Yes, though keep in mind that these utilities are renormalized, so the important metric is how much more one option is valued over the others during a particular choice, not the absolute value of how many action potentials per second a particular option is “valued” with. The value for the exact same thing (say, an apple) could be represented by a different number of action potentials per second depending on the other options in the choice set, among other factors (e.g. context effects).
This does, it seems to me, give some neurobiological credence to a particular solution to Pascal’s Mugging: bounding your utility function.
Does this mean there is a limit on how much we can want/prefer something?
Yes, though keep in mind that these utilities are renormalized, so the important metric is how much more one option is valued over the others during a particular choice, not the absolute value of how many action potentials per second a particular option is “valued” with. The value for the exact same thing (say, an apple) could be represented by a different number of action potentials per second depending on the other options in the choice set, among other factors (e.g. context effects).
This does, it seems to me, give some neurobiological credence to a particular solution to Pascal’s Mugging: bounding your utility function.
What is it for something to give neurobiological credence to the “bounded utility” answer to Pascal’s Mugging?