If morality is utilitarianism, then means (and all actions) are justified if they are moral, i.e. if they lead to increased utility. Never the less, “The ends don’t justify the means” can be given a reasonable meaning; I have one which is perhaps more pedestrian than the one in the article.
If u(x, y) = ax + by with a < b, then sacrificing one y to gain one x is utility-lowering. The (partial) end of increasing x does not justify any means which decrease y by the same amount^1. Our values are multidimensional; no single dimension is worth maximizing at the cost of all other dimensions. There is such as thing as “too high a price”. There’s an “all else being equal (or sufficiently compensating, in something like a Kaldor-Hicks sense)” missing in “it would be good if I got bread <IT’S MISSING HERE>, therefore I’m justified in stealing bread”.
Essentially, TEDJTM can be understood as a caution that since we don’t know all our ends we don’t know how our actions impact our complete utility function(s).
I’m not sure how our awareness that our predictions are sometimes wrong is an argument in favor of particular policies, though. I can either do A or B. I’m convinced that A produces a net gain of 100 utils, whereas option B only nets us 1 util. Clearly option A is best. However, I am a mere human, and thus fallible; therefore, just to be prudently cautious—the ends don’t justify the means—I should choose option B. After all, there might be an option C with a net gain of 200 utils.
This might be perfectly true and ((meta)meta)rational, but I feel somehow mugged. I suspect TEDJTM proves me too muggable.
[1] Nor does it justify those means where a*dx + b*dy < 0 and dx is not equal to dy, I merely chose dx=dy because it’s simplest.
If morality is utilitarianism, then means (and all actions) are justified if they are moral, i.e. if they lead to increased utility. Never the less, “The ends don’t justify the means” can be given a reasonable meaning; I have one which is perhaps more pedestrian than the one in the article.
If u(x, y) = ax + by with a < b, then sacrificing one y to gain one x is utility-lowering. The (partial) end of increasing x does not justify any means which decrease y by the same amount^1. Our values are multidimensional; no single dimension is worth maximizing at the cost of all other dimensions. There is such as thing as “too high a price”. There’s an “all else being equal (or sufficiently compensating, in something like a Kaldor-Hicks sense)” missing in “it would be good if I got bread <IT’S MISSING HERE>, therefore I’m justified in stealing bread”.
Essentially, TEDJTM can be understood as a caution that since we don’t know all our ends we don’t know how our actions impact our complete utility function(s).
I’m not sure how our awareness that our predictions are sometimes wrong is an argument in favor of particular policies, though. I can either do A or B. I’m convinced that A produces a net gain of 100 utils, whereas option B only nets us 1 util. Clearly option A is best. However, I am a mere human, and thus fallible; therefore, just to be prudently cautious—the ends don’t justify the means—I should choose option B. After all, there might be an option C with a net gain of 200 utils.
This might be perfectly true and ((meta)meta)rational, but I feel somehow mugged. I suspect TEDJTM proves me too muggable.
[1] Nor does it justify those means where a*dx + b*dy < 0 and dx is not equal to dy, I merely chose dx=dy because it’s simplest.