The areas where strong evidence is common are largely those areas we don’t intuitively think of as governed by probability theory and where classic logic performs well.
I’m pretty sure that statistics (as mathematics) all assume ‘logic’ (first-order logic at least), so I think this is also technically correct!
Gathering enough evidence sometimes allows reasoning to be performed using propositional logic with acceptable results.
Yes! Being able to use logic can be a fantastic super-power (when it works). Sometimes the universe really is like a Sudoku puzzle!
Being able to use both probabilities and logical statements, and appropriately, is a significant part of what I think David Chapman is gesturing at with what he calls ‘meta-rationality’. And beyond both of those formal rational systems, there’s an entire Platonic universe of alternative ontologies that can also be useful in some contexts (and for some purposes).
This comment is insightful!
I’m pretty sure that statistics (as mathematics) all assume ‘logic’ (first-order logic at least), so I think this is also technically correct!
Yes! Being able to use logic can be a fantastic super-power (when it works). Sometimes the universe really is like a Sudoku puzzle!
Being able to use both probabilities and logical statements, and appropriately, is a significant part of what I think David Chapman is gesturing at with what he calls ‘meta-rationality’. And beyond both of those formal rational systems, there’s an entire Platonic universe of alternative ontologies that can also be useful in some contexts (and for some purposes).