The paper was better than I expected. Part of that is that I misunderstood what was meant by “normativism”—they actually excluded instrumental rationality, defined as “Behaving in such a way as to achieve one’s personal
goals.”
If we pull the now-possibly-standard LW trick of defining “ought” as “me::ought,” suddenly we’re all talking about instrumental rationality. There is some trouble because how we extract preferences from human brains is not fully determined, but that at least is a more “meta” level of normativism.
The paper was better than I expected. Part of that is that I misunderstood what was meant by “normativism”—they actually excluded instrumental rationality, defined as “Behaving in such a way as to achieve one’s personal goals.”
If we pull the now-possibly-standard LW trick of defining “ought” as “me::ought,” suddenly we’re all talking about instrumental rationality. There is some trouble because how we extract preferences from human brains is not fully determined, but that at least is a more “meta” level of normativism.