Hrm, I think you’re still not getting it. It’s not that a chicken, pig, or cow’s life is worth some minimal but comparable amount. Because even then there would be some threshold were N chickens, pigs, or cow happiness-meters (for some suitably large N) would be worth 1 human’s. The position is that they are utterly incomparable for the purpose of moral statements. This is a non-utilitarian position. What is rejected is the additive property: you can’t take two bad events, add their “badness” together and argue that they are worse than some other single event that is by itself rated worse than one of the originals.
Some non-utilitarians say that certain utilities are of different classes and incomparable. Others say that utilities are comparable but don’t add linearly. Others don’t know but simply say that torturing to prevent dust in the eyes of any number of people just plain doesn’t feel right and any moral framework that allows that must be suspect, without offering an alternative.
In any of those cases, establishing the moral value of an animal is not obviously relevant to whether it is moral for humans to eat them.
It’s not that a chicken, pig, or cow’s life is worth some minimal but comparable amount. Because even then there would be some threshold were N chickens, pigs, or cow happiness-meters (for some suitably large N) would be worth 1 human’s.
I’m arguing they are comparable. See, I don’t think the N is that large.
is not obviously relevant to whether it is moral for humans to eat them.
At this point I don’t know whether you are not engaging honestly or purposefully trolling. Either way this discussion is without purpose, and I have no interest to engage further.
Hrm, I think you’re still not getting it. It’s not that a chicken, pig, or cow’s life is worth some minimal but comparable amount. Because even then there would be some threshold were N chickens, pigs, or cow happiness-meters (for some suitably large N) would be worth 1 human’s. The position is that they are utterly incomparable for the purpose of moral statements. This is a non-utilitarian position. What is rejected is the additive property: you can’t take two bad events, add their “badness” together and argue that they are worse than some other single event that is by itself rated worse than one of the originals.
Some non-utilitarians say that certain utilities are of different classes and incomparable. Others say that utilities are comparable but don’t add linearly. Others don’t know but simply say that torturing to prevent dust in the eyes of any number of people just plain doesn’t feel right and any moral framework that allows that must be suspect, without offering an alternative.
In any of those cases, establishing the moral value of an animal is not obviously relevant to whether it is moral for humans to eat them.
I’m arguing they are comparable. See, I don’t think the N is that large.
Sure it is. That’s the crux of the matter.
In non-utilitarian morality 1 + 1 =/= 2. Sometimes 1 + 1 = 1. Does that make sense?
Yes it does. I’m just arguing that they are comparable.
At this point I don’t know whether you are not engaging honestly or purposefully trolling. Either way this discussion is without purpose, and I have no interest to engage further.