Most physicists were trained to think in terms of Popperian epistemology, which is strictly inferior to (dominated
by) Bayesian epistemology (if you don’t believe that, it’s not worth my time to debate).
I equate “Bayesian epistemology” with a better approximation of universal inference. It’s easy to generate example environments where Bayesian agents dominate Popperian agents, while the converse is never true. Popperian agents completely fail to generalize well from small noisy datasets. When you have very limited evidence, popperian reliance on hard logical falsifiability just fails.
This shouldn’t even really be up for debate—do you actually believe the opposite position, or are you just trolling?
Heh, ok. Thanks for your time!
Ok, so I lied, I’ll bite.
I equate “Bayesian epistemology” with a better approximation of universal inference. It’s easy to generate example environments where Bayesian agents dominate Popperian agents, while the converse is never true. Popperian agents completely fail to generalize well from small noisy datasets. When you have very limited evidence, popperian reliance on hard logical falsifiability just fails.
This shouldn’t even really be up for debate—do you actually believe the opposite position, or are you just trolling?