I certainly find that I like creative work but don’t want to work, like music but don’t want to listen to music, like exercise but (sometimes) don’t want to exercise. I like volunteering, but don’t want to volunteer. (Perhaps tautologically) I like being in a good mood but sometimes don’t want to be in a good mood.
From that short list, it seems that one ought to give more credence to “like” than “want.” What I like doing, in the moment, correlates fairly well with conventional judgments of good behavior. (To be fair, some of what I like most—learning about what interests me, friendly discussions/conversations—are not particularly good behavior.)
But having kids, for instance, is something that people want but don’t like, and it certainly falls into the good behavior category. Working a dull job for pay. Any kind of goal that is about the destination rather than the journey—curing a disease or securing a civil right or a similar aim—may well be a process you dislike. Exposing yourself to danger. I don’t think these are failures to properly estimate future happiness, I think these are examples of not caring about future happiness. (This is a friend of mine’s argument against utilitarianism—there are things he wants that he knows he will not like, and he doesn’t want anyone forcing him to make his opioids happy against his will.)
I would guess that liking is more uniform than wanting. You can choose to value almost anything, and therefore want almost anything. What you like may be neurologically determined. Which may be why in my observation “liking” corresponds so well with being healthy, productive, well-rounded, and so on; I suspect you like, in a rough sense, what is good for you. Whereas you may want a variety of things that are not good for you, whether in a destructive sense or a noble sense.
I certainly find that I like creative work but don’t want to work, like music but don’t want to listen to music, like exercise but (sometimes) don’t want to exercise. I like volunteering, but don’t want to volunteer. (Perhaps tautologically) I like being in a good mood but sometimes don’t want to be in a good mood.
From that short list, it seems that one ought to give more credence to “like” than “want.” What I like doing, in the moment, correlates fairly well with conventional judgments of good behavior. (To be fair, some of what I like most—learning about what interests me, friendly discussions/conversations—are not particularly good behavior.)
But having kids, for instance, is something that people want but don’t like, and it certainly falls into the good behavior category. Working a dull job for pay. Any kind of goal that is about the destination rather than the journey—curing a disease or securing a civil right or a similar aim—may well be a process you dislike. Exposing yourself to danger. I don’t think these are failures to properly estimate future happiness, I think these are examples of not caring about future happiness. (This is a friend of mine’s argument against utilitarianism—there are things he wants that he knows he will not like, and he doesn’t want anyone forcing him to make his opioids happy against his will.)
I would guess that liking is more uniform than wanting. You can choose to value almost anything, and therefore want almost anything. What you like may be neurologically determined. Which may be why in my observation “liking” corresponds so well with being healthy, productive, well-rounded, and so on; I suspect you like, in a rough sense, what is good for you. Whereas you may want a variety of things that are not good for you, whether in a destructive sense or a noble sense.