So, sometimes actions that are generally considered rational lead to bad results in certain situations. I agree with this.
However, how are we to identify and anticipate these situations? If you have a tool other than rationality, present it. If you have a means of showing its validity other than the rationalist methods we use here, present that as well.
To say that rationality itself is a problem leaves us completely unable to act.
So, sometimes actions that are generally considered rational lead to bad results in certain situations. I agree with this.
Well said! I was not trying to attack the use of rationality as a method, but rather to attack the immoderate use of this method. Rationality is a good and powerful tool for acting intentionally, but should there not be some regulation in its use? You state
To say that rationality itself is a problem leaves us completely unable to act.
I would counter: To say that there is no problem with rationality leaves us completely without reason to suspend action.
As you have suggested, rationality is a tool for action. Are there not times when it is harmful to not act? Are there no reasons to suspend action?
Which is why I call it rational irrationality, or rationally irrational if you would prefer.
I do think it is possible to semantically stretch the conception of rationality to cover this, but I still think a fundamental distinction needs to be acknowledged between rationality that leads to taking control in a situation, and rationality that leads to intentional inaction.
I feel like you are conflating terminal values (goals) and instrumental values (means/effectiveness) a little bit here. There’s really no good reason to adopt an instrumental value that doesn’t help you achieve your goals. But if you aren’t sure of what your goals are, then no amount of improvement of your instrumental values will help.
I’m trying to distinguish between the circumstance where you aren’t sure if inactivity will help achieve what you want (if you want your spouse to complete a chore, should you remind them or not?) or aren’t sure if inactivity is what you want (do I really like meditation or not?).
In particular, your worry about accuracy of maps and whether you should act on them or check on them seems to fundamentally be a problem about goal uncertainty. Some miscommunication is occurring because the analogy is focused on instrumental values. To push a little further on the metaphor, a bad map will cause you to end up in Venice instead of Rome, but improving the map won’t help you decide if you want to be in Rome.
So, sometimes actions that are generally considered rational lead to bad results in certain situations. I agree with this.
However, how are we to identify and anticipate these situations? If you have a tool other than rationality, present it. If you have a means of showing its validity other than the rationalist methods we use here, present that as well.
To say that rationality itself is a problem leaves us completely unable to act.
Well said! I was not trying to attack the use of rationality as a method, but rather to attack the immoderate use of this method. Rationality is a good and powerful tool for acting intentionally, but should there not be some regulation in its use? You state
I would counter: To say that there is no problem with rationality leaves us completely without reason to suspend action.
As you have suggested, rationality is a tool for action. Are there not times when it is harmful to not act? Are there no reasons to suspend action?
Rationality is a tool for making choices. Sometimes the rational choice is not to play.
Which is why I call it rational irrationality, or rationally irrational if you would prefer. I do think it is possible to semantically stretch the conception of rationality to cover this, but I still think a fundamental distinction needs to be acknowledged between rationality that leads to taking control in a situation, and rationality that leads to intentional inaction.
I feel like you are conflating terminal values (goals) and instrumental values (means/effectiveness) a little bit here. There’s really no good reason to adopt an instrumental value that doesn’t help you achieve your goals. But if you aren’t sure of what your goals are, then no amount of improvement of your instrumental values will help.
I’m trying to distinguish between the circumstance where you aren’t sure if inactivity will help achieve what you want (if you want your spouse to complete a chore, should you remind them or not?) or aren’t sure if inactivity is what you want (do I really like meditation or not?).
In particular, your worry about accuracy of maps and whether you should act on them or check on them seems to fundamentally be a problem about goal uncertainty. Some miscommunication is occurring because the analogy is focused on instrumental values. To push a little further on the metaphor, a bad map will cause you to end up in Venice instead of Rome, but improving the map won’t help you decide if you want to be in Rome.