I think this is a strong argument here for genetic diversity, but a very weak one for saying there isn’t a unambiguous universal “good” direction for genes. So I agree that the case strongly implies part of your conclusion, that the state should not intervene to stop people from choosing “bad” genomes, but it might imply something much stronger; humanity has a widely shared benefit from genetic diversity—one which will be under-provided by freedom for everyone choosing what they think is best, and it should therefore be subsidized.
Yeah, cognitive diversity is one of those aspects that could be subject to some collapse. Anomaly et al.[1] discuss this, though ultimately suggest regulatory parsimony, which I’d take even further and enshrine as a right to genomic liberty.
I feel only sort-of worried about this, though. There’s a few reasons (note: this is a biased list where I only list reasons I’m less worried; a better treatment would make the opposite case too, think about bad outcomes, investigate determinative facts, and then make judgements, etc.):
Although I want the tech to be strong, inexpensive, and widely accessible, in practice it will of course have a long road of innovation and uptake; I think I should be surprised if, 15 years after strong germline engineering technology is first relatively inexpensive (say for $10k / baby), more than half of parents in the US are using the technology.
Hopefully, many clinics would nudge parents to make a more reflective and personal choice, e.g. by asking “what about us do we want to see in our kids”, rather than just asking “how do we make a normal person / elite person / etc.”. (I’m not remotely confident clinics would do this, but.)
For better or worse, there will be a long period of time (decades, probably, at least) in which many traits, including / especially many cognitive traits (subfactors of intelligence, wisdom, curiosity, determination, etc etc) will be only weakly or not at all genomically steerable. It’s hard to define and measure many traits; and even if you can measure them, it’s hard to collect enough genotype/phenotype data to find weak polygenic associations. So there will be a lot of cognitive variation that isn’t subject to direct genomic vectoring. (Though they could be more weakly vectored if they correlate with traits, e.g. Big Five personality traits, that are studied and vectored.)
I expect the gene pool to remain quite diverse for a long time.
I expect many (most?) people to want to pass on their genes.
(As a touchpoint, though I’m probably kinda weird in this, I have some value placed on passing on most of my DNA segments at least once—though I certainly also want to pass on “worse” segments much less frequently than “better” segments.)
Most genomic vectoring methods (selection and editing) don’t affect the actual genome very much. You and I differ at O(10^6.5) genetic loci; strong editing edits O(10^2.5) loci; selection… well I’m not sure about the math, but it would probably be something like O(10^3) changes in expectation. (This doesn’t necessarily apply to whole genome synthesis, or to selection schemes that involve many donors, which could in theory hugely amplify some DNA segments in the next generation, though doing so to an extreme degree would be inadvisable.)
I therefore expect there to remain a large amount of genetic diversity. This doesn’t mean that there has to be trait-diversity, but it should imply that it would remain fairly easy (using germline engineering) to recover any previously-extant traits. In other words, even fairly extreme trait-diversity collapse would be not so hard to partially reverse (I mean, parents who want to buck the trend could do so).
For most traits, especially cognitive traits, there’s going to be lots variation that isn’t controlled by GE. E.g. nurture effects, environmental / developmental randomness, and nonlinear and weak effects of genes that haven’t been picked up in polygenic scores. This implies that, while in many cases you can significantly push the mean value of the trait among your possible future children, you can’t greatly tighten the distribution of the trait. The exact shape of this depends on the trait (how much we understand the genetics, how much overall variation there is, what the distribution-tails of the trait imply in practice for behavior). My guess is that in practice this implies you still have lots of trait-variation.
I expect that for lots of parents, for lots of traits, they just won’t especially care to or choose to genomically vector that trait much (though maybe it would be more common to avoid extremes of the trait).
For example, do I want to make my kid a bit uncommonly extraverted or introverted? Plausibly I’d develop some preference after thinking about it more, but I have less of an immediate preference compared to some other traits.
I, and I suspect many other parents, would be somewhat suspicious of many supposed polygenic scores and trait constructs and measurements. Such parents would either not GV those traits, or GV them less strongly, or only GV them after investing more thinking (and therefore would make generally better decisions).
I suspect many parents would specifically have a preference to not make genomic choices about e.g. personality traits.
I weakly expect lots of parents would want kids with a variety of values of many given traits. I would. E.g. if there’s a tradeoff between different subfactors of intelligence, I’d want one kid with a stronger genomic foundation for one of the subfactors, another with another, etc.; I might plausibly want a kid with slightly low conscientiousness (higher creativity, maybe) and another with slightly high conscientiousness (more industrious, maybe).
I expect there’s quite a lot of diversity in what parents view as desirable traits. Different parents will differently emphasize beneficence (wellbeing of the child), altruism (how the child contributes to helping others), or other criteria; and different parents will have different opinions about what traits contribute to those outcomes. I therefore suspect that collapsing all the way to just the traits that parents think they want in/for their future children, while that would plausibly be pretty bad, would still be quite far from total homongeneity.
I suspect many parents would want to see themselves in their children, i.e. pass on some of their traits. (I would.) So diversity of parents is reflected somewhat in diversity of kids.
In theory, in the medium-term (a couple generations), there should be socioeconomic feedback towards an equilibrium, where if a useful niche-strategy is undersupplied, then it’s demanded more, and some parents eventually notice and respond by trying to fill that niche. (On the other hand, it could be that some niches collapse due to undersupply, which could be harder to reverse.)
Even if the total envelope of trait-values decreases, that doesn’t necessarily mean the desirable variation decreases. In fact, what I hope, and also somewhat expect, is that you get an increased “medium frontier” of humanity: fewer extreme spikes in some dimensions (e.g. maybe no one with disagreeableness quotient >160, or sometehing), but more total weirdness because lots of kids each have several traits on which they’re 2 SDs away from the mean:
It would be interesting to poll parents to see what sorts of considerations they might take into account, and decisions they might make. One could also ask embryo screening companies.
Anomaly, Jonathan, Christopher Gyngell, and Julian Savulescu. ‘Great Minds Think Different: Preserving Cognitive Diversity in an Age of Gene Editing’. Bioethics 34, no. 1 (January 2020): 81–89. https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12585.
I think this is a strong argument here for genetic diversity, but a very weak one for saying there isn’t a unambiguous universal “good” direction for genes. So I agree that the case strongly implies part of your conclusion, that the state should not intervene to stop people from choosing “bad” genomes, but it might imply something much stronger; humanity has a widely shared benefit from genetic diversity—one which will be under-provided by freedom for everyone choosing what they think is best, and it should therefore be subsidized.
Yeah, cognitive diversity is one of those aspects that could be subject to some collapse. Anomaly et al.[1] discuss this, though ultimately suggest regulatory parsimony, which I’d take even further and enshrine as a right to genomic liberty.
I feel only sort-of worried about this, though. There’s a few reasons (note: this is a biased list where I only list reasons I’m less worried; a better treatment would make the opposite case too, think about bad outcomes, investigate determinative facts, and then make judgements, etc.):
Although I want the tech to be strong, inexpensive, and widely accessible, in practice it will of course have a long road of innovation and uptake; I think I should be surprised if, 15 years after strong germline engineering technology is first relatively inexpensive (say for $10k / baby), more than half of parents in the US are using the technology.
Hopefully, many clinics would nudge parents to make a more reflective and personal choice, e.g. by asking “what about us do we want to see in our kids”, rather than just asking “how do we make a normal person / elite person / etc.”. (I’m not remotely confident clinics would do this, but.)
For better or worse, there will be a long period of time (decades, probably, at least) in which many traits, including / especially many cognitive traits (subfactors of intelligence, wisdom, curiosity, determination, etc etc) will be only weakly or not at all genomically steerable. It’s hard to define and measure many traits; and even if you can measure them, it’s hard to collect enough genotype/phenotype data to find weak polygenic associations. So there will be a lot of cognitive variation that isn’t subject to direct genomic vectoring. (Though they could be more weakly vectored if they correlate with traits, e.g. Big Five personality traits, that are studied and vectored.)
I expect the gene pool to remain quite diverse for a long time.
I expect many (most?) people to want to pass on their genes.
(As a touchpoint, though I’m probably kinda weird in this, I have some value placed on passing on most of my DNA segments at least once—though I certainly also want to pass on “worse” segments much less frequently than “better” segments.)
Most genomic vectoring methods (selection and editing) don’t affect the actual genome very much. You and I differ at O(10^6.5) genetic loci; strong editing edits O(10^2.5) loci; selection… well I’m not sure about the math, but it would probably be something like O(10^3) changes in expectation. (This doesn’t necessarily apply to whole genome synthesis, or to selection schemes that involve many donors, which could in theory hugely amplify some DNA segments in the next generation, though doing so to an extreme degree would be inadvisable.)
I therefore expect there to remain a large amount of genetic diversity. This doesn’t mean that there has to be trait-diversity, but it should imply that it would remain fairly easy (using germline engineering) to recover any previously-extant traits. In other words, even fairly extreme trait-diversity collapse would be not so hard to partially reverse (I mean, parents who want to buck the trend could do so).
For most traits, especially cognitive traits, there’s going to be lots variation that isn’t controlled by GE. E.g. nurture effects, environmental / developmental randomness, and nonlinear and weak effects of genes that haven’t been picked up in polygenic scores. This implies that, while in many cases you can significantly push the mean value of the trait among your possible future children, you can’t greatly tighten the distribution of the trait. The exact shape of this depends on the trait (how much we understand the genetics, how much overall variation there is, what the distribution-tails of the trait imply in practice for behavior). My guess is that in practice this implies you still have lots of trait-variation.
I expect that for lots of parents, for lots of traits, they just won’t especially care to or choose to genomically vector that trait much (though maybe it would be more common to avoid extremes of the trait).
For example, do I want to make my kid a bit uncommonly extraverted or introverted? Plausibly I’d develop some preference after thinking about it more, but I have less of an immediate preference compared to some other traits.
I, and I suspect many other parents, would be somewhat suspicious of many supposed polygenic scores and trait constructs and measurements. Such parents would either not GV those traits, or GV them less strongly, or only GV them after investing more thinking (and therefore would make generally better decisions).
I suspect many parents would specifically have a preference to not make genomic choices about e.g. personality traits.
I weakly expect lots of parents would want kids with a variety of values of many given traits. I would. E.g. if there’s a tradeoff between different subfactors of intelligence, I’d want one kid with a stronger genomic foundation for one of the subfactors, another with another, etc.; I might plausibly want a kid with slightly low conscientiousness (higher creativity, maybe) and another with slightly high conscientiousness (more industrious, maybe).
I expect there’s quite a lot of diversity in what parents view as desirable traits. Different parents will differently emphasize beneficence (wellbeing of the child), altruism (how the child contributes to helping others), or other criteria; and different parents will have different opinions about what traits contribute to those outcomes. I therefore suspect that collapsing all the way to just the traits that parents think they want in/for their future children, while that would plausibly be pretty bad, would still be quite far from total homongeneity.
I suspect many parents would want to see themselves in their children, i.e. pass on some of their traits. (I would.) So diversity of parents is reflected somewhat in diversity of kids.
In theory, in the medium-term (a couple generations), there should be socioeconomic feedback towards an equilibrium, where if a useful niche-strategy is undersupplied, then it’s demanded more, and some parents eventually notice and respond by trying to fill that niche. (On the other hand, it could be that some niches collapse due to undersupply, which could be harder to reverse.)
Even if the total envelope of trait-values decreases, that doesn’t necessarily mean the desirable variation decreases. In fact, what I hope, and also somewhat expect, is that you get an increased “medium frontier” of humanity: fewer extreme spikes in some dimensions (e.g. maybe no one with disagreeableness quotient >160, or sometehing), but more total weirdness because lots of kids each have several traits on which they’re 2 SDs away from the mean:
It would be interesting to poll parents to see what sorts of considerations they might take into account, and decisions they might make. One could also ask embryo screening companies.
Anomaly, Jonathan, Christopher Gyngell, and Julian Savulescu. ‘Great Minds Think Different: Preserving Cognitive Diversity in an Age of Gene Editing’. Bioethics 34, no. 1 (January 2020): 81–89. https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12585.