I think that’s actually a really terrible bit of arguing.
There are only two logically possible explanations: random chance, or design.
We can stop right there. If we’re all the way back at solipsism, we haven’t even gotten to defining concepts like ‘random chance’ or ‘design’, which presume an entire raft of external beliefs and assumptions, and we surely cannot immediately say there are only two categories unless, in response to any criticism, we’re going to include a hell of a lot under one of those two rubrics. Which probability are we going to use, anyway? There are many more formalized versions than just Kolmogorov’s axioms (which brings us to the analytic and synthetic problem).
And much of the rest goes on in a materialist vein which itself requires a lot of further justification (why can’t minds be ontologically simple elements? Oh, your experience in the real world with various regularities has persuaded you that is inconsistent with the evidence? I see...) Even if we granted his claims about complexity, why do we care about complexity? And so on.
Yes, if you’re going to buy into a (very large) number of materialist non-solipsist claims, then you’re going to have trouble making a case in such terms for solipsism. But if you’ve bought all those materialist or externalist claims, you’ve already rejected solipsism and there’s no tension in the first place. And he doesn’t do a good case of explaining that at all.
Good points, but then likewise how do you define and import the designations of ‘hand’ or ‘here’ and justify intuitions or a axiomatic system of logic (and I understood Carrier to be referring to epistemic solipsism like Moore—you seem to be going metaphysical)? (or were you not referring to Moore’s argument in the context of skepticism?)
I think Moore’s basic argument works on the level of epistemic skepticism, yes, but also metaphysics: some sort of regular metaphysics and externalism is what one believes, and what provides the grist for the philosophical mill. If you don’t credit the regular metaphysics, then why do you credit the reasoning and arguments which led you to the more exotic metaphysics?
I’m not sure what skeptical arguments it doesn’t work for. I think it may stop at the epistemic level, but that may just be because I’m having a hard time thinking of any ethics examples (which is my usual interest on the next level down of abstraction).
The way I see it, Moore’s argument gets you to where you’re uncertain of the reasoning pro or contra skepticism. But If you start from the position of epistemic solipsism (I know my own mind, but I’m uncertain of the external world), then you have reason (more or less depending how uncertain you are) to side with common sense. However, if you start at metaphysical solipsism (I’m uncertain of my own mind), then such an argument could even be reason to not side with common sense (e.g., there are little people in my mind trying to manipulate my beliefs; I must not allow them to).
I think that’s actually a really terrible bit of arguing.
We can stop right there. If we’re all the way back at solipsism, we haven’t even gotten to defining concepts like ‘random chance’ or ‘design’, which presume an entire raft of external beliefs and assumptions, and we surely cannot immediately say there are only two categories unless, in response to any criticism, we’re going to include a hell of a lot under one of those two rubrics. Which probability are we going to use, anyway? There are many more formalized versions than just Kolmogorov’s axioms (which brings us to the analytic and synthetic problem).
And much of the rest goes on in a materialist vein which itself requires a lot of further justification (why can’t minds be ontologically simple elements? Oh, your experience in the real world with various regularities has persuaded you that is inconsistent with the evidence? I see...) Even if we granted his claims about complexity, why do we care about complexity? And so on.
Yes, if you’re going to buy into a (very large) number of materialist non-solipsist claims, then you’re going to have trouble making a case in such terms for solipsism. But if you’ve bought all those materialist or externalist claims, you’ve already rejected solipsism and there’s no tension in the first place. And he doesn’t do a good case of explaining that at all.
Good points, but then likewise how do you define and import the designations of ‘hand’ or ‘here’ and justify intuitions or a axiomatic system of logic (and I understood Carrier to be referring to epistemic solipsism like Moore—you seem to be going metaphysical)? (or were you not referring to Moore’s argument in the context of skepticism?)
I think Moore’s basic argument works on the level of epistemic skepticism, yes, but also metaphysics: some sort of regular metaphysics and externalism is what one believes, and what provides the grist for the philosophical mill. If you don’t credit the regular metaphysics, then why do you credit the reasoning and arguments which led you to the more exotic metaphysics?
I’m not sure what skeptical arguments it doesn’t work for. I think it may stop at the epistemic level, but that may just be because I’m having a hard time thinking of any ethics examples (which is my usual interest on the next level down of abstraction).
The way I see it, Moore’s argument gets you to where you’re uncertain of the reasoning pro or contra skepticism. But If you start from the position of epistemic solipsism (I know my own mind, but I’m uncertain of the external world), then you have reason (more or less depending how uncertain you are) to side with common sense. However, if you start at metaphysical solipsism (I’m uncertain of my own mind), then such an argument could even be reason to not side with common sense (e.g., there are little people in my mind trying to manipulate my beliefs; I must not allow them to).