And that’s even if there is an error. A reckless financier who accepts a 89% chance of losing it all for an 11% chance of dectupling their empire would be rational if they truly had linear utility for money. (Even while sober people with sublinear utility functions shake their heads at the allegedly foolish spectacle of the bankruptcy in 89% of possible worlds.)
This is related to a very important point: Without more assumptions, there is no way to distinguish via outcomes the following 2 cases: irrationality while pursuing your values and being rational but having very different or strange values.
(Also, I dislike the implication that it all adds up to normality, unless something else is meant or it’s trivial, since you can’t define normality without a context.)
This is related to a very important point: Without more assumptions, there is no way to distinguish via outcomes the following 2 cases: irrationality while pursuing your values and being rational but having very different or strange values.
(Also, I dislike the implication that it all adds up to normality, unless something else is meant or it’s trivial, since you can’t define normality without a context.)