Logical time makes sense as time within a particular process of computation (possibly of logical inference). Different computations have their own internal directions of logical time, and space-like subcollections of (partial) states that aren’t comparable in logical time.
When a computation is reasoning about another computation, it will naturally tend to arrive at facts about the other computation in an order related to that computation’s own logical time. Of course, leaps in reasoning are possible, predicting distant future without reasoning in detail about the intermediate states, and some facts are facts about what happens more globally in the other computation, rather than about what happens in a particular location.
Agents that live in a world deal with computations of their own reasoning, with reasoning of the other agents, with time in the physical world. But also they can be concerned with computation of the implications of moral frameworks, or of contracts with other agents (which are smaller than any of the agents involved, and much smaller than the physical world). Some of the interesting computations won’t be feasible to concretely carry out in the physical world, it’s only possible to glimpse some facts about them, with uncertainty. Moral frameworks plausibly fall in that class.
Logical time makes sense as time within a particular process of computation (possibly of logical inference). Different computations have their own internal directions of logical time, and space-like subcollections of (partial) states that aren’t comparable in logical time.
When a computation is reasoning about another computation, it will naturally tend to arrive at facts about the other computation in an order related to that computation’s own logical time. Of course, leaps in reasoning are possible, predicting distant future without reasoning in detail about the intermediate states, and some facts are facts about what happens more globally in the other computation, rather than about what happens in a particular location.
Agents that live in a world deal with computations of their own reasoning, with reasoning of the other agents, with time in the physical world. But also they can be concerned with computation of the implications of moral frameworks, or of contracts with other agents (which are smaller than any of the agents involved, and much smaller than the physical world). Some of the interesting computations won’t be feasible to concretely carry out in the physical world, it’s only possible to glimpse some facts about them, with uncertainty. Moral frameworks plausibly fall in that class.