I understand what you are saying; you are saying that for the speaker of the statement it is not irrational, because the false statement might meet their motives. Or in other words, that rationality is completely dependent on the motives of the actor.
Yes.
Is this the rationality that your group idealizes?
Do not ask whether it is “the Way” to do this or that. Ask whether the sky is blue or green. If you speak overmuch of the Way you will not attain it.
You may try to name the highest principle with names such as “the map that reflects the territory” or “experience of success and failure” or “Bayesian decision theory”. But perhaps you describe incorrectly the nameless virtue. How will you discover your mistake? Not by comparing your description to itself, but by comparing it to that which you did not name.
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If someone told you that the moon was made of cheese, being a rational person, without providing any evidence of the fact, if they had no reason to believe that, they just believed it, you would think they were being irrational. And you know it.
No, I would generally not think someone was “being irrational” without specific reference to their motivations. If I must concern myself with the fulfillment of someone else’s utility function, it would usually take the form of “You should not X in order to Z because Y will more efficiently Z.” ETA: I would more likely think that their statement was a joke, and failing that think that it’s false and try to correct it. In case anyone’s curious, “the moon is made of green cheese” was a paradigm of a ridiculous, unproveable statement before humans went to the moon; and “green cheese” in this context means “new cheese”, not the color green.
You just want to pick a fight.
No, I’d rather be working on my dissertation, but I have a moral obligation to correct mistakes and falsehoods posted on this site.
I understand what you are saying; you are saying that for the speaker of the statement it is not irrational, because the false statement might meet their motives. Or in other words, that rationality is completely dependent on the motives of the actor.
Correct. As noted on another branch of this comment tree, this interpretation characterizes “instrumental rationality”, though a similar case could be made for “epistemic rationality”.
So religious zealots are rational because they have a goal that their lies and craziness is helping them achieve? That is what you are arguing.
That is not what I was arguing. If I understand you correctly however, you mean to say that what I’m arguing applies equally well to that case.
The important part of that statement is “X is rational”, where X is a human. Inasmuch as that predicate indicates that the subject behaves rationally most of the time, I would deny that it should be applied to any human. Humans are exceptionally bad at rationality.
That said, if a person X decided that course of action Y was the most efficient way to fulfill their utility function, then Y is rational by definition. (Of course, this applies equally well to non-persons with utility functions). Even if Y = “lies and craziness” or “religious belief” or “pin an aubergine to your lapel”.
So if I want to convince the world that God is real, it is rational to make up whatever lies I see fit to delegitimize other belief systems?
That’s a difficult empirical question, and outside my domain of expertise. You might want to consult an expert on lying, though I’d first question whether the subgoal of convincing the world that God is real, really advances your overall goals.
Yes.
See the twelfth virtue:
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No, I would generally not think someone was “being irrational” without specific reference to their motivations. If I must concern myself with the fulfillment of someone else’s utility function, it would usually take the form of “You should not X in order to Z because Y will more efficiently Z.” ETA: I would more likely think that their statement was a joke, and failing that think that it’s false and try to correct it. In case anyone’s curious, “the moon is made of green cheese” was a paradigm of a ridiculous, unproveable statement before humans went to the moon; and “green cheese” in this context means “new cheese”, not the color green.
No, I’d rather be working on my dissertation, but I have a moral obligation to correct mistakes and falsehoods posted on this site.
Correct. As noted on another branch of this comment tree, this interpretation characterizes “instrumental rationality”, though a similar case could be made for “epistemic rationality”.
That is not what I was arguing. If I understand you correctly however, you mean to say that what I’m arguing applies equally well to that case.
The important part of that statement is “X is rational”, where X is a human. Inasmuch as that predicate indicates that the subject behaves rationally most of the time, I would deny that it should be applied to any human. Humans are exceptionally bad at rationality.
That said, if a person X decided that course of action Y was the most efficient way to fulfill their utility function, then Y is rational by definition. (Of course, this applies equally well to non-persons with utility functions). Even if Y = “lies and craziness” or “religious belief” or “pin an aubergine to your lapel”.
That’s a difficult empirical question, and outside my domain of expertise. You might want to consult an expert on lying, though I’d first question whether the subgoal of convincing the world that God is real, really advances your overall goals.