I’m not sure its fair to pretend any scientific theory can make statements about things other than what we observe. Keep in mind, what you are saying is that encountering an experiment that seems to be fundamentally probabilistic (I can develop theories that predict probabilities, but NOT theories that predict exactly what will happen) is proof that a. the world is deterministic, b. this determinism is hidden from us in such a way as to make it ‘seem’ like things are probabilistic.
If we are properly Bayesian, shouldn’t we instead update by saying that the existence of experiments where we can only predict probabilities should push us in the direction of the existence of fundamental probability?
That’s cute, and if there weren’t such a thing as interference, you’d be totally right. But there is. It clearly indicates that this isn’t simply probability we’re talking about, here.
I’m not sure ‘cute’ is a useful word in facilitating a rational conversation. I certainly had an emotional reaction to it (feeling like I was being patronized) that I had to fight with in order to think clearly.
Anyway, maybe its best to see where we might be disagreeing. Do you believe its true that: 1. there exist experiments where we cannot predict what will happen
In those experiments we can predict what will happen if we run large ensembles of experiments in the same class
If you agree with that- do you think it MIGHT be problematic to use these facts to update in the direction of a fully deterministic theory?
I’m not sure its fair to pretend any scientific theory can make statements about things other than what we observe. Keep in mind, what you are saying is that encountering an experiment that seems to be fundamentally probabilistic (I can develop theories that predict probabilities, but NOT theories that predict exactly what will happen) is proof that a. the world is deterministic, b. this determinism is hidden from us in such a way as to make it ‘seem’ like things are probabilistic.
If we are properly Bayesian, shouldn’t we instead update by saying that the existence of experiments where we can only predict probabilities should push us in the direction of the existence of fundamental probability?
That’s cute, and if there weren’t such a thing as interference, you’d be totally right. But there is. It clearly indicates that this isn’t simply probability we’re talking about, here.
I’m not sure ‘cute’ is a useful word in facilitating a rational conversation. I certainly had an emotional reaction to it (feeling like I was being patronized) that I had to fight with in order to think clearly.
Anyway, maybe its best to see where we might be disagreeing. Do you believe its true that: 1. there exist experiments where we cannot predict what will happen
In those experiments we can predict what will happen if we run large ensembles of experiments in the same class
If you agree with that- do you think it MIGHT be problematic to use these facts to update in the direction of a fully deterministic theory?