The complicated computation F could be some person making a decision F(), and the complicated computation G could be defining an outcome of that decision we are considering, so that G()>14 is a claim about that outcome with some truth value. If everything is deterministic, it might still make sense to say that G() depends on F(), and even that the truth of G()>14 depends on F(). And also that it’s F that determines F(), and therefore that it’s F that determines the truth value of G()>14.
(I think there is some equivocation about beliefs vs. decisions in the post, but it doesn’t seem essential to the core puzzle it’s bringing up. A decision is distinct from a belief about that decision, and if you are making decisions because of beliefs about those decisions, you run into Löbian traps, so it’s not a good way of thinking about the role of beliefs about decisions.)
Hmm… well, I certainly agree that a decision is distinct from a belief about that decision (indeed, I explicitly argue against the opposing view), and that making decisions because of beliefs about those decisions is nonsensical.
I’m not sure about the rest of it. If you are making the assumption that everything is deterministic, it seems like that just gets you to @Shmi-style “decisions are not about changing the world, they are about learning what world you live in”, and (as I say in the post) that fully dissolves the “puzzle”.
The complicated computation F could be some person making a decision F(), and the complicated computation G could be defining an outcome of that decision we are considering, so that G()>14 is a claim about that outcome with some truth value. If everything is deterministic, it might still make sense to say that G() depends on F(), and even that the truth of G()>14 depends on F(). And also that it’s F that determines F(), and therefore that it’s F that determines the truth value of G()>14.
(I think there is some equivocation about beliefs vs. decisions in the post, but it doesn’t seem essential to the core puzzle it’s bringing up. A decision is distinct from a belief about that decision, and if you are making decisions because of beliefs about those decisions, you run into Löbian traps, so it’s not a good way of thinking about the role of beliefs about decisions.)
Hmm… well, I certainly agree that a decision is distinct from a belief about that decision (indeed, I explicitly argue against the opposing view), and that making decisions because of beliefs about those decisions is nonsensical.
I’m not sure about the rest of it. If you are making the assumption that everything is deterministic, it seems like that just gets you to @Shmi-style “decisions are not about changing the world, they are about learning what world you live in”, and (as I say in the post) that fully dissolves the “puzzle”.