All of the evidence shows flaws in our predictive ability, our memory, and our language. I don’t see any contradictions or wrongness...
Of course it’s logically possible that we could still be ‘right’ about our subjective experience but then have our model be immediately corrupted by memory and language, but given the above I see little reason to expect that.
But even if we are ‘right’ about our subjective experiences, but then our ability to think correctly about our subjective experience is immediately corrupted by memory and language, that still blocks our ability to use subjective experience for certain grounding in a foundationalist epistemology, for example.
It’s a bit more than a “logical possibility.” Consider these two options:
We actually dream in color, but we experience it as black and white, and remember it and report it correctly.
We actually dream in color, but we don’t remember it very well (particularly old dreams, and particularly because the memory centers of the brain do not function properly during dreaming), so our answers to questions about old dreams are inaccurate, possibly biased by television or our most recent memory or some other factor we’re unaware of.
It’s unclear to me that your position is logically possible, insofar as it is represented by 1. I don’t know what it means for a subjective experience to be something different from how it is experienced. I know exactly how things can be misremembered, I do it all the time. So it’s 2, which is not merely logically possible, but actually relies on a common and pretty unremarkable phenomenon, versus 1, which actually may not be logically possible because it doesn’t seem to actually mean anything.
As for your second point—didn’t say immediate, but I think you need to be a bit more specific than “certain grounding in a foundationalist epistemology.” I can’t disagree with you because I’m not entirely sure what you’re saying. If you can point to a specific epistemological problem that arises from any of the problems you’ve pointed out, well, that’d make this discussion a whole lot more useful.
Of course it’s logically possible that we could still be ‘right’ about our subjective experience but then have our model be immediately corrupted by memory and language, but given the above I see little reason to expect that.
But even if we are ‘right’ about our subjective experiences, but then our ability to think correctly about our subjective experience is immediately corrupted by memory and language, that still blocks our ability to use subjective experience for certain grounding in a foundationalist epistemology, for example.
It’s a bit more than a “logical possibility.” Consider these two options:
We actually dream in color, but we experience it as black and white, and remember it and report it correctly.
We actually dream in color, but we don’t remember it very well (particularly old dreams, and particularly because the memory centers of the brain do not function properly during dreaming), so our answers to questions about old dreams are inaccurate, possibly biased by television or our most recent memory or some other factor we’re unaware of.
It’s unclear to me that your position is logically possible, insofar as it is represented by 1. I don’t know what it means for a subjective experience to be something different from how it is experienced. I know exactly how things can be misremembered, I do it all the time. So it’s 2, which is not merely logically possible, but actually relies on a common and pretty unremarkable phenomenon, versus 1, which actually may not be logically possible because it doesn’t seem to actually mean anything.
As for your second point—didn’t say immediate, but I think you need to be a bit more specific than “certain grounding in a foundationalist epistemology.” I can’t disagree with you because I’m not entirely sure what you’re saying. If you can point to a specific epistemological problem that arises from any of the problems you’ve pointed out, well, that’d make this discussion a whole lot more useful.