My suspicion is that for any given “acausal trading partner” that someone may want to convince you about, there are an arbitrarily large number of other, rival “acausal trading partners” that they don’t want you to think about. And they all would want different things from you.
This is a generalization of the problem with Pascal’s wager: there are not just one, but any number of gods who might reward your faith in them; and you can’t a-priori pick out just one. Pascal is presented as presuming that the choice is between atheism and his culture’s traditional god; he doesn’t consider the teeming hordes of rival incompatible divinities that might be in the mix too.
My suspicion is that for any given “acausal trading partner” that someone may want to convince you about, there are an arbitrarily large number of other, rival “acausal trading partners” that they don’t want you to think about. And they all would want different things from you.
This is a generalization of the problem with Pascal’s wager: there are not just one, but any number of gods who might reward your faith in them; and you can’t a-priori pick out just one. Pascal is presented as presuming that the choice is between atheism and his culture’s traditional god; he doesn’t consider the teeming hordes of rival incompatible divinities that might be in the mix too.