefs are, indeed, crazy. I don’t see how this fact can ever be acknowledged by the rest of humanity if no one actually acts like it’s true, even those who accept it!
Are you saying that before the gay movement was high status, most of its representatives acted like homophobia was simply an opinion with which they disagreed, but which they respected nonetheless?
No, I am saying that whatever displays of scorn they made didn’t help them gain the sympathy of non-homosexuals, and probably hurt them.
Religious beliefs are, indeed, crazy. I don’t see how this fact can ever be acknowledged by the rest of humanity if no one actually acts like it’s true, even those who accept it!
I agree that we should act as though religious beliefs are crazy (in Eliezer’s sense of the word). The question is, what does it mean to act that way? That is, what is the most productive response to crazy beliefs? I expect that it’s not generally contempt.
No, I am saying that whatever displays of scorn they made didn’t help them gain the sympathy of non-homosexuals, and probably hurt them.
It may not have gotten them sympathy, but I think labeling the opposing view as bigotry and a phobia could easily have gotten them a higher status, even in the early days of the movement.
Honestly though, I have no idea where to find the information we need to settle this disagreement.
I agree that we should act as though religious beliefs are crazy (in Eliezer’s sense of the word). The question is, what does it mean to act that way?
What I mean is that our reaction to someone who says, “I believe that Jesus is the son of God” should be similar to our reaction to someone who says, “I believe aliens are trying to kidnap me”.
The reaction can be incredulity, or amusement, or contempt, or something else, anything that doesn’t communicate the impression that you think it’s perfectly (or mostly) OK to be deluded in such a fashion.
Honestly though, I have no idea where to find the information we need to settle this disagreement.
That’s an important question, but one for which I have no answer.
I agree that we should act as though religious beliefs are crazy (in Eliezer’s sense of the word). The question is, what does it mean to act that way?
What I mean is that our reaction to someone who says, “I believe that Jesus is the son of God” should be similar to our reaction to someone who says, “I believe aliens are trying to kidnap me”.
Okay, just so long as we agree that “what it means to act as though a belief is crazy” isn’t something that you ought to define however you like. (As though you were to argue “It’s ridiculous. Therefore, by definition, I should ridicule it.”) The proper way to act is not something you can determine just by analyzing what “crazy” means, or just by establishing that it’s not okay to have crazy beliefs. The proper way to act is determined by what will in fact change the world into a state more like it ought to be.
If you’re right about the history of the acceptance of homosexuality, then that is some evidence in favor of your position.
There’s an implicit premise here that the punishment works to discourage the bad behavior. Your argument for this premise is to make an analogy with the gay-rights movement:
That is not my sense of how the gay-rights movement succeeded at all. As I see it, they did it by gaining the sympathy of enough of the right people. This, in turn, they did by making their humanity evident. And this they did by having high-status, sympathetic representatives.
Now, once your group is already high-status, you can use scorn to squelch opposition. If you’re high-status, people will want to affiliate with you, and they’ll read your scorn as a signal that they can affiliate with you by helping to squelch your opposition.
Personally, I’d say that that trick is a dishonest manipulation, because it’s not truth-tracking. It depends only on having high status, not on being right. But, more pragmatically, it only works if you already have the high status. Otherwise, it backfires. People read your scorn as a signal to affiliate with your opponents.
Before homosexuals had sufficiently high status, any scorn they showed hampered their progress. But I grant that they eventually gained enough status so that the scorn trick could work. Sam Harris does not appear to me to have reached that level.
This may be true, but I don’t think the gay movement waited to start expressing their scorn for homophobia until after they were high status. Are you saying that before the gay movement was high status, most of its representatives acted like homophobia was simply an opinion with which they disagreed, but which they respected nonetheless?
My impression is that portraying homophobia as something contemptible played an important part in obtaining this high status. Hell, just coming up with the word ‘homophobia’ (which was brilliant) helped a lot, and that was done a few decades ago.
Anyway, there’s another reason why treating religious beliefs like they’re crazy is a good thing: Religious beliefs are, indeed, crazy. I don’t see how this fact can ever be acknowledged by the rest of humanity if no one actually acts like it’s true, even those who accept it!
No, I am saying that whatever displays of scorn they made didn’t help them gain the sympathy of non-homosexuals, and probably hurt them.
I agree that we should act as though religious beliefs are crazy (in Eliezer’s sense of the word). The question is, what does it mean to act that way? That is, what is the most productive response to crazy beliefs? I expect that it’s not generally contempt.
It may not have gotten them sympathy, but I think labeling the opposing view as bigotry and a phobia could easily have gotten them a higher status, even in the early days of the movement.
Honestly though, I have no idea where to find the information we need to settle this disagreement.
What I mean is that our reaction to someone who says, “I believe that Jesus is the son of God” should be similar to our reaction to someone who says, “I believe aliens are trying to kidnap me”.
The reaction can be incredulity, or amusement, or contempt, or something else, anything that doesn’t communicate the impression that you think it’s perfectly (or mostly) OK to be deluded in such a fashion.
That’s an important question, but one for which I have no answer.
Okay, just so long as we agree that “what it means to act as though a belief is crazy” isn’t something that you ought to define however you like. (As though you were to argue “It’s ridiculous. Therefore, by definition, I should ridicule it.”) The proper way to act is not something you can determine just by analyzing what “crazy” means, or just by establishing that it’s not okay to have crazy beliefs. The proper way to act is determined by what will in fact change the world into a state more like it ought to be.
If you’re right about the history of the acceptance of homosexuality, then that is some evidence in favor of your position.