It feels like a red herring to focus on anti-hypocrisy norms. As you mentioned, the current norms are something like, “Hypocrisy is bad, don’t trust hypocrites, and you can publicly call someone out on being a hypocrite”.
Someone being hypocritical should not be a make or break data-point that effects whether or not I believe them. It should effect how much epistemic effort I put into the interaction. Detecting hypocrisy should be a signal of, “It’s possible something fishy could be going on, so I’m going to bring more mental resources to the table.”
So I definitely don’t think that someone should ignore hypocrisy.
I’m unsure about the consequences of doing away with the social norm of being able to use hypocrisy as a defensible reason to not listen to someone. I don’t encounter a lot of adversarial situations, and thus am not very emotionally compelled by needing socially defensible out.
Yeah, I think it may be a red herring. The argument I really wanted to make was focused on the epistemic aspect of the anti-hypocrisy flinch. I brought in a norm debate without thinking enough about the distinction.
It feels like a red herring to focus on anti-hypocrisy norms. As you mentioned, the current norms are something like, “Hypocrisy is bad, don’t trust hypocrites, and you can publicly call someone out on being a hypocrite”.
Someone being hypocritical should not be a make or break data-point that effects whether or not I believe them. It should effect how much epistemic effort I put into the interaction. Detecting hypocrisy should be a signal of, “It’s possible something fishy could be going on, so I’m going to bring more mental resources to the table.”
So I definitely don’t think that someone should ignore hypocrisy.
I’m unsure about the consequences of doing away with the social norm of being able to use hypocrisy as a defensible reason to not listen to someone. I don’t encounter a lot of adversarial situations, and thus am not very emotionally compelled by needing socially defensible out.
Yeah, I think it may be a red herring. The argument I really wanted to make was focused on the epistemic aspect of the anti-hypocrisy flinch. I brought in a norm debate without thinking enough about the distinction.