You present some interesting material but I don’t think it supports your conclusion. For example, that I am unaware of some of my perceptual abilities does not entail that I’m wrong about my own subjective experience. Subjective experience is generally taken to mean consciousness and I cannot be conscious of something of which I am unaware. Perhaps my hidden talent for echolocation has covertly aided me in the past but, by definition, it can’t be part of what I was conscious of and therefore wasn’t part of my subjective experience. This also applies to your example of the persistence of experience.
Seeing the elliptical occlusion shape of the coin is how we see that it is circular—i.e., a circular coin has an elliptical occlusion shape relative to a line of sight. The elliptical occlusion shape of the coin isn’t subjective at all. It’s an objective fact about coins that they have elliptical occlusion shapes relative to a given line of sight (this is easily seen by tracing the outline of a coin on a pane of glass).
Schwitzegebel’s questions about the imagined scene cause confusion because they don’t apply to an imagined scene. You can imagine a house with a red door but if you imagine a house you cannot discover that it has a red door (although you can imagine that you discovered a house had a red door). Similarly, you can dream of colour, but it’s senseless to ask if somebody dreams in colour. If I frequently dream of the house with the red door I might tell you, with certainty, that of course I dream in colour but if I simply dream about a house I might report my dreams as colourless.
You present some interesting material but I don’t think it supports your conclusion. For example, that I am unaware of some of my perceptual abilities does not entail that I’m wrong about my own subjective experience. Subjective experience is generally taken to mean consciousness and I cannot be conscious of something of which I am unaware. Perhaps my hidden talent for echolocation has covertly aided me in the past but, by definition, it can’t be part of what I was conscious of and therefore wasn’t part of my subjective experience. This also applies to your example of the persistence of experience.
Seeing the elliptical occlusion shape of the coin is how we see that it is circular—i.e., a circular coin has an elliptical occlusion shape relative to a line of sight. The elliptical occlusion shape of the coin isn’t subjective at all. It’s an objective fact about coins that they have elliptical occlusion shapes relative to a given line of sight (this is easily seen by tracing the outline of a coin on a pane of glass).
Schwitzegebel’s questions about the imagined scene cause confusion because they don’t apply to an imagined scene. You can imagine a house with a red door but if you imagine a house you cannot discover that it has a red door (although you can imagine that you discovered a house had a red door). Similarly, you can dream of colour, but it’s senseless to ask if somebody dreams in colour. If I frequently dream of the house with the red door I might tell you, with certainty, that of course I dream in colour but if I simply dream about a house I might report my dreams as colourless.