The boundaries around the kind I accept are approximately the same as yours:
it is for a goal I agree with (extrapolated volition)
I supposed the reason why the husband in the story didn’t put his clothes in the hamper was that he was too lazy to do that, not that he (terminally) valued that the clothes stayed outside the hamper.
I supposed the reason why the husband in the story didn’t put his clothes in the hamper was that he was too lazy to do that, not that he (terminally) valued that the clothes stayed outside the hamper.
Having a terminal value for clothes outside the hamper isn’t the point. It is whether given the negotiated relationship boundaries and typical behaviors as they currently are the person being modified would prefer “status quo except I do more” over “status quo”.
“Too lazy” can be left out of such considerations. That doesn’t distinguish between akrasia and considered intent not to do the thing (for whatever reason). For most part judgements like “too lazy” are just another method of attempting influence—usually a method that is inferior to reinforcement.
For most part judgements like “too lazy” are just another method of attempting influence—usually a method that is inferior to reinforcement.
Well, making judgments like “too lazy” can also provide valuable social cover for other kinds of reinforcement (or punishment), within communities where deliberately altering the behavior of others is seen as unacceptable unless I can frame it as being for their benefit.
More generally, motivated speculation about other people’s best interests (including but not limited to positing that they possess unexpressed “terminal values” that happen to align better with what I seem to want than with what they seem to want) can be a very useful way to ignore people’s stated preferences without feeling (or being seen by third parties as) indebted to them.
I supposed the reason why the husband in the story didn’t put his clothes in the hamper was that he was too lazy to do that, not that he (terminally) valued that the clothes stayed outside the hamper.
Having a terminal value for clothes outside the hamper isn’t the point. It is whether given the negotiated relationship boundaries and typical behaviors as they currently are the person being modified would prefer “status quo except I do more” over “status quo”.
“Too lazy” can be left out of such considerations. That doesn’t distinguish between akrasia and considered intent not to do the thing (for whatever reason). For most part judgements like “too lazy” are just another method of attempting influence—usually a method that is inferior to reinforcement.
Well, making judgments like “too lazy” can also provide valuable social cover for other kinds of reinforcement (or punishment), within communities where deliberately altering the behavior of others is seen as unacceptable unless I can frame it as being for their benefit.
More generally, motivated speculation about other people’s best interests (including but not limited to positing that they possess unexpressed “terminal values” that happen to align better with what I seem to want than with what they seem to want) can be a very useful way to ignore people’s stated preferences without feeling (or being seen by third parties as) indebted to them.