Remember that I’m an anti-moral realist trying to steelman the moral realist position. As an anti-realist, it is not surprising at all that moral reasoning changes. I think there’s no particular reason to think that the scientific method (or some moralistic equivalent) is available to “discover” moral truths. But the moral realist has great difficulty explaining explaining quasi-random movement in morals.
Anyway, we seen to be disagreeing on the meaning of the words “progress” and “regress.” To illustrate: Imagine a plantation manager, overseeing a huge plantation. Usually, the plantation grows enough food to give everyone on the plantation an adequate diet. The manager apply his moral theory and decides to actually feed everyone an adequate diet.
Now an external event causes the plantation to grow insufficient food for the people living there. The manager applies the same moral theory and decides to feed some people an adequate diet and some an inadequate diet. Under one understanding of regress (“regress1”), this change is moral regress. Under another understanding (“regress2″), the change is not moral regress, merely changed circumstances.
You seem to be talking about moral regress1 and scientific regress1, while I am talking about moral and scientific regress2. I would argue that regress2 (and its counterpart, progress2) is the concept generally meant by ordinary usage. Further, regress2 is the more useful definition in a meta-ethics conversation, because regress1 is not usually evidence for or against moral realism.
Assuming moral realism, the human mind may not be designed to discover truth about morality any more than it is to discover turth about any other aspect of nature, it is designed to be as adaptive as possible
But the central feature of most object level moral theories is that acting morally is more adaptive. For a utilitarian, acting morally generates more utility than acting immorally. Given the benefit of hindsight, shouldn’t we notice when our society is generating less utility than it could? And thus act to change our behavior towards generating more utility. That’s why I think that the existence of moral facts would constrain the behaviors of individuals. If we can’t detect whether more utility is generated, then there’s no reason to believe in the existence of universal and objective moral truths.
As an anti-realist, I take the position that “generating less utility than society could” is not a well formed assertion. But the moral realist does think the phrase is universally meaningful.
Remember that I’m an anti-moral realist trying to steelman the moral realist position. As an anti-realist, it is not surprising at all that moral reasoning changes.
A thought here: if you genuinely want to steel-man moral realism you need to look at various forms of “minimal” moral realism, which are consistent with moral subjectivism. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism and the sub-section “Robust versus minimal moral realism”.
An example here could be a missionary confronting a New Guinea highlander just after a cannibal feast (assuming these really happened). The missionary says “Eating people in your cannibal feasts is wrong”. The highlander says “Eating people in our cannibal feasts is not wrong.” According to a minimal moral realist, one who embraces moral subjectivism, both of these may be true statements—they both correspond to moral facts—because the term “wrong” has a different meaning for the different speakers. Though their meanings clearly overlap e.g. they may both agree that eating people outside special feasts is “wrong” or that sex outside marriage is “wrong”.
Or, for an analogy, consider two normally-sighted people looking at a coloured wall. One says “The wall is orange”, the other says “The wall is not orange, it is red”. Both of these statements may be true—i.e. both correspond to colour facts—because the speakers put the boundary between orange and red in a slightly different place. They have slightly different (though overlapping) concepts of “red”.
It is very hard to refute versions of moral realism like this. You’d have to somehow show that no-one has a properly consistent concept of right and wrong, so that even within the cannibal’s own moral system he is talking self-contradictory nonsense. That’s going to be difficult.
But the moral realist has great difficulty explaining explaining quasi-random movement in morals.
Does he? We have quasi random movement in other kinds of maps of reality too. A Catholic moral realist can at the same time believe orthodox theologians have been making progress on understanding morality while the laity has on average morally regressed, just as a doctor can believe medicine is marching forward even if something like homeopathy gains popularity in the time period he lives in.
Now an external event causes the plantation to grow insufficient food for the people living there. The manager applies the same moral theory and decides to feed some people an adequate diet and some an inadequate diet. Under one understanding of regress (“regress1”), this change is moral regress. Under another understanding (“regress2″), the change is not moral regress, merely changed circumstances.
His son only ever knew the underfed plantation and then feeds them so even when there is enough for everyone. Is this regress1 or regress2 in your view?
But the central feature of most object level moral theories is that acting morally is more adaptive. For a utilitarian, acting morally generates more utility than acting immorally. Given the benefit of hindsight, shouldn’t we notice when our society is generating less utility than it could? And thus act to change our behavior towards generating more utility. That’s why I think that the existence of moral facts would constrain the behaviors of individuals. If we can’t detect whether more utility is generated, then there’s no reason to believe in the existence of universal and objective moral truths.
Remember a moral realist is not obliged to consider morality personally adaptive. Recall that many classical views of divine punishment or the negative consequences of immorality are not in the bad consequences for the individual but the society as a whole.
His son only ever knew the underfed plantation and then feeds them so even when there is enough for everyone. Is this regress1 or regress2 in your view?
There’s not a different outcome / decision. Without change, how can we say that there is progress or regress of any kind?
Recall that many classical views of divine punishment or the negative consequences of immorality are not in the bad consequences for the individual but the society as a whole.
Whatever. For the moral realist, the point is that there are real consequences—reduced wealth or lifespan or whatever—caused by immoral behavior. That feedback from objective reality creates strong pressure against moral regress2 - in the same way that failed predictions create strong pressure against scientific regress2.
Your discussion about elite knowledge vs. mass implementation is interesting, but is probably independent of whether moral facts are objective and universal. For purposes of this discussion, it’s probably easier to ignore the issue for the moment. Like ignoring the knock-on effects when discussing torture vs. dust-speck.
Remember that I’m an anti-moral realist trying to steelman the moral realist position. As an anti-realist, it is not surprising at all that moral reasoning changes. I think there’s no particular reason to think that the scientific method (or some moralistic equivalent) is available to “discover” moral truths. But the moral realist has great difficulty explaining explaining quasi-random movement in morals.
Anyway, we seen to be disagreeing on the meaning of the words “progress” and “regress.” To illustrate: Imagine a plantation manager, overseeing a huge plantation. Usually, the plantation grows enough food to give everyone on the plantation an adequate diet. The manager apply his moral theory and decides to actually feed everyone an adequate diet.
Now an external event causes the plantation to grow insufficient food for the people living there. The manager applies the same moral theory and decides to feed some people an adequate diet and some an inadequate diet. Under one understanding of regress (“regress1”), this change is moral regress. Under another understanding (“regress2″), the change is not moral regress, merely changed circumstances.
You seem to be talking about moral regress1 and scientific regress1, while I am talking about moral and scientific regress2. I would argue that regress2 (and its counterpart, progress2) is the concept generally meant by ordinary usage. Further, regress2 is the more useful definition in a meta-ethics conversation, because regress1 is not usually evidence for or against moral realism.
But the central feature of most object level moral theories is that acting morally is more adaptive. For a utilitarian, acting morally generates more utility than acting immorally. Given the benefit of hindsight, shouldn’t we notice when our society is generating less utility than it could? And thus act to change our behavior towards generating more utility. That’s why I think that the existence of moral facts would constrain the behaviors of individuals. If we can’t detect whether more utility is generated, then there’s no reason to believe in the existence of universal and objective moral truths.
As an anti-realist, I take the position that “generating less utility than society could” is not a well formed assertion. But the moral realist does think the phrase is universally meaningful.
A thought here: if you genuinely want to steel-man moral realism you need to look at various forms of “minimal” moral realism, which are consistent with moral subjectivism. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism and the sub-section “Robust versus minimal moral realism”.
An example here could be a missionary confronting a New Guinea highlander just after a cannibal feast (assuming these really happened). The missionary says “Eating people in your cannibal feasts is wrong”. The highlander says “Eating people in our cannibal feasts is not wrong.” According to a minimal moral realist, one who embraces moral subjectivism, both of these may be true statements—they both correspond to moral facts—because the term “wrong” has a different meaning for the different speakers. Though their meanings clearly overlap e.g. they may both agree that eating people outside special feasts is “wrong” or that sex outside marriage is “wrong”.
Or, for an analogy, consider two normally-sighted people looking at a coloured wall. One says “The wall is orange”, the other says “The wall is not orange, it is red”. Both of these statements may be true—i.e. both correspond to colour facts—because the speakers put the boundary between orange and red in a slightly different place. They have slightly different (though overlapping) concepts of “red”.
It is very hard to refute versions of moral realism like this. You’d have to somehow show that no-one has a properly consistent concept of right and wrong, so that even within the cannibal’s own moral system he is talking self-contradictory nonsense. That’s going to be difficult.
Does he? We have quasi random movement in other kinds of maps of reality too. A Catholic moral realist can at the same time believe orthodox theologians have been making progress on understanding morality while the laity has on average morally regressed, just as a doctor can believe medicine is marching forward even if something like homeopathy gains popularity in the time period he lives in.
His son only ever knew the underfed plantation and then feeds them so even when there is enough for everyone. Is this regress1 or regress2 in your view?
Remember a moral realist is not obliged to consider morality personally adaptive. Recall that many classical views of divine punishment or the negative consequences of immorality are not in the bad consequences for the individual but the society as a whole.
There’s not a different outcome / decision. Without change, how can we say that there is progress or regress of any kind?
Whatever. For the moral realist, the point is that there are real consequences—reduced wealth or lifespan or whatever—caused by immoral behavior. That feedback from objective reality creates strong pressure against moral regress2 - in the same way that failed predictions create strong pressure against scientific regress2.
Your discussion about elite knowledge vs. mass implementation is interesting, but is probably independent of whether moral facts are objective and universal. For purposes of this discussion, it’s probably easier to ignore the issue for the moment. Like ignoring the knock-on effects when discussing torture vs. dust-speck.