If you invade another nation, most of their value is in their infrastructure and their population: it takes time and effort to rebuild and co-opt these.
The other factor here is that human power structures are not stable. Even if the work is done to conquer and re-develop resources the power structure that benefits is not necessarily the same one that does it. We can use the US as an example again. It was worthwhile for the British to exterminate most of the inhabitants of the (now) US and to build infrastructure and new population. Yet the present day UK does not collect the benefits from that investment because the colonists realised this ‘nation’ and ‘empire’ business is an abstraction in people’s minds, and one that can be altered by sinking a few ships and killing a few overlords. The individuals and their descendants benefited. The empire did not (as much).
Human power structures are too fragile to have allowed even the most dominant countries from just winning, taking all the resources and keeping them. This will not necessarily apply to all future human civilisations and it certainly wouldn’t apply to AIs.
Trusting mechanisms like comparative advantage to save us in the face of strong not-explicitly-friendly-AI is crazy. The assumptions required to make that sort of system safe and stable just don’t hold. (This kind of error is what most frustrates me about Robin Hanson’s essays on related subjects.)
How much did the British of the 1600s make from the United States? Was it more than they spent in the cost of the colonization? was the gain greater than that to be had from other investment opportunities?
Furthermore, how much did the British of 1600 care about the British of 2013? Did they really care more about them than the Americans of 2013? Are the British of the Elizabethan era less connected to the Americans of today than the British today?
I’m not sure we can talk meaningfully about or plan for benefits 400+ years in the future. I strongly suspect Queen Elizabeth I wasn’t planning that far ahead except in the most vague terms.
Human power structures are stable enough to plan for a reasonable period of time in the future. The further into time your plans go the more uncertain they become which is why plans need to be adjusted on the fly to meet changing conditions. Thinking otherwise I’ll call the waterfall fallacy.
How much did the British of the 1600s make from the United States? Was it more than they spent in the cost of the colonization? was the gain greater than that to be had from other investment opportunities?
Almost certainly. And even neglecting any direct resource extraction, by my estimation it was worthwhile colonizing simply so that the USA exists. The UK benefits from gains from trade with the US and it is almost certainly better both politically and economically to have the country based on British heritage rather than whatever the alternative would have been.
Furthermore, how much did the British of 1600 care about the British of 2013? Did they really care more about them than the Americans of 2013?
It seems rather likely that the did. National identity and formally acknowledged power tends to be important to the people with power then.
Are the British of the Elizabethan era less connected to the Americans of today than the British today?
Only a little less. The dilution from immigration and the excessive amounts of slave importing makes some difference. The symbology of the rebellion also seems like the kind of thing that matters a bit since it involves a greater degree of change to the cultural legacy. Even so the connection is still rather strong and certainly comparable. It remains a “fork”.
Almost certainly. And even neglecting any direct resource extraction, by my estimation it was worthwhile colonizing simply so that the USA exists. The UK benefits from gains from trade with the US and it is almost certainly better both politically and economically to have the country based on British heritage rather than whatever the alternative would have been.
My understanding of economic history is that the Marxist/Leninist interpretation of empire as profitable remains controversial and that a great many believe empire is better interpreted as related to national prestige and private interests engaged in rentseeking/‘privatizing gains and socializing losses’, and that it’s questionable that England did receive in excess profits (above and beyond what it would have received from free trade) anywhere near what it spent on things like the British Navy or the French and Indian War (with Jacques Marseille arguing the same thing about the French empire).
The other factor here is that human power structures are not stable. Even if the work is done to conquer and re-develop resources the power structure that benefits is not necessarily the same one that does it. We can use the US as an example again. It was worthwhile for the British to exterminate most of the inhabitants of the (now) US and to build infrastructure and new population. Yet the present day UK does not collect the benefits from that investment because the colonists realised this ‘nation’ and ‘empire’ business is an abstraction in people’s minds, and one that can be altered by sinking a few ships and killing a few overlords. The individuals and their descendants benefited. The empire did not (as much).
Human power structures are too fragile to have allowed even the most dominant countries from just winning, taking all the resources and keeping them. This will not necessarily apply to all future human civilisations and it certainly wouldn’t apply to AIs.
Trusting mechanisms like comparative advantage to save us in the face of strong not-explicitly-friendly-AI is crazy. The assumptions required to make that sort of system safe and stable just don’t hold. (This kind of error is what most frustrates me about Robin Hanson’s essays on related subjects.)
I really like your British empire/US example—and may steal it in future, if that’s all right.
How much did the British of the 1600s make from the United States? Was it more than they spent in the cost of the colonization? was the gain greater than that to be had from other investment opportunities?
Furthermore, how much did the British of 1600 care about the British of 2013? Did they really care more about them than the Americans of 2013? Are the British of the Elizabethan era less connected to the Americans of today than the British today?
I’m not sure we can talk meaningfully about or plan for benefits 400+ years in the future. I strongly suspect Queen Elizabeth I wasn’t planning that far ahead except in the most vague terms.
Human power structures are stable enough to plan for a reasonable period of time in the future. The further into time your plans go the more uncertain they become which is why plans need to be adjusted on the fly to meet changing conditions. Thinking otherwise I’ll call the waterfall fallacy.
Almost certainly. And even neglecting any direct resource extraction, by my estimation it was worthwhile colonizing simply so that the USA exists. The UK benefits from gains from trade with the US and it is almost certainly better both politically and economically to have the country based on British heritage rather than whatever the alternative would have been.
It seems rather likely that the did. National identity and formally acknowledged power tends to be important to the people with power then.
Only a little less. The dilution from immigration and the excessive amounts of slave importing makes some difference. The symbology of the rebellion also seems like the kind of thing that matters a bit since it involves a greater degree of change to the cultural legacy. Even so the connection is still rather strong and certainly comparable. It remains a “fork”.
My understanding of economic history is that the Marxist/Leninist interpretation of empire as profitable remains controversial and that a great many believe empire is better interpreted as related to national prestige and private interests engaged in rentseeking/‘privatizing gains and socializing losses’, and that it’s questionable that England did receive in excess profits (above and beyond what it would have received from free trade) anywhere near what it spent on things like the British Navy or the French and Indian War (with Jacques Marseille arguing the same thing about the French empire).