I think I’m beginning to remember...(from “Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance,” which was 15 years ago, for me)...
Everyone, dualists and physical materialists alike, may agree that the experience of redness is a real physical phenomenon (as something that occurs in the brain). But isn’t the qualia/dualism debate about whether a red object possesses a property (quality) of “redness”?
Am I being down-voted because you don’t think objects can possess qualia (like redness or beauty, etc) or because you don’t agree this is what the debate between physical materialists and dualists is about? I think it’s important to remember what the debate is originally about, because the way it’s being framed here, it doesn’t seem like there would be one.
Not downvoting you, but the debate isn’t about that. It would be more about “even if you knew all the physical facts about the brain, how those things implement the various algorithms the brain implements, etc, would there still be some aspect of redness that ‘transcends’ that, an epiphenomenon that one needs ADDITIONAL facts to learn about from the outside?” (well, okay, I guess that isn’t exactly true of all flavors of dualism… Since the flavors of dualism that have the dual properties actually have physical effects and so on would be a bit different, but then arguably one could even rephrase that sort of belief so that it’s not even a form of dualism anymore, or becomes an epiphenomena style of dualism)
What you’ve described is consistent with what I find on the internet and what s being discussed on this thread. I just thought there might be more to it..
I think I’m beginning to remember...(from “Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance,” which was 15 years ago, for me)...
Everyone, dualists and physical materialists alike, may agree that the experience of redness is a real physical phenomenon (as something that occurs in the brain). But isn’t the qualia/dualism debate about whether a red object possesses a property (quality) of “redness”?
Am I being down-voted because you don’t think objects can possess qualia (like redness or beauty, etc) or because you don’t agree this is what the debate between physical materialists and dualists is about? I think it’s important to remember what the debate is originally about, because the way it’s being framed here, it doesn’t seem like there would be one.
Not downvoting you, but the debate isn’t about that. It would be more about “even if you knew all the physical facts about the brain, how those things implement the various algorithms the brain implements, etc, would there still be some aspect of redness that ‘transcends’ that, an epiphenomenon that one needs ADDITIONAL facts to learn about from the outside?” (well, okay, I guess that isn’t exactly true of all flavors of dualism… Since the flavors of dualism that have the dual properties actually have physical effects and so on would be a bit different, but then arguably one could even rephrase that sort of belief so that it’s not even a form of dualism anymore, or becomes an epiphenomena style of dualism)
What you’ve described is consistent with what I find on the internet and what s being discussed on this thread. I just thought there might be more to it..