I think Luke’s point is that people’s intuitions about the nature of their subjective experience / consciousness can sometimes be wrong. The human version of echolocation is admittedly very primitive, but you still experience changes in sound and sound patterns. People think that when they imagine something, they see it sort of like a photograph, but in fact they don’t (though some might do).
or that I feel I am not driving when I am
But you do, to a certain extent. When you’re absorbed in some conversation while driving to work, you could realize at some point that (almost?) none of your conscious attention is focused on the driving and is instead focused on the conversation. Your driving is automatic, without any need for much conscious input, unless something unusual happens.
“X is a subjective experience that is wrong.”
He isn’t saying that some subjective experience is wrong (I’m not even sure what that means), he’s saying that the way you (intuitively) think you’re experiencing something can be different from the way you actually experience it.
Edit: I think I do agree, though, with Yvain’s point that probably none of these examples would’ve changed Decartes’ mind.
I think Luke’s point is that people’s intuitions about the nature of their subjective experience / consciousness can sometimes be wrong. The human version of echolocation is admittedly very primitive, but you still experience changes in sound and sound patterns. People think that when they imagine something, they see it sort of like a photograph, but in fact they don’t (though some might do).
But you do, to a certain extent. When you’re absorbed in some conversation while driving to work, you could realize at some point that (almost?) none of your conscious attention is focused on the driving and is instead focused on the conversation. Your driving is automatic, without any need for much conscious input, unless something unusual happens.
He isn’t saying that some subjective experience is wrong (I’m not even sure what that means), he’s saying that the way you (intuitively) think you’re experiencing something can be different from the way you actually experience it.
Edit: I think I do agree, though, with Yvain’s point that probably none of these examples would’ve changed Decartes’ mind.