Once the brain matter is there, they think that’s all there is to consciousness—there’s nothing further to explain. Most of us think there is something still to be explained, and dualism can achieve this by positing bridging laws that cause ‘mind’ to emerge from ‘matter’.
Looks like a clear-cut case of Mind Projection Fallacy to me, or, at the very least, a severe misrepresentation of how a mature reductive materialist sees their own viewpoint. A reductive materialist need not pass from “Brain dynamics entirely and strictly constitute consciousness” to “There’s nothing further to explain.” There is plenty more to explain, namely, the nature of the identity.
Knowing that != knowing why != knowing how != seeing how.
If you merely know that mind=brain you may have a great deal left to explain. You may still need to find the insights needed to dissolve the apparent impossibility of mind=brain.
The map is not the territory, so you can’t jump from
mind=brain
to
(mind=brain)->know(‘mind=brain’)
to
know(‘mind=brain’)->know_how(‘mind’=‘brain’)
to
~know_how(‘mind’=‘brain’)->~(mind=brain)
You seem to jump from “The identity ‘mind=brain’ seems unsatisfying” to “I have just cause to believe that mind is not matter”. Of course the mere asserted identity seems unsatisfying: If you don’t know any of the actual reductions, the mere materialist assertion that some reduction exists won’t let you make any new predictions. This does not give you just cause to reject materialism; it gives you just cause to believe that your map is missing some reductions.
Postulating “bridging laws” completely fails to explain the lingering mysteries in any fashion whatsoever. It makes no new predictions even in retrospect; it is anticipation-isomorphic to “magic” or “God did it” or “elan vital” or “some reduction exists, but I won’t tell you what”. Note that if you actually accepted “The mind equals the brain!” as an answer to consciousness, it would also constitute a mysterious answer to a mysterious question: believing it would not make you any less confused. The answer is when consciousness stops being mysterious—this requires an actual reduction, not just a flat assertion that a reduction exists.
Richard, also, from your “Dualist Explanations”:
Looks like a clear-cut case of Mind Projection Fallacy to me, or, at the very least, a severe misrepresentation of how a mature reductive materialist sees their own viewpoint. A reductive materialist need not pass from “Brain dynamics entirely and strictly constitute consciousness” to “There’s nothing further to explain.” There is plenty more to explain, namely, the nature of the identity.
Knowing that != knowing why != knowing how != seeing how.
If you merely know that mind=brain you may have a great deal left to explain. You may still need to find the insights needed to dissolve the apparent impossibility of mind=brain.
The map is not the territory, so you can’t jump from
mind=brain
to
(mind=brain)->know(‘mind=brain’)
to
know(‘mind=brain’)->know_how(‘mind’=‘brain’)
to
~know_how(‘mind’=‘brain’)->~(mind=brain)
You seem to jump from “The identity ‘mind=brain’ seems unsatisfying” to “I have just cause to believe that mind is not matter”. Of course the mere asserted identity seems unsatisfying: If you don’t know any of the actual reductions, the mere materialist assertion that some reduction exists won’t let you make any new predictions. This does not give you just cause to reject materialism; it gives you just cause to believe that your map is missing some reductions.
Postulating “bridging laws” completely fails to explain the lingering mysteries in any fashion whatsoever. It makes no new predictions even in retrospect; it is anticipation-isomorphic to “magic” or “God did it” or “elan vital” or “some reduction exists, but I won’t tell you what”. Note that if you actually accepted “The mind equals the brain!” as an answer to consciousness, it would also constitute a mysterious answer to a mysterious question: believing it would not make you any less confused. The answer is when consciousness stops being mysterious—this requires an actual reduction, not just a flat assertion that a reduction exists.
Which, of course, it does.