The problem being the lack of continuity,
Which would be avoided if your current host body dies in the transfer.
I don’t think that’s how continuity of self works. Suppose I, Velorien A, cast the horcrux spell. I continue to exist, and now I have created a Velorien B, an imperfect copy in a younger, healthier body. When Velorien A dies, whether instantly or in a number of years, I die. Velorien B will continue to exist. From an external perspective, yes, there was one old/ill Velorien, and now there is one young/healthy Velorien. From the perspective of Velorien B, he is Velorien A but in a younger, healthier body. But from my perspective… well, I don’t have a perspective, because I’m dead.
I think you’ve got it the wrong way round. The first part is the problem. The second part is how the problem manifests itself.
Let’s take the full quote.
“No continuity of—” there wasn’t a snake word for consciousness “—sself, you would go on thinking after making the horcrux, then sself with new memoriess diess and iss not resstored—”
The problem is continuity of consciousness. What Quirrell is saying is that because there is no continuity of consciousness, when you die, you die, no matter that you made a horcrux first.
I certainly don’t believe that Quirrell, who has probably spent much of his life considering the problem, would be so naive as to think that destroying the original somehow gives the copy continuity of consciousness with the original.
I don’t think that’s how continuity of self works. Suppose I, Velorien A, cast the horcrux spell. I continue to exist, and now I have created a Velorien B, an imperfect copy in a younger, healthier body. When Velorien A dies, whether instantly or in a number of years, I die. Velorien B will continue to exist. From an external perspective, yes, there was one old/ill Velorien, and now there is one young/healthy Velorien. From the perspective of Velorien B, he is Velorien A but in a younger, healthier body. But from my perspective… well, I don’t have a perspective, because I’m dead.
You can see it that way, and I largely do too, but that was not how Harry and Quirrell identified the problem.
The issue, the reasons for the issue.
If we avoid those reasons, which dying in the transfer does, then the issue is resolved.
I think you’ve got it the wrong way round. The first part is the problem. The second part is how the problem manifests itself.
Let’s take the full quote.
The problem is continuity of consciousness. What Quirrell is saying is that because there is no continuity of consciousness, when you die, you die, no matter that you made a horcrux first.
I certainly don’t believe that Quirrell, who has probably spent much of his life considering the problem, would be so naive as to think that destroying the original somehow gives the copy continuity of consciousness with the original.