“Belief in superintelligence” isn’t specific. A lot of AI scepticism is about claims of what happens when, not about what’s possible in a million years. And it’s easy to be wrong about the more specific claims. So under many specific senses of “belief in superintelligence” that someone might contest, the purpose of “dismantle the sceptics’ disbelief” might be epistemic violence or a bottom line written before an argument. Conversely, the sense of “belief in superintelligence” needs to be specific enough for it to be credible that it’s robustly and objectively correct, rather than a miscommunication about something genuinely contentious, a different epistemic status following a different intended meaning.
What analogies could one use to dismantle the sceptics’ disbelief?
“Belief in superintelligence” isn’t specific. A lot of AI scepticism is about claims of what happens when, not about what’s possible in a million years. And it’s easy to be wrong about the more specific claims. So under many specific senses of “belief in superintelligence” that someone might contest, the purpose of “dismantle the sceptics’ disbelief” might be epistemic violence or a bottom line written before an argument. Conversely, the sense of “belief in superintelligence” needs to be specific enough for it to be credible that it’s robustly and objectively correct, rather than a miscommunication about something genuinely contentious, a different epistemic status following a different intended meaning.