The “tree falling in a forest” question was posed before people knew that sound was caused by vibrations, or even that sound was a physical phenomenon. It wasn’t asking the same question it’s asking now. It may have been intended to ask, “Is sound a physical phenomenon?”
Confession: I always assumed (until EY’s article, believe it or not!) that the “tree falling in a forest …” philosophical dilemma was asking whether the tree makes vibrations.
That is, I thought the issue it’s trying to address is, “If nothing is around to verify the vibrations, how do you know the vibrations really happen in that circumstance? What keeps you from believing that whenever nobody’s around [nor e.g. any sensor], the vibrations just don’t happen?”
Over what period, exactly, was the question widely accepted to be making a point about the difference between vibrations and auditory experiences, as Eliezer seemed to imply is the common understanding?
I’ve encountered people asking the question with both meanings or sometimes a combination of meanings. Like many of these questions of a similar form, the questions are often so muddled as to be close to useless.
The “tree falling in a forest” question was posed before people knew that sound was caused by vibrations, or even that sound was a physical phenomenon.
I don’t think that’s correct. The notion that sound is vibrations in air dates back to at least Aristotle. See for example here
I don’t know, but Aristotle’s writings were not well-known in Europe from the 6th through the end of the 12th centuries. They were re-introduced via the Crusades.
By the way, the modern phrasing of the dilemma is, “If people are in a multiplayer game on Xbox Live, and everyone’s headset is muted, does a whiny 11-year-old still complain about lag?”
I don’t. Sorry, I thought the question was medieval, but now can’t remember why I thought that. Probably just from giving the question-asker the benefit of the doubt. If the original asker was Berkeley, then it was just a stupid question.
The “tree falling in a forest” question was posed before people knew that sound was caused by vibrations, or even that sound was a physical phenomenon. It wasn’t asking the same question it’s asking now. It may have been intended to ask, “Is sound a physical phenomenon?”
Confession: I always assumed (until EY’s article, believe it or not!) that the “tree falling in a forest …” philosophical dilemma was asking whether the tree makes vibrations.
That is, I thought the issue it’s trying to address is, “If nothing is around to verify the vibrations, how do you know the vibrations really happen in that circumstance? What keeps you from believing that whenever nobody’s around [nor e.g. any sensor], the vibrations just don’t happen?”
(In yet other words, a question about belief in the implied invisible, or inaudible as the case may be.)
Over what period, exactly, was the question widely accepted to be making a point about the difference between vibrations and auditory experiences, as Eliezer seemed to imply is the common understanding?
I’ve encountered people asking the question with both meanings or sometimes a combination of meanings. Like many of these questions of a similar form, the questions are often so muddled as to be close to useless.
I don’t think that’s correct. The notion that sound is vibrations in air dates back to at least Aristotle. See for example here
I don’t know, but Aristotle’s writings were not well-known in Europe from the 6th through the end of the 12th centuries. They were re-introduced via the Crusades.
By the way, the modern phrasing of the dilemma is, “If people are in a multiplayer game on Xbox Live, and everyone’s headset is muted, does a whiny 11-year-old still complain about lag?”
Do you have a citation for that? The earliest reference I see is Berkeley.
I don’t. Sorry, I thought the question was medieval, but now can’t remember why I thought that. Probably just from giving the question-asker the benefit of the doubt. If the original asker was Berkeley, then it was just a stupid question.