In frequentism there is no such thing as a ‘probability of the hypothesis’, after all a hypothesis is either true or false and we don’t know which. So as a substitution frequentists consider the other conditional probability, the probability of seeing this data or worse provided the hypothesis is true, where worse must be defined beforehand. I’d say this is a wrong approach, a very very wrong approach.
That’s not a substitution, and it’s the probability of seeing the data provided the hypothesis is false, not true.
It gives the upper bound on the risk that you’re going to believe in a wrong thing if you follow the strategy of “do experiments, believe the hypothesis if confirmed”.
Mostly we want to update all probabilities until they’re very close to 0 or to 1 , because the uncertainty leads to loss of expected utility in the future decision making.
In frequentism there is no such thing as a ‘probability of the hypothesis’
Yeah, and in Bayesianism, any number between 0 and 1 will do—there’s still no such thing as a specific “probability of the hypothesis”, merely a change to an arbitrary number.
edit: it’s sort of like arguing that worst-case structural analysis of a building or a bridge is a “very very wrong approach”, and contrast it with some approach where you make up priors about the quality of concrete, and end up shaving a very very small percent off the construction cost, while building a weaker bridge which bites you in the ass eventually anyway when something unexpected happens to the bridge.
That’s not a substitution, and it’s the probability of seeing the data provided the hypothesis is false, not true.
It gives the upper bound on the risk that you’re going to believe in a wrong thing if you follow the strategy of “do experiments, believe the hypothesis if confirmed”.
Mostly we want to update all probabilities until they’re very close to 0 or to 1 , because the uncertainty leads to loss of expected utility in the future decision making.
Yeah, and in Bayesianism, any number between 0 and 1 will do—there’s still no such thing as a specific “probability of the hypothesis”, merely a change to an arbitrary number.
edit: it’s sort of like arguing that worst-case structural analysis of a building or a bridge is a “very very wrong approach”, and contrast it with some approach where you make up priors about the quality of concrete, and end up shaving a very very small percent off the construction cost, while building a weaker bridge which bites you in the ass eventually anyway when something unexpected happens to the bridge.