I realize your questions may be rhetorical, but I’m going to attempt an answer anyways, because it illustrates a point:
The morality of the shipowner’s actions do not depend on the realized outcomes: It can only depend on his prior beliefs about the probability of the outcomes, and on the utility function that he uses to evaluate them. If we insisted on making morality conditional on the future, causality is broken: It will be impossible for any ethical agent to make use of such ethics as a decision theory.
The problem here is that the Shipowner’s “sincerely held beliefs” are not identical to his genuine extrapolated prior. It is not stated in the text, but I think he is able to convince himself about “the soundness of the ship” only by ignoring degrees of belief: If he was a proper Bayesian, he would have realized that having “doubts” and not updating your beliefs is not logically consistent
In any decision theory that is usable by agents making decisions in real time, the morality of his action is determined either at the time he allowed the ship to sail, or at the time he allowed his prior to get corrupted. I personally believe the latter. This quotation illustrates why I see rationality as a moral obligation, even when it feels like a memetic plague.
The morality of the shipowner’s actions do not depend on the realized outcomes: It can only depend on his prior beliefs about the probability of the outcomes, and on the utility function that he uses to evaluate them.
I am not sure—I see your point, but completely ignoring the actual outcome seems iffy to me. There are, of course, many different ways of judging morality and, empirically, a lot of them do care about realized outcomes.
The problem here is that the Shipowner’s “sincerely held beliefs” are not identical to his genuine extrapolated prior.
I don’t know what a “genuine extrapolated prior” is.
I see rationality as a moral obligation
Well, behaving according to the “reasonable person” standard is a legal obligation :-)
completely ignoring the actual outcome seems iffy to me
That’s because we live in a world where people’s inner states are not apparent, perhaps not even to themselves. So we revert to (a) what would a reasonable person believe, (b) what actually happened. The latter is unfortunate in that it condemns many who are merely morally unlucky and acquits many who are merely morally lucky, but that’s life. The actual bad outcomes serve as “blameable moments”. What can I say—it’s not great, but better than speculating on other people’s psychological states.
In a world where mental states could be subpoenaed, Clifford would have both a correct and an actionable theory of the ethics of belief; as it is I think it correct but not entirely actionable.
I don’t know what a “genuine extrapolated prior” is.
That which would be arrived at by a reasonable person (not necessarily a Bayesian calculator, but somebody not actually self-deceptive) updating on the same evidence.
A related issue is sincerity; Clifford says the shipowner is sincere in his beliefs, but I tend to think in such cases there is usually a belief/alief mismatch.
I love this passage from Clifford and I can’t believe it wasn’t posted here before. By the way, William James mounted a critique of Clifford’s views in an address you can read here; I encourage you to do so as James presents some cases that are interesting to think about if you (like me) largely agree with Clifford.
In a world where mental states could be subpoenaed, Clifford would have both a correct and an actionable theory
That’s not self-evident to me. First, in this particular case as you yourself note, “Clifford says the shipowner is sincere in his belief”. Second, in general, what are you going to do about, basically, stupid people who quite sincerely do not anticipate the consequences of their actions?
That which would be arrived at by a reasonable person … updating on the same evidence.
I think Clifford was wrong to say the shipowner was sincere in his belief. In the situation he describes, the belief is insincere—indeed such situations define what I think “insincere belief” ought to mean.
what are you going to do about, basically, stupid people who quite sincerely do not anticipate the consequences of their actions?
Good question. Ought implies can, so in extreme cases I’d consider that to diminish their culpability. For less extreme cases—heh, I had never thought about it before, but I think the “reasonable man” standard is implicitly IQ-normalized. :)
I think the “reasonable man” standard is implicitly IQ-normalized. :)
While that may be so, the Clifford approach relying on the subpoenaed mental states relies on mental states and not on any external standard (including the one called “resonable person”).
That’s because we live in a world where… it’s not great, but better than speculating on other people’s psychological states.
I wanted to put something like this idea into my own response to Lumifer, but I couldn’t find the words. Thanks for expressing the idea so clearly and concisely.
I realize your questions may be rhetorical, but I’m going to attempt an answer anyways, because it illustrates a point:
The morality of the shipowner’s actions do not depend on the realized outcomes: It can only depend on his prior beliefs about the probability of the outcomes, and on the utility function that he uses to evaluate them. If we insisted on making morality conditional on the future, causality is broken: It will be impossible for any ethical agent to make use of such ethics as a decision theory.
The problem here is that the Shipowner’s “sincerely held beliefs” are not identical to his genuine extrapolated prior. It is not stated in the text, but I think he is able to convince himself about “the soundness of the ship” only by ignoring degrees of belief: If he was a proper Bayesian, he would have realized that having “doubts” and not updating your beliefs is not logically consistent
In any decision theory that is usable by agents making decisions in real time, the morality of his action is determined either at the time he allowed the ship to sail, or at the time he allowed his prior to get corrupted. I personally believe the latter. This quotation illustrates why I see rationality as a moral obligation, even when it feels like a memetic plague.
I am not sure—I see your point, but completely ignoring the actual outcome seems iffy to me. There are, of course, many different ways of judging morality and, empirically, a lot of them do care about realized outcomes.
I don’t know what a “genuine extrapolated prior” is.
Well, behaving according to the “reasonable person” standard is a legal obligation :-)
That’s because we live in a world where people’s inner states are not apparent, perhaps not even to themselves. So we revert to (a) what would a reasonable person believe, (b) what actually happened. The latter is unfortunate in that it condemns many who are merely morally unlucky and acquits many who are merely morally lucky, but that’s life. The actual bad outcomes serve as “blameable moments”. What can I say—it’s not great, but better than speculating on other people’s psychological states.
In a world where mental states could be subpoenaed, Clifford would have both a correct and an actionable theory of the ethics of belief; as it is I think it correct but not entirely actionable.
That which would be arrived at by a reasonable person (not necessarily a Bayesian calculator, but somebody not actually self-deceptive) updating on the same evidence.
A related issue is sincerity; Clifford says the shipowner is sincere in his beliefs, but I tend to think in such cases there is usually a belief/alief mismatch.
I love this passage from Clifford and I can’t believe it wasn’t posted here before. By the way, William James mounted a critique of Clifford’s views in an address you can read here; I encourage you to do so as James presents some cases that are interesting to think about if you (like me) largely agree with Clifford.
That’s not self-evident to me. First, in this particular case as you yourself note, “Clifford says the shipowner is sincere in his belief”. Second, in general, what are you going to do about, basically, stupid people who quite sincerely do not anticipate the consequences of their actions?
That would be a posterior, not a prior.
I think Clifford was wrong to say the shipowner was sincere in his belief. In the situation he describes, the belief is insincere—indeed such situations define what I think “insincere belief” ought to mean.
Good question. Ought implies can, so in extreme cases I’d consider that to diminish their culpability. For less extreme cases—heh, I had never thought about it before, but I think the “reasonable man” standard is implicitly IQ-normalized. :)
Sure.
This is called fighting the hypothetical.
While that may be so, the Clifford approach relying on the subpoenaed mental states relies on mental states and not on any external standard (including the one called “resonable person”).
I wanted to put something like this idea into my own response to Lumifer, but I couldn’t find the words. Thanks for expressing the idea so clearly and concisely.