I definitely appreciate these scenarios, but it’s worth looking at where things don’t seem to fit, because people will often use these details to dismiss them.
In particular, this section seems to clash with my understanding of conflict logistics and incentives.
Data centers in China erupt with shrapnel. Military bases become smoking holes in the ground. Missiles from the PRC fly toward strategic targets in Hawaii, Guam, Alaska, and California. Some get through, and the public watch destruction on their home turf in awe.
Within two weeks, the United States and the PRC spend most of their stockpiles of conventional missiles
As far as I can tell, it’s 1) practically unfeasible and 2) misaligned with both sides’ incentives to deplete their stockpiles of short- to mid-range missiles on opposition soil in such a short timeframe.
For the PRC, the main objective would be to restore deterrence and maintain regional dominance. Some missile strikes might occur, but the focus would likely be on targeting naval forces, rather than widespread strikes on land targets. Both sides would prioritise controlling the South China Sea, focusing on air superiority, naval engagements etc. The PRC wouldn’t want to spread themselves too thin, they might instead try to force the Taiwan issue through strikes on naval defences and regional infrastructure.
If the PRC continued to escalate to U.S. bases to knock-out naval and air support to the South China Sea, it’s only feasible that they’d focus on bases they could reach with land-based missiles (max range 3100 miles), like Guam and Okinawa. Striking the U.S. mainland would be logistically impractical, because China doesn’t have missile platforms anywhere nearby. Also, many of their longer-range missiles are dual-use (nuclear and conventional), so large-scale non-nuclear strikes would scupper their own deterrence. It’s also massively escalatory to attack the mainland, and risks direct nuclear exchange (where U.S. would dominate, despite massive destruction on both sides).
Also, in terms of “depleting all their stockpiles”, I don’t think either side would be able to deploy their stockpiles within two weeks. The U.S. has a decent missile stockpile deployed on submarines and Pacific fleet vessels (maybe 1⁄3 of their total), which could be launched within a few days. But even if they wanted to instantly restock Tomahawk stockpiles to keep on blasting away at the Chinese mainland, it’d take well over two weeks to get stuff over from the Atlantic, and they wouldn’t have much strategic incentive to do so.
This is partly because you get diminishing returns on missile strikes. Each additional missile has less marginal impact as key targets are destroyed or degraded and the comparative value of keeping missiles as strategic reserves for when new high-value targets emerge increases.
I definitely appreciate these scenarios, but it’s worth looking at where things don’t seem to fit, because people will often use these details to dismiss them.
In particular, this section seems to clash with my understanding of conflict logistics and incentives.
As far as I can tell, it’s 1) practically unfeasible and 2) misaligned with both sides’ incentives to deplete their stockpiles of short- to mid-range missiles on opposition soil in such a short timeframe.
For the PRC, the main objective would be to restore deterrence and maintain regional dominance. Some missile strikes might occur, but the focus would likely be on targeting naval forces, rather than widespread strikes on land targets. Both sides would prioritise controlling the South China Sea, focusing on air superiority, naval engagements etc. The PRC wouldn’t want to spread themselves too thin, they might instead try to force the Taiwan issue through strikes on naval defences and regional infrastructure.
If the PRC continued to escalate to U.S. bases to knock-out naval and air support to the South China Sea, it’s only feasible that they’d focus on bases they could reach with land-based missiles (max range 3100 miles), like Guam and Okinawa. Striking the U.S. mainland would be logistically impractical, because China doesn’t have missile platforms anywhere nearby. Also, many of their longer-range missiles are dual-use (nuclear and conventional), so large-scale non-nuclear strikes would scupper their own deterrence. It’s also massively escalatory to attack the mainland, and risks direct nuclear exchange (where U.S. would dominate, despite massive destruction on both sides).
Also, in terms of “depleting all their stockpiles”, I don’t think either side would be able to deploy their stockpiles within two weeks. The U.S. has a decent missile stockpile deployed on submarines and Pacific fleet vessels (maybe 1⁄3 of their total), which could be launched within a few days. But even if they wanted to instantly restock Tomahawk stockpiles to keep on blasting away at the Chinese mainland, it’d take well over two weeks to get stuff over from the Atlantic, and they wouldn’t have much strategic incentive to do so.
This is partly because you get diminishing returns on missile strikes. Each additional missile has less marginal impact as key targets are destroyed or degraded and the comparative value of keeping missiles as strategic reserves for when new high-value targets emerge increases.