I don’t think this matters all that much. In Newcomb’s problem, even though your decision is predetermined, you should still want to act as if you can affect the past, specifically Omega’s prediction.
There is no “ought” or “should” in a deterministic world of perfect predictors. There is only “is”. You are an algorithm and Omega knows how you will act. Your inner world is an artifact that gives you an illusion of decision making. The division is simple: one-boxers win, two-boxers lose, the thought process that leads to the action is irrelevant.
One-boxers win because they reasoned in their head that one-boxers win because of updateless decision theory or something so they “should” be a one-boxer. The decision is predetermined but the reasoning acts like it has a choice in the matter (and people who act like they have a choice in the matter win.) What carado is saying is that people who act like they can move around the realityfluid tend to win more, just like how people who act like they have a choice in Newcomb’s problem and one-box in Newcomb’s problem win even though they don’t have a choice in the matter.
None of this is relevant. I don’t like the “realityfluid” metaphor, either. You win because you like the number 1 more than number 2, or because you cannot count past 1, or because you have a fancy updateless model of the world, or because you have a completely wrong model of the world which nonetheless makes you one-box. You don’t need to “act like you have a choice” at all.
The difference between an expected utility maximizer using updateless decision theory and an entity who likes the number 1 more than the number 2, or who cannot count past 1, or who has a completely wrong model of the world which nonetheless makes it one-box is that the expected utility maximizer using updateless decision theory wins in scenarios outside of Newcomb’s problem where you may have to choose to $2 instead of $1, or have to count amounts of objects larger than 1, or have to believe true things. Similarly, an entity that “acts like they have a choice” generalizes well to other scenarios whereas these other possible entities don’t.
Yes, agents whose inner model is counting possible worlds, assigning probabilities and calculating expected utility can be successful in a wider variety of situations than someone who always picks 1. No, thinking like “an entity that “acts like they have a choice”″ does not generalize well, since “acting like you have choice” leads you to CDT and two-boxing.
I don’t think this matters all that much. In Newcomb’s problem, even though your decision is predetermined, you should still want to act as if you can affect the past, specifically Omega’s prediction.
There is no “ought” or “should” in a deterministic world of perfect predictors. There is only “is”. You are an algorithm and Omega knows how you will act. Your inner world is an artifact that gives you an illusion of decision making. The division is simple: one-boxers win, two-boxers lose, the thought process that leads to the action is irrelevant.
One-boxers win because they reasoned in their head that one-boxers win because of updateless decision theory or something so they “should” be a one-boxer. The decision is predetermined but the reasoning acts like it has a choice in the matter (and people who act like they have a choice in the matter win.) What carado is saying is that people who act like they can move around the realityfluid tend to win more, just like how people who act like they have a choice in Newcomb’s problem and one-box in Newcomb’s problem win even though they don’t have a choice in the matter.
None of this is relevant. I don’t like the “realityfluid” metaphor, either. You win because you like the number 1 more than number 2, or because you cannot count past 1, or because you have a fancy updateless model of the world, or because you have a completely wrong model of the world which nonetheless makes you one-box. You don’t need to “act like you have a choice” at all.
The difference between an expected utility maximizer using updateless decision theory and an entity who likes the number 1 more than the number 2, or who cannot count past 1, or who has a completely wrong model of the world which nonetheless makes it one-box is that the expected utility maximizer using updateless decision theory wins in scenarios outside of Newcomb’s problem where you may have to choose to $2 instead of $1, or have to count amounts of objects larger than 1, or have to believe true things. Similarly, an entity that “acts like they have a choice” generalizes well to other scenarios whereas these other possible entities don’t.
Yes, agents whose inner model is counting possible worlds, assigning probabilities and calculating expected utility can be successful in a wider variety of situations than someone who always picks 1. No, thinking like “an entity that “acts like they have a choice”″ does not generalize well, since “acting like you have choice” leads you to CDT and two-boxing.