But this is not how it works. For certain definitions, meta-X is still a subset of X;
And for others, it isn’t.
If a statement is true for all algorithms, it is also true for the “algorithm that tries several algorithms”;
Theoretically, but there is no such algorithm.
Similarly, saying: “I don’t have an epistemology; instead I have several epistemologies, and I use different ones in different situations” is a kind of epistemology.
But it’s not a single algorithmic epistemology.
Also, some important details are swept under the rug, for example: How do you choose which epistemology is appropriate for which situation?
How do you do anything for whcih there isn’t an algorithm? You use experience, intuition, and other system 1 stuff.
This is such a cheap trick
It isn’t in all cases. There is a genuine problem in telling whether a claim of radically superior knowledge is genuine, You can;t round them all off to fraud.
And for others, it isn’t.
Theoretically, but there is no such algorithm.
But it’s not a single algorithmic epistemology.
How do you do anything for whcih there isn’t an algorithm? You use experience, intuition, and other system 1 stuff.
It isn’t in all cases. There is a genuine problem in telling whether a claim of radically superior knowledge is genuine, You can;t round them all off to fraud.