Yes I would agree that I’m trying to establish a theory of pure difference. That “they are all the same” in terms of only being differences is not a negative but a perk of the theory, its what makes it compatible with a monist materialism. As soon as you permit a positive meaning you must permit these different aspects or plains of existence.
Does pain really have no characteristic s other than being different from pleasure?
Pain is differentiated not just from pleasure but from all other experiences. Difference doesn’t all mean the same difference, I’m thinking of like neural net weights where each connection is some number between zero and one. When this becomes a many to many network of connections, the possible structural patterns can become quite complex. Its my hypothesis for example that pain has a unique structural pattern that comes from causing changes within many sensous input systems themselves, and is therefore characterized as “a mode of perceiving and subjective experience which is undesired”.
Obviously not, since humans have conditions in which qualia can go missing, or become hypertrophic, eg. colour blindness and synaesthesia.
Not sure I understand what the objection is here.
I don’t see why camp #1 requires dualism
Camp 1 is unable to account for self evident experience qua experience, it creates an outside to physical reality in saying “this isn’t worth addressing”, there’s what’s real and, perhaps uncharitably, what’s fiction. To create a truly material monist ontology you must create a material account of this fiction or belief or whatever experience. The failure to do this is a major error in analytic philosophy and the failure of people like Yudkowsky in my opinion.
Yes I would agree that I’m trying to establish a theory of pure difference. That “they are all the same” in terms of only being differences is not a negative but a perk of the theory, its what makes it compatible with a monist materialism. As soon as you permit a positive meaning you must permit these different aspects or plains of existence.
Pain is differentiated not just from pleasure but from all other experiences. Difference doesn’t all mean the same difference, I’m thinking of like neural net weights where each connection is some number between zero and one. When this becomes a many to many network of connections, the possible structural patterns can become quite complex. Its my hypothesis for example that pain has a unique structural pattern that comes from causing changes within many sensous input systems themselves, and is therefore characterized as “a mode of perceiving and subjective experience which is undesired”.
Not sure I understand what the objection is here.
Camp 1 is unable to account for self evident experience qua experience, it creates an outside to physical reality in saying “this isn’t worth addressing”, there’s what’s real and, perhaps uncharitably, what’s fiction. To create a truly material monist ontology you must create a material account of this fiction or belief or whatever experience. The failure to do this is a major error in analytic philosophy and the failure of people like Yudkowsky in my opinion.