Wedrifid’s comment here is similar to this post. If you really value measure and probability differently, then you should be open to quite strange trade proposals. For me, this serves as a reductio ad absurdum, my conclusion is that one really should value them the same.
Would you similarly consider 90% chance of total extinction and destruction of the universe, equivalent with killing 9/10th of the human race (and 9/10th of the universe)?
Hm, in that case I guess I would prefer deterministically destroying 90% of the universe. A universe with 10% persons is a bigger improvement over the empty universe than a universe with 100% persons is over the 10% universe, so we have a convex utility function and risk aversion. As you write, to be indifferent I guess I would have to subscribe to a “strong total utilitarian” principle, that I value a universe exactly according to the number of people in it.
I take it that your argument is that the same reasoning should apply to multiverses, and we should pick the alternative that leaves a guaranteed 10% remaining Everett branches? That’s a neat perspective which I had not appreciated before: the quantum process is more deterministic than the logical process, since it destroys (part of) the multiverse deterministically instead of subjectively-randomly.
I note that for this argument to go through, you need that our utility function over different multiverses really is convex, which you didn’t argue for. We choose between different universes every day, so we have relatively well-developed intuitions about which universe we prefer. I rarely think about which multiverse I prefer to live in, so I’m less confident that the utilitarian principle is wrong there. And rejecting it leads to the strange trades.
I feel this discussion doesn’t capture my first intuition about the problem, though, which is about subjective versus objective probability. If I knew what the 10^100th digit was, then of course I would have an opinion about whether I wanted the digit or the qubit to decide. But when I don’t know either way, it seems weird to care about the exact mechanism used to set off the bomb. So it seems that not only do I value the collection of quantum future worlds as a sum weighted by their measure, I would also extend this to the collection of possible future worlds. (Where a world is possible if as far as I know it could happen).
I note that for this argument to go through, you need that our utility function over different multiverses really is convex, which you didn’t argue for.
I would agree with that (on grounds of excessive duplication of almost-identical agents, for one), but the point for this post is more to get people reactions than to push a particular theory.
Wedrifid’s comment here is similar to this post. If you really value measure and probability differently, then you should be open to quite strange trade proposals. For me, this serves as a reductio ad absurdum, my conclusion is that one really should value them the same.
Would you similarly consider 90% chance of total extinction and destruction of the universe, equivalent with killing 9/10th of the human race (and 9/10th of the universe)?
Hm, in that case I guess I would prefer deterministically destroying 90% of the universe. A universe with 10% persons is a bigger improvement over the empty universe than a universe with 100% persons is over the 10% universe, so we have a convex utility function and risk aversion. As you write, to be indifferent I guess I would have to subscribe to a “strong total utilitarian” principle, that I value a universe exactly according to the number of people in it.
I take it that your argument is that the same reasoning should apply to multiverses, and we should pick the alternative that leaves a guaranteed 10% remaining Everett branches? That’s a neat perspective which I had not appreciated before: the quantum process is more deterministic than the logical process, since it destroys (part of) the multiverse deterministically instead of subjectively-randomly.
I note that for this argument to go through, you need that our utility function over different multiverses really is convex, which you didn’t argue for. We choose between different universes every day, so we have relatively well-developed intuitions about which universe we prefer. I rarely think about which multiverse I prefer to live in, so I’m less confident that the utilitarian principle is wrong there. And rejecting it leads to the strange trades.
I feel this discussion doesn’t capture my first intuition about the problem, though, which is about subjective versus objective probability. If I knew what the 10^100th digit was, then of course I would have an opinion about whether I wanted the digit or the qubit to decide. But when I don’t know either way, it seems weird to care about the exact mechanism used to set off the bomb. So it seems that not only do I value the collection of quantum future worlds as a sum weighted by their measure, I would also extend this to the collection of possible future worlds. (Where a world is possible if as far as I know it could happen).
I would agree with that (on grounds of excessive duplication of almost-identical agents, for one), but the point for this post is more to get people reactions than to push a particular theory.