c. The abstraction wouldn’t be a very good abstraction if it fails to be similar to real machines except in what it abstracts away.
Tautologically, all equivalent models of computation are equivalent for this purpose.
The portion of the machine which is responsible for that computation was in a state which is isomorphic to “2+2” and is now in a state which is isomorphic to “4″.
The phrase “computing red” is too vague/lacking context to interpret.
Functions. Your report of how your algorithm feels from the inside is part of the output of the algorithm, and therefore of the function; a mind made of modules with no side-outputs would not have the corresponding “feelings”.
Neither consciousness nor computation exists in the axioms of a sensible Theory of Everything; both are descriptions of certain sorts of systems which are possible in any sufficiently complex universe, just as “7” occurs in descriptions of some states of any universe containing at least 7 objects.
No.
Consciousness is not a sharp-edged category. More usefully-described-as-conscious computations are less frequent in the space of all possible computations.
c. The abstraction wouldn’t be a very good abstraction if it fails to be similar to real machines except in what it abstracts away.
Tautologically, all equivalent models of computation are equivalent for this purpose.
The portion of the machine which is responsible for that computation was in a state which is isomorphic to “2+2” and is now in a state which is isomorphic to “4″.
The phrase “computing red” is too vague/lacking context to interpret.
Functions. Your report of how your algorithm feels from the inside is part of the output of the algorithm, and therefore of the function; a mind made of modules with no side-outputs would not have the corresponding “feelings”.
Neither consciousness nor computation exists in the axioms of a sensible Theory of Everything; both are descriptions of certain sorts of systems which are possible in any sufficiently complex universe, just as “7” occurs in descriptions of some states of any universe containing at least 7 objects.
No.
Consciousness is not a sharp-edged category. More usefully-described-as-conscious computations are less frequent in the space of all possible computations.