“But I tell you he couldn’t have written such a note!” cried Flambeau. “The note is utterly wrong about the facts. And innocent or guilty, Dr Hirsch knew all about the facts.”
“The man who wrote that note knew all about the facts,” said his clerical companion soberly. “He could never have got ‘em so wrong without knowing about ’em. You have to know an awful lot to be wrong on every subject—like the devil.”
“Do you mean—?”
“I mean a man telling lies on chance would have told some of the truth,” said his friend firmly. “Suppose someone sent you to find a house with a green door and a blue blind, with a front garden but no back garden, with a dog but no cat, and where they drank coffee but not tea. You would say if you found no such house that it was all made up. But I say no. I say if you found a house where the door was blue and the blind green, where there was a back garden and no front garden, where cats were common and dogs instantly shot, where tea was drunk in quarts and coffee forbidden—then you would know you had found the house. The man must have known that particular house to be so accurately inaccurate.”
If someone tells you the opposite of the truth in order to deceive you, and you believe the opposite of what they say because you know they are deceitful, then you believe the truth. (A knave is as good as a knight to a blind bat.) The problem is, a clever liar doesn’t lie all the time, but only when it matters.
Another problem is that for many interesting assertions X, opposite(opposite(X)) does not necessarily equal X. Indeed, opposite(opposite(X)) frequently implies NOT X.
Could you give an example? I would have thought this happens with Not(opposite(X)); for example, “I don’t hate you” is different than “I love you”, and in fact implies that I don’t. But I would have thought “opposite” was symmetric, so opposite(opposite(X)) = X.
Well, OK. So suppose (to stick with your example) I love you, and I want to deceive you about it by expressing the opposite of what I feel. So what do I say?
You seem to take for granted that opposite(“I love you”) = “I hate you.” And not, for example, “I am indifferent to you.” Or “You disgust me.” Or various other assertions. And, sure, if “I love you” has a single, unambiguous opposite, and the opposite also has a single, unambiguous opposite, then my statement is false. But it’s not clear to me that this is true.
If I end up saying “I’m indifferent to you” and you decide to believe the opposite of that… well, what do you believe?
Of course, simply negating the truth (“I don’t love you”) is unambiguously arrived at, and can be thought of as an opposite… though in practice, that’s often not what I actually do when I want to deceive someone, unless I’ve been specifically accused of the truth. (“We’re not giant purple tubes from outer space!”)
--G.K. Chesterton, “The Duel of Dr. Hirsch”
Reversed malevolence is intelligence?
Inverted information is not random noise.
...unless you’re reversing noise which is why Reverse Stupidity is not Intelligence.
If someone tells you the opposite of the truth in order to deceive you, and you believe the opposite of what they say because you know they are deceitful, then you believe the truth. (A knave is as good as a knight to a blind bat.) The problem is, a clever liar doesn’t lie all the time, but only when it matters.
It’s more likely that they’re a stupid liar than that they got it all wrong by chance.
Another problem is that for many interesting assertions X, opposite(opposite(X)) does not necessarily equal X. Indeed, opposite(opposite(X)) frequently implies NOT X.
Could you give an example? I would have thought this happens with Not(opposite(X)); for example, “I don’t hate you” is different than “I love you”, and in fact implies that I don’t. But I would have thought “opposite” was symmetric, so opposite(opposite(X)) = X.
Well, OK. So suppose (to stick with your example) I love you, and I want to deceive you about it by expressing the opposite of what I feel. So what do I say?
You seem to take for granted that opposite(“I love you”) = “I hate you.” And not, for example, “I am indifferent to you.” Or “You disgust me.” Or various other assertions. And, sure, if “I love you” has a single, unambiguous opposite, and the opposite also has a single, unambiguous opposite, then my statement is false. But it’s not clear to me that this is true.
If I end up saying “I’m indifferent to you” and you decide to believe the opposite of that… well, what do you believe?
Of course, simply negating the truth (“I don’t love you”) is unambiguously arrived at, and can be thought of as an opposite… though in practice, that’s often not what I actually do when I want to deceive someone, unless I’ve been specifically accused of the truth. (“We’re not giant purple tubes from outer space!”)