I feel agreement with “I would sooner associate consciousness with the change in a brain than with the brain itself, if I had to pick one or the other.”, and yet I wonder. Doesn’t a configuration space contain the fact that change is occurring, at least in the sense that it contains the informational content of relative velocities, not just of relative positions? Also, I have long asserted that experience associated with static configurations seems to me to be close to isomorphic to experience associated with multiple instantiations of a computation. In any event, even if we have retained causality we have still eliminated change.
I feel agreement with “I would sooner associate consciousness with the change in a brain than with the brain itself, if I had to pick one or the other.”, and yet I wonder. Doesn’t a configuration space contain the fact that change is occurring, at least in the sense that it contains the informational content of relative velocities, not just of relative positions? Also, I have long asserted that experience associated with static configurations seems to me to be close to isomorphic to experience associated with multiple instantiations of a computation. In any event, even if we have retained causality we have still eliminated change.
Very good points Nick T!