Probability (for a Bayesian) is relative to a prior. There is always a prior: P(A|B) is the fundamental concept, not P(A). See, for example, Jaynes, chapter 1, pp.112ff., which is the point where he begins to construct a calculus for reasoning about “plausibilities”, and eventually, in chapter 2, derives their measurement by numbers in the range 0-1.
Probability (for a Bayesian) is relative to a prior. There is always a prior: P(A|B) is the fundamental concept, not P(A). See, for example, Jaynes, chapter 1, pp.112ff., which is the point where he begins to construct a calculus for reasoning about “plausibilities”, and eventually, in chapter 2, derives their measurement by numbers in the range 0-1.
This is true, and I can see why it could create some conflict in interpreting this question. Thanks.