Now that I have seeped in Less Wrong for another month, I would like to revisit the question of theism. I have always defined God to myself as “whatever is minimally required to make sense” since I have an innate belief that things should make sense. So I found it interesting that at Less Wrong, it is consistently maintained that nothing extra is needed. I found this idea very attractive and I have spent many hours here trying to learning what kind of world view is held here.
It has certainly been a challenging study in inference to figure out what Less Wrong is about. I’m only beginning to understand what “rationality” is (i.e., the core, fundamental principles) and I may only infer what it is by observing the arguments that rationalists make, considering of course the obvious complications that rationalists are not perfectly rational nor is there a single “rational” view.
I’ve observed sincerely, I think, to some extent, and I induce that the probability that “rationality” is a meaningful, self-consistent, complete theory is tiny. Do you guys know this? I suspect so, because there are ribbons, here and there, of the suggestion that meaning is actually indeed too much to ask of authentic observation of “reality”.
It is not obvious, of course, that any theory developed by human beings must be consistent and complete and meaningful. Perhaps, by some metric, rationality is as good a theory as another.
But theism. I don’t know if the assumption of God is necessary for a consistent and complete theory, but certainly it would be sufficient? I think I’ve heard from Bayesians before that God is not impossible, just extremely unlikely. Your argument from the beginning has been that belief in God is not justified. Yet, if belief in God results in a meaningful theory, isn’t that more justified than a set of beliefs that result in a meaningless theory?
Perhaps “God” is not the missing element required to make “rationality” consistent and complete—however, anything that I can think of adding that might fix the theory could be eliminated by exactly the same arguments that you use to eliminate belief in God. (For example: Truth. Love. Quality. etc.)
I’m hoping that someone here is much wiser than me and can point me in a fruitful direction. Can you validate the existence of the inconsistency I speak of, in your terms, and explain how you resolve it?
“I have always defined God to myself as “whatever is minimally required to make sense” since I have an innate belief (that I cannot excise, even if I wished to) that things should make sense.”
This is needlessly obscure and far from the normal meaning of the term, and the use of such a loaded word is suspicious.
and I induce that the probability that “rationality” is a meaningful (self-consistent, compete) theory is tiny.
A theory of what?
You seem to be expecting “rationality” to replace “God” in some slot; perhaps “theory of everything”. But this seems to me a category error, rationality being an activity, not an explanation.
Perhaps “God” is not the missing element required to make “rationality” consistent and complete—however, anything that I can think of adding that might fix the theory could be eliminated by exactly the same arguments that you use to eliminate belief in God. (For example: Truth. Love. Quality. etc.)
Truth, love, and quality are directly observable. Though I don’t see what you hope to do with them. I suspect that the missing element you see is actually an unnecessary element.
Could you explain what this missing element is missing from, and what it should supply?
Could you explain what this missing element is missing from, and what it should supply?
At that time, I was keenly experiencing the lack of an objective morality in the materialist worldview.
You seem to be expecting “rationality” to replace “God” in some slot; perhaps “theory of everything”. But this seems to me a category error, rationality being an activity, not an explanation.
This is exactly correct. I thought ‘rationality’ was a paradigm to replace a religious worldview. I probably meant ‘materialism’ everywhere I used the word ‘rationality’.
Now that I have seeped in Less Wrong for another month, I would like to revisit the question of theism. I have always defined God to myself as “whatever is minimally required to make sense” since I have an innate belief that things should make sense. So I found it interesting that at Less Wrong, it is consistently maintained that nothing extra is needed. I found this idea very attractive and I have spent many hours here trying to learning what kind of world view is held here.
It has certainly been a challenging study in inference to figure out what Less Wrong is about. I’m only beginning to understand what “rationality” is (i.e., the core, fundamental principles) and I may only infer what it is by observing the arguments that rationalists make, considering of course the obvious complications that rationalists are not perfectly rational nor is there a single “rational” view.
I’ve observed sincerely, I think, to some extent, and I induce that the probability that “rationality” is a meaningful, self-consistent, complete theory is tiny. Do you guys know this? I suspect so, because there are ribbons, here and there, of the suggestion that meaning is actually indeed too much to ask of authentic observation of “reality”.
It is not obvious, of course, that any theory developed by human beings must be consistent and complete and meaningful. Perhaps, by some metric, rationality is as good a theory as another.
But theism. I don’t know if the assumption of God is necessary for a consistent and complete theory, but certainly it would be sufficient? I think I’ve heard from Bayesians before that God is not impossible, just extremely unlikely. Your argument from the beginning has been that belief in God is not justified. Yet, if belief in God results in a meaningful theory, isn’t that more justified than a set of beliefs that result in a meaningless theory?
Perhaps “God” is not the missing element required to make “rationality” consistent and complete—however, anything that I can think of adding that might fix the theory could be eliminated by exactly the same arguments that you use to eliminate belief in God. (For example: Truth. Love. Quality. etc.)
I’m hoping that someone here is much wiser than me and can point me in a fruitful direction. Can you validate the existence of the inconsistency I speak of, in your terms, and explain how you resolve it?
“I have always defined God to myself as “whatever is minimally required to make sense” since I have an innate belief (that I cannot excise, even if I wished to) that things should make sense.”
This is needlessly obscure and far from the normal meaning of the term, and the use of such a loaded word is suspicious.
and I induce that the probability that “rationality” is a meaningful (self-consistent, compete) theory is tiny.
A theory of what?
You seem to be expecting “rationality” to replace “God” in some slot; perhaps “theory of everything”. But this seems to me a category error, rationality being an activity, not an explanation.
Perhaps “God” is not the missing element required to make “rationality” consistent and complete—however, anything that I can think of adding that might fix the theory could be eliminated by exactly the same arguments that you use to eliminate belief in God. (For example: Truth. Love. Quality. etc.)
Truth, love, and quality are directly observable. Though I don’t see what you hope to do with them. I suspect that the missing element you see is actually an unnecessary element.
Could you explain what this missing element is missing from, and what it should supply?
At that time, I was keenly experiencing the lack of an objective morality in the materialist worldview.
This is exactly correct. I thought ‘rationality’ was a paradigm to replace a religious worldview. I probably meant ‘materialism’ everywhere I used the word ‘rationality’.