...huh. That comment was probably more helpful than you expected it to be. I’m pretty sure I’ve identified part of my problem as having too high a standard for what makes an x-rationalist. If you let the doctors who developed evidence-based medicine in...yes, that clears a few things up.
One thinks particularly of Robyn Dawes—I don’t know him from “evidence-based medicine” per se, but I know he was fighting the battle to get doctors to acknowledge that their “clinical experience” wasn’t better than simple linear models, and he was on the front lines against psychotherapy shown to perform no better than talking to any bright person.
If you read “Rational Choice in an Uncertain World” you will see that Dawes is pretty definitely on the level of “integrate Bayes into everyday life”, not just Traditional Rationality. I don’t know about the historical origins of evidence-based medicine, so it’s possible that a bunch of Traditional Rationalists invented it; but one does get the impression that probability theorists trying to get people to listen to the research about the limits of their own minds, were involved.
After thinking on this for a while, here are my thoughts. This should probably be a new post but I don’t want to start another whole chain of discussions on this issue.
I had the belief that many people on Less Wrong believed that our currently existing Art of Rationality was sufficient or close to sufficient to guarantee practical success or even to transform its practioner into an ubermensch like John Galt. I’m no longer sure anyone believes this. If they do, they are wrong. If anyone right now claims they participate in Less Wrong solely out of a calculated program to maximize practical benefits and not because they like rationality, I think they are deluded.
Where x-rationality is defined as “formal, math-based rationality”, there are many cases of x-rationality being used for good practical effect. I missed these because they look more like three percent annual gains in productivity than like Brennan discovering quantum gravity or Napoleon conquering Europe. For example, doctors can use evidence-based medicine to increase their cure rate.
The doctors who invented evidence-based medicine deserve our praise. Eliezer is willing to consider them x-rationalists. But there is no evidence that they took a particularly philosophical view towards rationality, as opposed to just thinking “Hey, if we apply these tests, it will improve medicine a bit.” Depending on your view of socialism, the information that one of these inventors ran for parliament on a socialist platform may be an interesting data point.
These doctors probably had mastery of statistics, good understanding of the power of the experimental method, and a belief that formalizing things could do better than normal human expertise. All of these are rationalist virtues. Any new doctor who starts their career with these virtues will be in a better position to profit from and maybe expand upon evidence-based medicine than a less virtuous doctor, and will reap great benefits from their virtues. Insofar as Less Wrong’s goal is to teach people to become such doctors, this is great...
...except that epidemiology and statistics classes teach the same thing with a lot less fuss. Less Wrong’s goal seems to be much higher. Less Wrong wants a doctor who can do that, and understand their mental processes in great detail, and who will be able to think rationally about politics and religion and turn the whole thing into a unified rationalist outlook.
Or maybe it doesn’t. Eliezer has already explained that a lot of his OB writing was just stuff that he came across trying to solve AI problems. Maybe this has turned us into a community of people who like talking about philosophy, and that really doesn’t matter much and shouldn’t be taught at rationality dojos. Maybe a rationality dojo should be an extra-well-taught applied statistics class and some discussion of important cognitive biases and how to avoid them. It seems to me that a statistics class plus some discussion of cognitive biases would be enough to transform an average doctor into the kind of doctor who could invent or at least use evidence-based medicine and whatever other x-rationality techniques might be useful in medicine. With a few modifications, the same goes for business, science, and any other practical field.
I predict the marginal utility of this sort of rationality will decline quickly. The first year of training will probably do wonders. The second year will be less impressive. I doubt a doctor who studies this rationality for ten years will be noticeably better off than one who studies it for five, although this may be my pessimism speaking. Probably the doctor would be better off spending those second five years studying some other area of medicine. In the end, I predict these kinds of classes could improve performance in some fields 10-20% for people who really understood them.
This would be a useful service, but it wouldn’t have the same kind of awesomeness as Overcoming Bias did. There seems to be a second movement afoot here, one to use rationality to radically transform our lives and thought processes, moving so far beyond mere domain-specific reasoning ability that even in areas like religion, politics, morality, and philosophy we hold only rational beliefs and are completely inhospitable to any irrational thoughts. This is a very different sort of task.
This new level of rationality has benefits, but they are less practical. There are mental clarity benefits, and benefits to society when we stop encouraging harmful political and social movements, and benefits to the world when we give charity more efficiently. Once people finish the course mentioned in (6) and start on the course mentioned in (8), it seems less honest to keep telling them about the vast practical benefits they will attain.
This might have certain social benefits, but you would have to be pretty impressive for conscious-level social reasoning to get better than the dedicated unconscious modules we already use for that task.
I have a hard time judging opinion here, but it does seem like some people think sufficient study of z-rationality can turn someone into an ubermensch. But the practical benefits beyond those offered by y-rationality seem low. I really like z-rationality, but only because I think it’s philosophically interesting and can improve society, not because I think it can help me personally.
In the original post, I was using x-rationality in a confused way, but I think to some degree I was thinking of (8) rather than (6).
One thinks particularly of Robyn Dawes—I don’t know him from “evidence-based medicine” per se, but I know he was fighting the battle to get doctors to acknowledge that their “clinical experience” wasn’t better than simple linear models, and he was on the front lines against psychotherapy shown to perform no better than talking to any bright person.
If you read “Rational Choice in an Uncertain World” you will see that Dawes is pretty definitely on the level of “integrate Bayes into everyday life”, not just Traditional Rationality. I don’t know about the historical origins of evidence-based medicine, so it’s possible that a bunch of Traditional Rationalists invented it; but one does get the impression that probability theorists trying to get people to listen to the research about the limits of their own minds, were involved.
Those studies sucked. That book had tons of fallacious reasoning and questionable results. It was while reading Dawes’ book that I became convinced that H&B is actively harmful for rationality. Now that you say Dawes was also behind the anti-psychotherapy stuff I suddenly have a lot more faith in psychotherapy. (By the way, it’s not just that Dawes isn’t a careful researcher—he can also be actively misleading.)
I really hope Anna is right that the Center for Modern Rationality won’t be giving much weight to oft-cited overblown H&B results (e.g “confirmation bias”). Knowing about biases almost always hurts people.
ETA: Apologies for curmudgeonly tone; I’m just worried that unless executed with utmost care, the CMR idea will do evil.
That is an important heuristic (and upvoted), but I don’t think it’s one we should endorse without some pretty substantial caveats. If you deprecate any results that strike you as ideologically tainted, and your criteria for “ideologically tainted” are themselves skewed in one direction or another by identity effects, you can easily end up accepting less accurate information than you would by taking every result in the field at face value.
Agreed. I think your caveat is just a special case: put minimal trust in researchers who seem to have ideological axes to grind, including yourself. (And if you can’t discern when you might be grinding an axe then you’re probably screwed anyway.) (But yeah, I admit it’s a perversion of “researchers” to include meta-researchers.)
I think the claim that “those studies sucked” and the accompanying link were in reference to:
the battle to get doctors to acknowledge that their “clinical experience” wasn’t better than simple linear models
The linked comment discusses a few different statistical prediction rules, not just wine-tasting. To the extent that the comment identifies systematic flaws in claims that linear models outperform experts, it does somewhat support the claim that “those studies sucked” (though I wouldn’t think it supports the claim sufficiently to actually justify making it).
(See Steven’s comment, the “those studies sucked” comment was meant to be a reference to the linear model versus expert judgment series, not the psychotherapy studies. Obviously the link was supposed to be representative of a disturbing trend, not the sum total justification for my claims.)
FWIW I still like a lot of H&B research—I’m a big Gigerenzer fan, and Tetlock has some cool stuff, for example—but most of the field, including much of Tversky and Kahneman’s stuff, is hogwash, i.e. less trustworthy than parapsychology results (which are generally held to a much higher standard). This is what we’d expect given the state of the social sciences, but for some reason people seem to give social psychology and cognitive science a free pass rather than applying a healthy dose of skepticism. I suspect this is because of confirmation bias: people are already trying to push an ideology about how almost everyone is irrational and the world is mad, and thus are much more willing to accept “explanations” that support this conclusion.
Start by reading Gigerenzer’s critiques. E.g. I really like the study on how overconfidence goes away if you ask for frequencies rather than subjective probabilities—this actually gives you a rationality technique that you can apply in real life! (In my experience it works, but that’s an impression, not a statistical finding.) I also quite liked his point about how just telling subjects to assume random sampling is misleading. You can find a summary of two of his critiques in a LW post by Kaj Sotala, “Heuristics and Biases Biases?” or summat. Also fastandfrugal.com should have some links or links to links. Also worth noting is that Gigerenzer’s been cited many thousands of times and has written a few popular books. I especially like Gigerenzer because unlike many H&B folk he has a thorough knowledge of statistics, and he uses that knowledge to make very sharp critiques of Kahneman’s compare-to-allegedly-ideal-Bayesian-reasoner approach. (Of course it’s still possible to use a Bayesian approach, but the most convincing Bayesian papers I’ve seen were sophisticated (e.g. didn’t skimp on information theory) and applied only to very simple problems.)
I wouldn’t even say that the problem is overall in the H&B lit, it’s just that lots of H&B folk spin their results as if they somehow applied to real life situations. It’s intellectually dishonest, and leads to people like Eliezer having massive overconfidence in the relevance of H&B knowledge for personal rationality.
...huh. That comment was probably more helpful than you expected it to be. I’m pretty sure I’ve identified part of my problem as having too high a standard for what makes an x-rationalist. If you let the doctors who developed evidence-based medicine in...yes, that clears a few things up.
One thinks particularly of Robyn Dawes—I don’t know him from “evidence-based medicine” per se, but I know he was fighting the battle to get doctors to acknowledge that their “clinical experience” wasn’t better than simple linear models, and he was on the front lines against psychotherapy shown to perform no better than talking to any bright person.
If you read “Rational Choice in an Uncertain World” you will see that Dawes is pretty definitely on the level of “integrate Bayes into everyday life”, not just Traditional Rationality. I don’t know about the historical origins of evidence-based medicine, so it’s possible that a bunch of Traditional Rationalists invented it; but one does get the impression that probability theorists trying to get people to listen to the research about the limits of their own minds, were involved.
After thinking on this for a while, here are my thoughts. This should probably be a new post but I don’t want to start another whole chain of discussions on this issue.
I had the belief that many people on Less Wrong believed that our currently existing Art of Rationality was sufficient or close to sufficient to guarantee practical success or even to transform its practioner into an ubermensch like John Galt. I’m no longer sure anyone believes this. If they do, they are wrong. If anyone right now claims they participate in Less Wrong solely out of a calculated program to maximize practical benefits and not because they like rationality, I think they are deluded.
Where x-rationality is defined as “formal, math-based rationality”, there are many cases of x-rationality being used for good practical effect. I missed these because they look more like three percent annual gains in productivity than like Brennan discovering quantum gravity or Napoleon conquering Europe. For example, doctors can use evidence-based medicine to increase their cure rate.
The doctors who invented evidence-based medicine deserve our praise. Eliezer is willing to consider them x-rationalists. But there is no evidence that they took a particularly philosophical view towards rationality, as opposed to just thinking “Hey, if we apply these tests, it will improve medicine a bit.” Depending on your view of socialism, the information that one of these inventors ran for parliament on a socialist platform may be an interesting data point.
These doctors probably had mastery of statistics, good understanding of the power of the experimental method, and a belief that formalizing things could do better than normal human expertise. All of these are rationalist virtues. Any new doctor who starts their career with these virtues will be in a better position to profit from and maybe expand upon evidence-based medicine than a less virtuous doctor, and will reap great benefits from their virtues. Insofar as Less Wrong’s goal is to teach people to become such doctors, this is great...
...except that epidemiology and statistics classes teach the same thing with a lot less fuss. Less Wrong’s goal seems to be much higher. Less Wrong wants a doctor who can do that, and understand their mental processes in great detail, and who will be able to think rationally about politics and religion and turn the whole thing into a unified rationalist outlook.
Or maybe it doesn’t. Eliezer has already explained that a lot of his OB writing was just stuff that he came across trying to solve AI problems. Maybe this has turned us into a community of people who like talking about philosophy, and that really doesn’t matter much and shouldn’t be taught at rationality dojos. Maybe a rationality dojo should be an extra-well-taught applied statistics class and some discussion of important cognitive biases and how to avoid them. It seems to me that a statistics class plus some discussion of cognitive biases would be enough to transform an average doctor into the kind of doctor who could invent or at least use evidence-based medicine and whatever other x-rationality techniques might be useful in medicine. With a few modifications, the same goes for business, science, and any other practical field.
I predict the marginal utility of this sort of rationality will decline quickly. The first year of training will probably do wonders. The second year will be less impressive. I doubt a doctor who studies this rationality for ten years will be noticeably better off than one who studies it for five, although this may be my pessimism speaking. Probably the doctor would be better off spending those second five years studying some other area of medicine. In the end, I predict these kinds of classes could improve performance in some fields 10-20% for people who really understood them.
This would be a useful service, but it wouldn’t have the same kind of awesomeness as Overcoming Bias did. There seems to be a second movement afoot here, one to use rationality to radically transform our lives and thought processes, moving so far beyond mere domain-specific reasoning ability that even in areas like religion, politics, morality, and philosophy we hold only rational beliefs and are completely inhospitable to any irrational thoughts. This is a very different sort of task.
This new level of rationality has benefits, but they are less practical. There are mental clarity benefits, and benefits to society when we stop encouraging harmful political and social movements, and benefits to the world when we give charity more efficiently. Once people finish the course mentioned in (6) and start on the course mentioned in (8), it seems less honest to keep telling them about the vast practical benefits they will attain.
This might have certain social benefits, but you would have to be pretty impressive for conscious-level social reasoning to get better than the dedicated unconscious modules we already use for that task.
I have a hard time judging opinion here, but it does seem like some people think sufficient study of z-rationality can turn someone into an ubermensch. But the practical benefits beyond those offered by y-rationality seem low. I really like z-rationality, but only because I think it’s philosophically interesting and can improve society, not because I think it can help me personally.
In the original post, I was using x-rationality in a confused way, but I think to some degree I was thinking of (8) rather than (6).
Those studies sucked. That book had tons of fallacious reasoning and questionable results. It was while reading Dawes’ book that I became convinced that H&B is actively harmful for rationality. Now that you say Dawes was also behind the anti-psychotherapy stuff I suddenly have a lot more faith in psychotherapy. (By the way, it’s not just that Dawes isn’t a careful researcher—he can also be actively misleading.)
I really hope Anna is right that the Center for Modern Rationality won’t be giving much weight to oft-cited overblown H&B results (e.g “confirmation bias”). Knowing about biases almost always hurts people.
ETA: Apologies for curmudgeonly tone; I’m just worried that unless executed with utmost care, the CMR idea will do evil.
Which illustrates an important heuristic: put minimal trust in researchers who seem to have ideological axes to grind.
That is an important heuristic (and upvoted), but I don’t think it’s one we should endorse without some pretty substantial caveats. If you deprecate any results that strike you as ideologically tainted, and your criteria for “ideologically tainted” are themselves skewed in one direction or another by identity effects, you can easily end up accepting less accurate information than you would by taking every result in the field at face value.
I probably don’t need to give any examples.
Agreed. I think your caveat is just a special case: put minimal trust in researchers who seem to have ideological axes to grind, including yourself. (And if you can’t discern when you might be grinding an axe then you’re probably screwed anyway.) (But yeah, I admit it’s a perversion of “researchers” to include meta-researchers.)
As The Last Psychiatrist would say, always be thinking about what the author wants to be true.
FYI to other readers: Citation does not support claim, it’s about linear models of wine-tasting rather than experimental support for psychotherapy.
I think the claim that “those studies sucked” and the accompanying link were in reference to:
The linked comment discusses a few different statistical prediction rules, not just wine-tasting. To the extent that the comment identifies systematic flaws in claims that linear models outperform experts, it does somewhat support the claim that “those studies sucked” (though I wouldn’t think it supports the claim sufficiently to actually justify making it).
(See Steven’s comment, the “those studies sucked” comment was meant to be a reference to the linear model versus expert judgment series, not the psychotherapy studies. Obviously the link was supposed to be representative of a disturbing trend, not the sum total justification for my claims.)
FWIW I still like a lot of H&B research—I’m a big Gigerenzer fan, and Tetlock has some cool stuff, for example—but most of the field, including much of Tversky and Kahneman’s stuff, is hogwash, i.e. less trustworthy than parapsychology results (which are generally held to a much higher standard). This is what we’d expect given the state of the social sciences, but for some reason people seem to give social psychology and cognitive science a free pass rather than applying a healthy dose of skepticism. I suspect this is because of confirmation bias: people are already trying to push an ideology about how almost everyone is irrational and the world is mad, and thus are much more willing to accept “explanations” that support this conclusion.
Tversky and Kahneman, hogwash? What? Can you explain? Or just mention something?
Start by reading Gigerenzer’s critiques. E.g. I really like the study on how overconfidence goes away if you ask for frequencies rather than subjective probabilities—this actually gives you a rationality technique that you can apply in real life! (In my experience it works, but that’s an impression, not a statistical finding.) I also quite liked his point about how just telling subjects to assume random sampling is misleading. You can find a summary of two of his critiques in a LW post by Kaj Sotala, “Heuristics and Biases Biases?” or summat. Also fastandfrugal.com should have some links or links to links. Also worth noting is that Gigerenzer’s been cited many thousands of times and has written a few popular books. I especially like Gigerenzer because unlike many H&B folk he has a thorough knowledge of statistics, and he uses that knowledge to make very sharp critiques of Kahneman’s compare-to-allegedly-ideal-Bayesian-reasoner approach. (Of course it’s still possible to use a Bayesian approach, but the most convincing Bayesian papers I’ve seen were sophisticated (e.g. didn’t skimp on information theory) and applied only to very simple problems.)
I wouldn’t even say that the problem is overall in the H&B lit, it’s just that lots of H&B folk spin their results as if they somehow applied to real life situations. It’s intellectually dishonest, and leads to people like Eliezer having massive overconfidence in the relevance of H&B knowledge for personal rationality.
Awesome, big thanks!
All this rationality organizing talk has to have some misquotes :(