A problem in moving from game-theoretic models to the “real world” is that in the latter we don’t always know the other decision maker’s payoff matrix, we only know—at best! - his possible strategies. We can only guess at the other’s payoffs; albeit fairly well in social context. We are more likely to make a mistake because we have the wrong model for the opponent’s payoffs than because we make poor strategic decisions.
Suppose we change this game so that the payoff matrix for the paperclips is chosen from a suitably defined random distribution. How will that change your decision whether to “cooperate” or to “defect”?
A problem in moving from game-theoretic models to the “real world” is that in the latter we don’t always know the other decision maker’s payoff matrix, we only know—at best! - his possible strategies. We can only guess at the other’s payoffs; albeit fairly well in social context. We are more likely to make a mistake because we have the wrong model for the opponent’s payoffs than because we make poor strategic decisions.
Suppose we change this game so that the payoff matrix for the paperclips is chosen from a suitably defined random distribution. How will that change your decision whether to “cooperate” or to “defect”?