It seems that homunculus concept is unnecessary here. You can easily talk about the experience itself, e.g. “seeing”, or you can still use “I see” as a language construct while realising that you are only referring to the happening phenomenon of “seeing”.
There is a difference between knowing something and experiencing it in a particular way, and the former may only very slightly nudge the latter if at all.
I can know a chair is red, but if I close my eyes, I don’t see it.
I can know a chair is red, but if I put on coloured glasses, I will not see it as red.
I can know that nothing changes in reality when I take LSD, but, oh boy, does my perception change.
The real problem here is that we are not rational agents, and, what’s worse, the small part of us that even resembles anything rational is not in control of our experience.
We’d like to imagine ourselves as agents and then we run into surprises like “how can I know something, but still experience it (or worse, behave!) differently”.
It seems that homunculus concept is unnecessary here. You can easily talk about the experience itself, e.g. “seeing”, or you can still use “I see” as a language construct while realising that you are only referring to the happening phenomenon of “seeing”.
There is a difference between knowing something and experiencing it in a particular way, and the former may only very slightly nudge the latter if at all.
I can know a chair is red, but if I close my eyes, I don’t see it.
I can know a chair is red, but if I put on coloured glasses, I will not see it as red.
I can know that nothing changes in reality when I take LSD, but, oh boy, does my perception change.
The real problem here is that we are not rational agents, and, what’s worse, the small part of us that even resembles anything rational is not in control of our experience.
We’d like to imagine ourselves as agents and then we run into surprises like “how can I know something, but still experience it (or worse, behave!) differently”.