I was thinking about why I didn’t have an explicit problem with selling UOPs for money.
I see giving someone UOPs as equivalent to delegating some political authority. I’ve read a bit in a computer security field that has had long running arguments with the main stream security field about delegation.
They tend to argue that if bad things happen with explicit delegation, they can easily happen with implicit delegation as well. So your example of buying UOPs for money and then using the UOPs to get political power to enact something, why not just buy off the politician directly to enact something? I do propose that the transactions of UOPs be transparent so that people can see who gave UOPs foolishly/unwisely as well. So the delegation would be known.
You made me wonder if the dislike of explicit delegation is a bias. And if so why do we have it?
However the system doesn’t have any checks and balances for implicit bias. Somehow we have to align the politicians incentives with the long term good of the organisation. Huge potential payoffs X years after they leave office under some conditions? I’ll have to think about this some more.
I was thinking about why I didn’t have an explicit problem with selling UOPs for money.
I see giving someone UOPs as equivalent to delegating some political authority. I’ve read a bit in a computer security field that has had long running arguments with the main stream security field about delegation.
They tend to argue that if bad things happen with explicit delegation, they can easily happen with implicit delegation as well. So your example of buying UOPs for money and then using the UOPs to get political power to enact something, why not just buy off the politician directly to enact something? I do propose that the transactions of UOPs be transparent so that people can see who gave UOPs foolishly/unwisely as well. So the delegation would be known.
You made me wonder if the dislike of explicit delegation is a bias. And if so why do we have it?
However the system doesn’t have any checks and balances for implicit bias. Somehow we have to align the politicians incentives with the long term good of the organisation. Huge potential payoffs X years after they leave office under some conditions? I’ll have to think about this some more.